IN RE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GREGORIO DE LA CRUZ. IGNACIO DE LA CRUZ, ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE, VS. IGMIDIO DE LA CRUZ AND PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.

In this intestate proceeding the administrator filed the following petition:

“Comparece el administrador en el intestado arriba titulado, por
medio de su abogado que subscribe, y al Hon. Juzgado respetuosamente
manifiesta:

“1. Que por la presente solicita de este Hon.
Juzgado una autorizacion para que el administrador pueda vender en
venta privada por un precio no menor de P600 las dos parcelas de
terreno pertenecientes al intestado, cuyas descripciones son las
siguientes:

“Primera parcela.—Un solar que mide
1,056 metros cuadrados, situado en el Barrio de Bambang, Municipio de
Bocaue, Bulacan. Linda por el norte con un camino; al este con Lorenzo
de los Santos; al sur, con el rio; al oeste, con Gervasia Celestino;
avalorado en P160, segun Tax No. 12762.

“Segunda parcela.—Un
solar que mide 1,599 metros cuadrados, situado en el Barrio de Bambang,
Municipio de Bocaue, Bulacan. Linda al norte con Josef a Dionisio; al
este, con Josef a Dionisio, Pedro Valero y Jose de la Cruz; al sur, con
camino municipal y al oeste, con Hilario Celestino y Josef a Dionisio;
avalorado en P240, segun Tax No. 6614.

“2. Que esta solicitud se funda sobre los motivos siguientes:

“(a) Que en la actualidad la administration del presente Intestado no tiene fondos;

“(b) Que los gastos de la presente administracion hasta la fecha ascienden a la suraa de P343.10;

“(c)
Que este Hon. Juzgado ha ordenado al administrador a que pagara la suma
de P48 como honorarios de los Comisionados de Avaluo y Reclamaciones en
este Intestado, pero que el Administrador no ha podido hasta la fecha
cumplir con dicha orden por falta de fondos;

“(d)
Que el administrador ha sido recientemente autorizado a presentar
acetones correspondientes para el cobro de creditos a favor del
Intestado cuyo valor asciende a la suma total de P1,220; el
administrador tendra que presentar tres demandas contra los tres
deudores y para este fin necesitara la suma de P36.80 para el registro
de las tres demandas y para los honorarios del Sheriff por
emplazamientos, mas la suma de unos cien pesos para el pago parcial de
los gastos de viaje y honorarios del abogado que va atender dichos
asuntos.

” {e) Que el administrador desea pagar siquiera
parte de jlos gastos de viaje y parte de los honorarios del abogado del
administrador de este Intestado, por sus servicios que ha prestado
hasta la fecha.

“3. Que la suma de P600 como precio de venta
de las dos parcelas de terreno arriba descritas es muy ventajosa para
la administracion y es la mayor oferta que ha recibido el
administrador, teniendo en cuenta la presente depresion economica.

“4. Que es necesario vender las dos parcelas de terreno arriba
descritas porque nadie quiere comprarlas a menos que se vendan
juntamente, aparte del hecho de que el producto de venta de una de las
referidas parcelas de terreno no sera suficiente para.cubrir los gastos
de la administracion.

“5. Que sera ventajoso vender los referidos terrenos en venta privada, porque se podria obtener mejor precio.

‘Tor lo tanto, el administrador suplica al Hon. Juzgado se sirva
autorizar al administrador para que pueda vender las dos parcelas de
terreno arriba descritas en la forma arriba mencionada por el precio no
menor de P600, entendiendose que la escritura que se otorgue para dicho
fin sea antes sometida para la aprobacion del Hon. Juzgado.

“Bocaue, para Malolos, Bulacan, hoy 17 de enero de 1933.”

On February 18, 1933, the lower court authorized the sale of the
two parcels of land, described in the above petition, in an order which
reads as follows:

“Tratase de una mocion registrada por la representation del administrador Ignacio de la Cruz el dia 20 de enero de 1933.

“Pidese en dicha mocion que este Juzgado autorice al Administrador
mencionado a vender los dos solares o parcelas que se describen en la
mocion, avaluados en P160 y P240, respectivamente, para los efectos del
pago del impuesto territorial.

