GREGORIO PASCUA ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC, AND HILARIA AGUILAR ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This
is an original petition for mandamus tiled by Gregorio Pascua and
others against Buenaventura Ocampo, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac,
Hilaria Aguilar and others, to compel the respondent judge, on the
alleged grounds stated therein, to approve and certify the bill of
exceptions, copy of which is attached thereto.

The following pertinent facts are necessary for the resolution of the questions raised in this appeal:

On April 29, 1933, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered
judgment in civil case No, 3261 of the said court, wherein Gregorio
Pascua and others were the plaintiffs and Hilaria Aguilar and others
were the defendants. The said plaintiffs received notice of said
judgment on May 8, 1933. Inasmuch as the judgment in question was
adverse to them, on May 26, 1933, that is, eighteen days after they
received notice of the decision, they filed a motion to no other effect
than that the trial court reconsider its appreciation of the evidence
presented and its conclusions of fact and, that it modify the judgment
rendered therein. On July 13, 1933, the court denied the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration. On July 20, 1933, that is, seventy-three
days after they had been notified of the decision, the plaintiffs
therein and petitioners herein filed a motion for a new trial based on
the alleged grounds that the evidence presented by the defendants
during the trial was not sufficient to justify the decision and that
the decision in question was contrary to the law. The said motion was
denied by the court by an order dated July 22, 1933, and upon being
notified of the order in question on July 25, 1933, the aforesaid
plaintiffs filed their exception and notice of intention to appeal
therefrom on July 29, 1933. On August 5, 1933, they filed their bill of
exceptions which was rejected by the respondent court by an order dated
September 21, 1933, on the ground that the motion for new trial was
filed after the thirty-day period fixed by section 145 of Act No. 190,
as amended by Act No. 2347.

Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by section 27 of Act No. 2347, reads as follows:

“Sec. 145. New trial.—Within
thirty days after notice of a decision rendered by a Court of First
Instance, the judge thereof may at the petition of the party aggrieved,
and after due notice to the adverse party, set aside the judgment and
grant a new trial, provided the petition is based on any of the
following causes materially affecting the legitimate rights of the
petitioner:

“1. Accident or surprise which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the
party applying has probably been impaired in his rights.

“2.
Newly discovered evidence, material to the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.

“3. Because the
judge has become satisfied that excessive damages have been awarded, or
that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision, or that it
is against the law.”

Section 146 of the same Code prescribes the method of procedure in applications for a new trial as follows:

“SEC. 146. Method of procedure in applications for new trial.—The
application shall be made by motion in writing, stating the ground
therefor, of which the adverse party shall have such reasonable notice
as the judge may direct. When the application is made for a cause
mentioned in the first or second subdivisions of the last section, it
must be made upon affidavits, and counter affidavits from the adverse
party may likewise be received.

“The overruling or granting
of a motion for a new trial shall not be a ground of exception, but
shall be deemed to have been an act of discretion on the part of the
judge, within the meaning of the second sentence of section one hundred
and forty-one. If, however, the motion for a new trial was made on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision, an
exception may be taken to the order overruling such motion, and such
exception may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as in other cases.”

It will be seen from the legal provisions cited above that in order to
obtain annulment of a judgment and the holding of a new trial, it is
necessary that, within thirty days after notice of the decision in
question is received by the petitioner, a petition to that effect be
presented, based on any of the grounds enumerated in section 145 of the
Code of Civil Procedure aforecited, and made in the form and under the
conditions prescribed by section 146 of the same Code, also cited
above. Any other petition, which does not comply with the
aforementioned legal requisites, is not a motion for a new trial within
the meaning of the law. A motion for a new trial, which complies with
the requisites prescribed by the law, is the only one whose
presentation within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days
suspends the running of the said period. The motion for
reconsideration, filed by the plaintiffs with the trial court eighteen
days after receipt of notice of the decision, did not comply with the
requisites prescribed by the law and, therefore, was not a motion for a
new trial in the legal sense and did not suspend the running of the
period of thirty (30) days fixed by the law. The real motion for a new
trial, which complied with all the formalities of the law, was filed by
the plaintiffs seventy-three (73) days after receipt of notice of the
decision, that is, after the thirty-day period fixed by the law,
inasmuch as the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs
within the said thirty-day period did not suspend the running thereof
on the aforesaid ground that it was not a motion for a new trial in the
legal sense.

The doctrine laid down in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs.
Legarda (48 Phil., 507), is not applicable in this case on the ground
that the question raised in that case referred to two motions filed
within the thirty-day period from the date the petitioner received
notice of the decision, deducting therefrom the period during which the
court had the first motion under advisement. The first motion was based
upon newly discovered evidence and the second upon the grounds that the
judgment was not supported by the evidence submitted during the trial
and that it was contrary to the law. These are the grounds enumerated
in the aforecited section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
court held that the law does not limit to only one, the petition for a
new trial which may be presented upon the said grounds but that more
than one may be presented as long as it is done within the period of
thirty days from the date the petitioner is notified of the decision,
deducting therefrom the period during which the judge has each motion
under advisement.

In view of the foregoing considerations,
we are of the opinion and so hold that a motion for reconsideration,
which is not based upon any of the grounds enumerated in section 145 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2347, and wherein
the annulment of the judgment and the holding of a new trial are not
prayed for, is not a motion for a new trial within the meaning of the
law, and the filing thereof does not suspend the running of the period
of thirty days stated in the section aforecited.

Wherefore
the petition for a writ of mandamus filed herein is hereby denied, with
the costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.