SOO HONG CHUNG, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OP CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Appellant arrived in the City of Manila on
May 21, 1934, from Hongkong and demanded entrance as an American
citizen by virtue of birth. His right of entry was considered by a
board of special inquiry of the Port of Manila appointed by the Insular
Collector of Customs, and that board, notwithstanding his presentation
of a certificate from the Bureau of Immigration of Washington, D. C.,
dated June 3, 1920, issued under the provisions of Rule 16 of the
Chinese Regulations of that department, refused to admit him on the
ground that the testimony of applicant failed to show that he was the
party named in that certificate.

From the finding of the board of special inquiry appeal was
taken to the Collector of Customs who confirmed the action of the
board, and habeas corpus proceedings were had in the Court of First
Instance of Manila claiming that the action of the immigration
authorities was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.

After hearing, the Court of First Instance denied the application
for habeas corpus and remanded petitioner-appellant to the custody of
the immigration authorities. Two days thereafter, appellant filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for reconsideration
based on the merits of the case, which motion was subsequently denied.
Whereupon appellant noted his appeal, paid the docketing fees of this
court, and filed his brief.

The Acting Solicitor-General has moved that the appeal be dismissed
on the ground that appellant did not act within time as provided in
section 4 of Act No. 654, which Act authorizes appeals in habeas corpus
proceedings. Section 4 reads as follows:

“SEC. 4. The appeal provided for in this Act shall
be perfected by filing with the clerk of the Court of First Instance
wherein the decision was rendered, or with the judge of the Supreme
Court or a Court of First Instance who granted the writ and made the
order, within twenty-four hours after the order has been made granting
or refusing the discharge of the prisoner, a statement that the person
so appealing is dissatisfied with the action of the court or judge in
respect to the order so made and appeals therefrom to the Supreme
Court. The clerk, or judge, as the case may be, shall thereupon
immediately transmit to the Supreme Court the original petition for the
writ of habeas corpus, the writ of habeas corpus, the return thereon, a
statement of all the proceedings therein, and the original order
discharging or remanding the prisoner, together with all the papers
used upon the hearing, and the orders in regard to appeal and the
statement of appeal. The correctness of the papers shall be certified
to by the clerk or judge transmitting them.”

Appellant objects to the dismissal and claims that the
Solicitor-General is estopped from raising this question at this stage
of the proceedings and relies on the decisions of this court in the
cases of Luengo & Martinez vs. Herrero (17 Phil., 29), and Slade Perkins vs.
Perkins (57 Phil., 223). Examining those two cases, it is at once seen
that the facts are very different from the instant case. In the Luengo
case the question was not presented for consideration until upon the
hearing of the case on its merits, and the question involved was
whether the “presentation of a bill of exceptions for approval, in due
time, is equivalent to or involves an announcement of an intention to
appeal.”

Likewise in the Perkins case the question was not presented until
appellee’s brief was filed or, in other words, until the case was ready
for submission to this court on its merits. Likewise in that case, the
fundamental question was whether the order appealed from was of such a
nature that an appeal would lie at that time or could be had only at a
future date.

Appellant seeks a special remedy and asks us to review and reverse
the decisions of the tribunal created by law to hear and determine the
facts of the case and the action of the Court of First Instance who
held that those proceedings were not arbitrary and illegal. He claims
the right to the benefits of a legislative act without complying with
the conditions which the statute itself prescribes, viz.: “*
* * by filing * * * within twenty-four hours after the order has been
made * * * refusing the discharge of the prisoner, a statement that the
person so appealing is dissatisfied with the action of the court * * *
in respect to the order so made and appeals therefrom to the Supreme
Court.”

This language is clear and needs little interpretation.

We assume that the statute contemplates that the period of time
therein prescribed runs from date of notice of the entry of the order.
It may also be noted that the statute in question does not necessarily
contemplate a motion for reconsideration before the right of appeal
accrues. However, should a motion for reconsideration be filed within
the statutory period, it is assumed that the trial court or judge would
have the right to consider such motion and that petitioner would have
his right to appeal after denial of said motion, provided he made the
proper representations within twenty-four hours after receipt of notice
of the denial of the motion.

There can be no discussion over the fact that the Legislature may
fix the time within which an appeal may be perfected. It has done so in
all cases, and while various periods of time for different kinds of
cases may be so fixed, the question whether the period should be a
short one or more extended is a legislative, not a judicial, question.

In this case, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
had become final before petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration. His right to appeal to this court from that decision
had already been extinguished by the lapse of time. It could not be
revived by a belated motion for reconsideration.

The motion of the Acting Solicitor-General for the dismissal of the
appeal must therefore be sustained. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.