“Despues de considerar el
Juzgado las razones por las que se pide la mencionada autorizacion para
vender las dos citadas parcelas, y despues de considerar igualmente las
razones que se alegan en el escrito de oposicion contra la citada
solicitud de autorizacion para vender, este Juzgado es de opinion que
el administrador Ignacio de la Cruz ha ciertamente menester de fondos
para poder cumplir debidamente con sus deberes de administrador y para
interponer las acciones y demandas que fuesen necesarias para el
interes de este intestado. El Juzgado esta igualraente convencido por
las alegaciones de la representacion del administrador que este no
dispone de ningun fondo que puede ser gastado en el cumplimiento de sus
deberes.

“Por las consideraciones expuestas, el Juzgado, de
acuerdo con la solicitud, concede autorizacion al administrador Ignacio
de la Cruz para vender las dos parcelas que se describen en la
solicitud a un precio total que no sea menor de P600, pudiendo, a este
efecto, otorgar la escritura o escrituras correspondientes, las cuales,
sin embargo, no surtiran sus efectos hasta que sean debidamente
aprobadas por este Juzgado.”

On March 11, 1933, the administrator executed a deed of sale in
favor of Tomas de Guzman and Benita de la Roma in which it appears that
said parcels were sold at private sale for the sum of P600.

Later Igmidio de la Cruz and Pedro de la Cruz, legitimate sons of Gregorio de la Cruz, filed a petition in which they prayed:

“Por tanto, respetuosamente, piden se declaren
nulos y se or dene se dejen sin efecto el auto de febrero 18, 1933,
jautorizando dicha venta, asi como la escritura de venta otorgada en
marzo 11, 1933, por el administrador judicial a favor de los conyuges
Tomas de Guzman y Benita de la Roma.”

This prayer is based upon the following allegations:

“Que al obtenerse y concederse dicha autorizacion
para vender, los herederos aqui comparecientes no han prestado
consentimiento por escrito, pues el Administrador Judicial ni siquiera
ha intentado pedir dicho consentimiento, por cuyo motivo tanto la
escritura de venta como la autorizacion para otorgarla son ilegales y
nulas per se, de acuerdo con los preceptos imperativos de los articulos
714 y 718 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil. * * *

“Que en la obtencion de dicha autorizacion para vender se han quebrantado los requisites legales siguientes:

“(a) Porque no se ha obtenido el consentimiento por escrito de todos los herederos.

” (b) Porque no se ha hecho constar en la solicitud el valor de los bienes muebles de este Intestado.

“(c) Porque el Juzgado no ha senalado dia ni lugar para la vista o audiencia de la solicitud.

“(d) Porque el Juzgado no ha requerido que se sirviese el aviso requerido por la ley para la vista de dicha solicitud.

“(e)
Porque no ha cumplido el requerimiento de la ley de que el aviso para
la vista de la solicitud se publicara por tres semanas sucesivas en un
periodico designado por el Juzgado, ni se ha servido a los herederos
aqui comparecientes aviso personal.

“(f) Porque no
se ha determinado si procede exigirse o no que el Administrador
prestara una fianza adicional, para proteger los derechos de los
herederos contra los danos y perjuicios que pudiese causarles la venta
de dichas dos parcelas de terreno, especialmente por haberse fijado
solamente la suma de P600, cuando el verdadero valor de dichas parcelas
de terreno es mucho mayor, y cuando, en igualdad de condiciones, debe
concederse preferencia a los herederos para comprar dichas parcelas de
terreno, y los comparecientes estan dispuestos a ejercer dicho derecho
de preferencia.

” (g) Porque en el auto del Juzgado
concediendo autorizaci6n para vender dichas parcelas de terreno no se
ha hecho constar, que se han cumplido todos los requisites prescritos
en las cuatro primeras subdivisiones del articulo 722 del C6digo de
Procedimiento Civil. * * *

“Que a causa de las ilegalidades arriba mencionadas, tanto el auto autorizando la venta como la venta misma son nulos ab initio.”

The sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, copied in that petition read as follows:

“SEC. 714. Realty may be sold or encumbered though personality not exhausted.—When
the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts
and charges of administration without injuring the business of those
interested in the estate, or otherwise prejudicing their interests, and
where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the
payment of such debts and charges, the court, on application of the
executor or administrator with the consent and approbation, in writing,
of the heirs, devisees, and legatees, residing in the Philippine
Islands, may grant a license to the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber for that purpose real, in lieu of
personal estate, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgaging or
encumbrance of real estate would be beneficial to the persons
interested and will not defeat any devise of land; in which case the
assent of the devisee shall be required.”

“SEC. 718. Estate may be sold when beneficial to heirs.—When
it appears to the court that it will be beneficial to the heirs,
devisees, or legatees, and those interested in an estate, by reason of
their residing out of the Islands or otherwise, that a part or the
whole of the personal estate, or a part or the whole of the real
estate, or both the real and personal estate, should be sold, the court
may, upon application of the administrator or executor, with the
consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees, and
legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, grant license to
sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, legacies, or charges of administration; but such license shall
not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case
of such sale, the proceeds shall be decreed and assigned to the persons
entitled to the estate, and in the same proportions.”

“SEC. 722. Regulations for license to sell.—When
an executor or administrator considers it necessary or beneficial to
sell real or personal estate, in cases provided by law, he may make
application to the court having jurisdiction of the estate, and such
court may grant license, when it appears necessary or beneficial, under
the following regulations :

“1. The executor or
administrator shall present to the court his petition in writing,
setting forth the amount of debts due from the deceased, with charges
of administration, the value of the personal estate, situation of the
estate to be sold, or such other facts as show that the sale is
necessary or beneficial;

“2. In cases where the consent of
heirs, devisees, and legatees is required, the executor or
administrator shall produce to the court their assent in writing, and
signed by such heirs, devisees, or legatees, or by the guardians of
such as are minors or otherwise under guardianship;

“3. The
court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing for deciding
upon such application, and shall require notice to be given of such
application, and of the time and place of hearing to the persons
interested; which notice shall state the nature of the application and
the reason for the same, the time and place of hearing, and shall be
published three weeks successively previous thereto, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the neighborhood of those interested, to be
designated by the court; and the court may order such further notice as
is adjudged proper. If personal notice is given to the persons
interested, the public notice may be dispensed with;

“4. If
the court requires it, the executor or administrator, before license is
granted, shall give a new bond, in such sum and with such sureties as
the court directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator
shall account for the proceeds of such sale;

“5. If the
proof produced satisfies the court and if the regulations in the first
four subdivisions of this section are complied with, the court may, by
decree, authorize the executor or administrator to sell such part of
the estate as is deemed necessary, either at public or private sale, as
would be most beneficial to all parties concerned, and furnish the
executor or administrator with certified copy of such license or order
of sale;

“6. If the order is to sell the estate at auction,
the court shall designate the mode of giving notice of the time and
place of the sale, which shall be stated in the copy or certificate of
such order furnished the executor or administrator;

“7. The
record of the order of sale in the court, and the copy or the
certificate of such order furnished the executor or administrator,
shall state that such of the requisites prescribed in the first four
subdivisions of this section, as are required in the case, are complied
with; and such certificate or copy of the order of sale shall be
recorded in the office of the Registrar of Land Titles of the province
in which the lands thus to be sold are situated.”

The lower court denied the petition of Igmidio and Pedro de la Cruz in an order, dated December 6, 1933, which reads:

“Se trata de una moci6n de Igmidio y Pedro de la
Cruz de fecha 5 de mayo de 1933 en la que se pide se deje sin efecto el
auto de este Juzgado de fecha 18 de febrero de 1933 e igualmente se
declare nula la escritura de venta de fecha 11 de marzo de 1933
otorgada por el Administrador. Contra esta moci6n de los referidos
Igmidio y Pedro de la Cruz, la representacidn del administrador se
opone sobre los fundamentos alegados en su escrito de fecha 1.° de
febrero de 1933.

“Examinados detenidamente los autos de la
presente causa se desprende que la solicitud de venta del administrador
al tiempo de su presentacion llevaba la conformidad de los idos
herederos Modesta y Silvino de la Cruz, habiendo sido notificados por
correo certificado los otros dos herederos Igmidio y Pedro de la Cruz,
hoy opositores, representados estos por su abogado Sr. M. A. Ferrer, de
acuerdo con el articulo 714 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil tal como
esta enmendado por la Ley No. 3882; que los mismos en tiempo oportuno
presentaron su objecion a la solicitud de venta, pero el Juzgado no
obstante dicha oposicion concedio autorizacion al administrador por ser
beneficiosa a los intereses del presente Intestado.

