GUILLERMO AMANTE, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO MA. SISON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, AND ROSARIO MANZANERO, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner filed this petition for a
writ of certiorari for the purpose of annulling the order entered by
the Court of First Instance of Batangas on September 27, 1934, in
special proceeding No. 2986 of said court, setting aside another order
dated December 21, 1933.

In said special proceeding No. 2986, the herein petitioner filed
an application in accordance with the provisions of section 597 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended lately by Act No. 3370, praying for
the summary settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased
Leopoldo Laurel, the value of which did riot exceed P6,000, and the
approval, after hearing, of his claim for the sum of P850, of Pedro
Marile for P870, of Santiago Jazmin for P300, of Cosme Reyes for P200,
and of Juana Mabilangan for P130. On November 17, 1933, an order was
entered setting the hearing of the application for December 21st of the
same year and directing that said order together with the date of the
hearing be published, for the period fixed by law, in the newspaper Mamera
edited in Manila and with circulation in the Province of Batangas and
in the municipality of Sto. Tomas where the deceased was residing at
the time of his death. Hearing was held on the appointed date and,
after the presentation of evidence, the court entered the order dated
December 21, 1933, approving the aforesaid claims and directing Ruperto
Carpio, who was appointed special administrator, to sell the real
estate of the deceased and with its proceeds pay the claims in
question. The special administrator made the required publication and
on March 23, 1934, he sold the real estate to the herein petitioner who
was the highest bidder. On the same date he executed the corresponding
deed of sale which was approved by the court and registered in the
registry of deeds of the province. After payment of said claims, there
remained a surplus of 9250 which was deposited with the clerk of the
court. On January 5, 1934, the widow of the deceased filed a motion for
reconsideration praying the court to set aside the order of December
21, 1933, and suspend the proceedings of the case. The motion was
denied by an order dated February 7th of the same year. On April 16,
1934, the same widow filed another motion based, according to her
counsel, upon the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, praying that said order of December 21, 1933, be set aside,
that the sale of the property be annulled, and that she be permitted to
present evidence in support of her contention that the claims were
fraudulent On September 27,1934, the court entered the order which is
the subject of this petition whereby it set aside the order dated
December 21, 1933, and appointed the widow as regular administratrix,
after filing a bond for P1,000, and directed the parties to submit
within five (5) days the names of two persons to be appointed
commissioners on claims and appraisal.

The petitioner contends that the order dated September 27, 1934,
was entered by the court after loss of jurisdiction, for the reason
that the other order dated December 21, 1933, had already become final
and had been fully executed. The respondent judge did not comply with
the order requiring him to file an answer, but the other respondent
insists, in her answer, that the respondent judge acted within and did
not exceed his jurisdiction in issuing the order in question, on the
ground that the motion which gave rise thereto had been filed under the
provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it had
been shown that the court, in entering the order dated December 21,
1933, had acted without and in excess of jurisdiction, having failed to
give the personal notice required by section 597. It is clear that the
court based its order of September 27, 1934, on the provisions of
section 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in view of the birth of the
heir Leopoldo Laurel, jr.

Without discussing nor passing upon the legal grounds invoked by
counsel for the parties, it being considered unnecessary to do so, this
court holds that the petition cannot prosper, on the ground that the
respondent judge has not been given an opportunity to reexamine the
legal aspect of the case by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The necessity of filing a motion for reconsideration, before bringing
an action for certiorari and similar special remedies, is a rule
already established in this jurisdiction, and the same has been upheld
in the cases of Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (25 Phil., 245), and Uy Chu vs. Imperial and Uy Du (44 Phil., 27). In the first mentioned case this court said:

“We cannot leave the case without suggesting that
the applicant herein, before coming to this court, should, as the
better practice, have made the proper application to the Court of First
Instance for a dissolution or modification of the mandatory injunction,
and thereby given that court an opportunity, after full argument of
counsel and citation of authorities, to pass upon the question of his
power and jurisdiction and, even, the correctness and propriety of his
action, should power and jurisdiction be found by the court to exist.
Questions which Courts of First Instance are required by law to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and presented to this court
without first giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing on
such questions themselves. The most natural and proper thing to do,
when such court, in the judgment of one of the parties, has issued an
injunction erroneously, is immediately to call the attention of that
court to its supposed error and ask for its correction. The strongest
reasons of policy and courtesy, if not actual legal right itself,
require such procedure; and we discourage all attempts to come to this
court upon questions which a court below is entitled to decide without
first invoking its judgment thereon. There are special reasons for
following this course in cases where the court has acted ex parte.”

In the latter case the same rule was reiterated in the following terms:

“This rule is a wholesome one and has generally
been adhered to by this court except when special circumstances have
required immediate and more direct action. No such special
circumstances have been shown to exist in the present case, and the
additional allegation inserted in the amended petition that previously
to the issuance of the order complained of the attention of the court
was called to certain defects in the motion upon which the order was
based does not take the case out of the rule quoted. The error or
irregularity must be brought to the attention of the inferior court by
way of a motion for reconsideration.”

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

MALCOLM, J., concurs in the result on the merits.