“Por los
hechos arriba relatados, el Juzgado no encuentra terminos habiles para
dejar sin efecto el auto de fecha 18 de febrero de 1933, y anular la
escritura de venta otorgada por el administrador Ignacio de la Cruz en
virtud de la autorizacion concedida a este. Se deniega, por tanto, la
mocion de Igmidio y Pedro de la Cruz de fecha 5 de mayo de 1933.”

An exception was noted to the above orders, dated February 18 and
December 6, 1933. A record of appeal was filed which was approved by
the lower court. The only error assigned by the appellants reads as
follows:

“El Juzgado errd al haber autorizado, con
infraccion de preceptos expresos del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, la
venta de dos parcelas de terreno de este intestado, y al no haber
revocado dicho auto y la venta otorgada en virtud del mismo.”

The following paragraph of their brief, based upon the facts
alleged in their petition, clearly indicates that the appellants
question the jurisdiction of the lower court to order the sale of real
estate without complying with the provisions of the section of the Code
of Civil Procedure copied above:

“El examen de los autos del intestado demostrara
que no se han cumplido los requerimientos esenciales exigidos por la
ley, antes de que pueda autorizarse la venta de inmuebles de un
intestado.”

The appellants overlooked the fact that section 714, as amended by Act No. 3882, now reads as follows:

“SEC. 714. Realty may be sold or encumbered.—When
there is no personal estate of the deceased or when, though there be
such, its sale would redound to the detriment of the interests of the
participants in the estate and the deceased has left no testamentary
disposition for the payment of his debts and charges of administration,
the court, on application of the executor or administrator, and on
written notice to the heirs, devisees, and other persons interested,
may grant him a license to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber for
that purpose real estate, if it clearly appears that such sale,
mortgaging or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested
and will not defeat any devise of land; in which case the assent of the
devisee shall be required.” In view of this amendment the court may
grant a license to an executor or administrator to sell real property,
in lieu of personal estate, for the payment of debts and charges of an
estate without the consent of the heirs, “if it clearly appears that
such a sale would be beneficial to the persons interested and will not
defeat any devise of land; in which case the assent of the devisee
shall be required.”

The record shows that the date of the hearing of the petition was
known to appellants as they appeared and filed an opposition in writing
and that copies of the petition were sent to them. As to their
contention that the notice was not published in a newspaper three weeks
successively previous to the hearing, paragraph 3 of section 722, Code
of Civil Procedure, also provides that if personal notice is given to
the persons interested, the public notice may be dispensed with. As to
requiring the administrator to give a new bond before license to sell
is granted, paragraph 4 of the same section provides: “If the court
requires it, the executor or administrator, before license is granted,
shall give a new bond,* * *”. It is evident that the court may use its
discretion and may or may not require a new bond.

Therefore, none of the above contentions of the appellants has any merit whatsoever.

Section 718 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the facts in this case.

Section 714, as amended, quoted above, provides, among other things, that when there is no personal estate of the deceased or when, though there be such,
its sale would redound to the detriment of the interests of the
participants in the estate * * * the court on application of the
executor or administrator * * * may grant him a license to sell * * *
real estate for the purposes mentioned in that section.

Section 722, quoted above, provides, among other things, that when
an executor or administrator considers it necessary or beneficial to
sell real or personal estate * * * he may make application to the court
having jurisdiction of the estate, and such court may grant license * *
* under the following regulations:

“1. The executor or administrator shall present to
the court his petition in writing, setting forth the amount of debts
due from the deceased, with charges of administration, the value of the personal estate, situation of the estate to be sold, or such other facts as show that the sale is necessary or beneficial;”

The petition of the administrator in this case does not set forth
the value of the personal estate nor does it allege that there is no
personal estate nor that if there be such its sale would redound to the
detriment of the interests of the participants therein.

This court held in the case of Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs.
Ramos (43 Phil., 704), before section 714 was amended, that the
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased person is without
authority to sell real estate, when there are no debts or obligations
existing against the estate, without the consent and approbation, in
writing, of the heirs who are interested in the estate to be sold.

In the case of the Estate of Gamboa Carpizo vs. Floranza (12 Phil.,
191), this court held that an order made by a Court of First Instance,
in probate proceedings, for the sale of real property belonging to the
estate of a deceased person, is void when no notice of the hearing upon
the petition for such sale is given, as required by section 722 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

It will be noted that when the first case, cited above, was decided
the production of the consent in writing of the heirs was required by
regulation No. 2 of section 722.

Notice by publication or personal notice to the persons interested is still required by regulation No. 3 of section 722.

Surely the requirement in regulation No. 1 of section 722 as to the
setting forth of the value of the personal estate of the deceased is
just as important as the others mentioned in the case cited above. This
conclusion is inevitable if regulation No. 7 of section 722 means
anything. This regulation provides that “The record of the order of
sale in the court, and the copy or the certificate of such order
furnished the executor or administrator, shall state that such of
the requisites prescribed in the first four subdivisions of this
section, as are required in the case, are complied with; * * *.”

The authorities are practically unanimous in holding that one of
the requisite averments of petitions for the sale of a decedent’s lands
is that there is not sufficient personality to cover the amount of the
debts or charges of administration.

“In order to confer jurisdiction the petition must
disclose the jurisdictional facts. Otherwise the purchaser may acquire
no legal title, though he may be recognized as having an equitable
title enforceable against the heirs who receive their share of the
purchase money.* * *

“It is generally considered that two
of the requisite averments of petitions for the sale of a decedent’s
lands are that there are unpaid debts of the decedent and that there is
not sufficient personalty to pay the amount of such debts.” (11 R. C.
L., 326, 327.)

“* * *The court’s jurisdiction to order the
sale does not inhere in its general authority over the administration
of the estate, but is invoked by the petition for the sale. The power
of the court in the premises does not arise till a petition is
presented by the administrator or other proper party. When a proper
petition is filed, then jurisdiction over the particular matter is
acquired. It seems that the jurisdiction of the court essentially depends on the averments of the petition and not on the truth or falsity of such averments. * * *” (11 R. C. L., 326.)

“In order to confer jurisdiction the petition must disclose the
jurisdictional facts. Otherwise the purchaser may acquire no legal
title, though he may be recognized as having an equitable title
enforceable against the heirs who receive their share of the purchase
money. The reason for this rule appears to lie in the fact that the
necessity for a sale is not a matter for the executor or administrator
to determine, but is a conclusion which the court must draw from the
facts stSted, and the petition therefore must furnish the materials for
its judgment. The essential averments necessarily vary in the several
states. As an illustration of a proper petition it may be stated that a
petition was upheld where it alleged that the estate was owing debts to
a certain amount, that the personal property of such estate was insufficient to pay such debts, and
that the will of the decedent gave no power to sell his lands for the
payment of his debts. As a practical matter the filing of a petition
containing the information needed for the reaching of a proper decision
of the court as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed sale is
conclusive to the orderly conduct of the administration and may avoid
expensive blunders.” (11 R. C. L., 326, 327.)

In view of the provisions of our Code of Civil Procedure, the
holdings of this court in the two cases cited above and the
jurisprudence copied from Ruling Case Law, it is held that the averment
as to the value of the personal estate of a deceased person, in a
probate proceeding, is an essential and necessary requisite to a
petition for the sale of real estate and that a Court of First Instance
acquires no jurisdiction to order such sale if that averment does not
appear in the petition; that such an order is void and that a sale of
real estate by virtue of such an order is null and void.

The orders of the lower court, dated February 18, 1933, and
December 6, 1933, are set aside and the sale of the two parcels of land
made by virtue of said orders is declared null and void.

Without costs. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

 

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MALCOLM and VILLA-REAL, JJ., dissenting:

It is customary for appellate courts to decide cases on the points
specifically relied upon by the parties. A reading of the three scanty
pages which make up the brief of the appellants will disclose that the
word “jurisdiction” nowhere appears in that brief. A reading of the
brief of the appellee will disclose that counsel for the appellee was
unadvised that the question of jurisdiction was at issue, and so
contented “himself with answering the argument of the appellants
addressed to section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

But this is not all. While the bill of exceptions is silent as to
the exact ground for opposition to the confirmation of the sale of the
realty, even now no showing is made that there is any personality
available for sale. It is a general rule that when a court has acted on
a petition and ordered a sale, the sale will be sustained in spite of
informalities or statements merely defective. It has often been held
that jurisdiction will be presumed from the fact that the court made
the order.

We are opposed to making out case? for attorneys which they do not
make out themselves. We are opposed to sanctioning technicalities. We
are opposed to authorizing the eating up of small estates of deceased
persons, like the one before us, in useless litigation. By the time the
courts get through with this little estate, there will be no estate to
be distributed.

For these reasons we vote for the affirmance of the orders of the trial court.

 

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ABAD SANTOS, J.,

I am constrained to express my disagreement with the decision of
the majority of the court, because I believe that it sets a dangerous
precedent. To realize fully the importance of the principle involved in
this case, it is necessary to advert to certain salient facts. In the
first place, it should be noted that the petition for the sale of the
real estate was filed by the administrator on January 17, 1933. As
stated in the majority opinion, “The record shows that the date of the
hearing of the petition was known to appellants as they appeared and
filed an opposition in writing and that copies’ of the petition were
sent to them.” After considering the petition and the objections made
thereto by the appellants, the lower court, on February 18, 1933,
issued an order authorizing the sale. Pursuant to this order the
property was sold to the spouses Tomas de Guzman and Benita de la Roma
on March 11, 1933, which sale was duly approved by the court.

Instead of appealing from the order of the lower court of February
18, 1933, authorizing the sale, the appellants did nothing until long
after the order had become final and the sale made thereunder had been
approved by the court, that is to say, until May 5, 1933, when they
filed a petition praying that both said order and the deed of sale
executed by the administrator on March 11, 1933, be declared null and
of no effect. Appellants made it appear in their petition that they
were ignorant of the petition for the sale of the real estate filed by
the administrator on January 17, 1933, but, as already indicated, the
majority of the court correctly found that this representation made
under oath by the appellants is completely belied by the record.
Notwithstanding this fact, however, and also notwithstanding the fact
that, after due consideration, the petition to annul the sale was
denied by the lower court on December 6, 1933, this court, by the
decision of the majority, now sets aside the orders of the lower court
dated February 18, 1933 and December 6, 1933, and declares null and
void the sale on the ground that “the averment as to the value of the
personal estate of a deceased person, in a probate proceeding, is an
essential and necessary requisite to a petition for the sale of real
estate and that a Court of First Instance acquires no jurisdiction to
order such sale if that averment does not appear in the petition; that
such an order is void and that a sale of real estate by virtue of such
an order is null and void.”

Under section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, the
court may, upon application by the executor or administrator, authorize
the sale of the real estate, even if there is personal estate, if it
clearly appears that such sale would be beneficial to the persons
interested and will not defeat any devise of land. It is thus seen that
the jurisdictional fact which is the ground-work of the proceeding and
which, when made to appear to the court by an appropriate petition, is
sufficient to set in motion the exercise of jurisdiction, is not the
existence or value of the personal estate, but the fact that the sale
of the real estate would be beneficial to the persons interested.

The general rule is that, where the court has jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter of the action, its judgment is not open
to attack or impeachment by parties or privies in any collateral action
or proceeding. In the instant case, the petition to have declared null
and void both the order of the lower court of February 18, 1933, and
the sale made thereunder, was tantamount to a collateral attack upon a
judgment or decree, since it was filed long after the order sought to
be annulled became final, and the sale made in accordance therewith was
approved by the court. As stated by the court in King vs. Kent’s Heirs
(29 Ala., 542): ” * * * When the petition is directly assailed, the
question is one of pleading, and the internments are made against the
pleader; but a different rule prevails, when the proceedings have gone
into a decree, under which rights of property have attached. Then every
reasonable intendment in the construction of the language of the
petition, must be in favor of the validity of the paper. Under a
different rule, designing persons might withhold objections for
amendable defects, until after the proceedings had terminated, and
rights had attached, and then vitiate the whole proceeding; thus
converting a court of justice into a snare.”

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the order appealed from should be affirmed