GUI PENG HUI, IN BEHALF OF GUI ENG, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE ACTING INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

This
is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, with a view to set aside an order of the
immigration authorities denying Gui Eng, a Chinese citizen, the right
to enter this country as a minor son of the petitioner-appellee, a
resident Chinese merchant.

It is well-settled that minor
children of resident Chinese merchants are entitled to admission into
this country, and the principal question raised by this appeal is
whether Gui Eng is a minor.

The evidence shows that Gui Eng
arrived in this country on April 22, 1930; and that on December 2,
1931, upon the petition of the immigration authorities, three
quarantine officers declared that, in their opinion, said immigrant was
more than 21 years of age. At the hearing of the case on October 1,
1931, before a board of special inquiry, the immigrant testified that
he was 22 years old when he arrived here, and that his younger brothers
and sisters were 21, 19, 17, 15, 12, 9 and 5 years old, respectively.
His father corroborated his testimony, and added that he married Gui
Eng’s mother 24 years ago. The evidence further shows that, when Gui
Eng was denied admission, his counsel moved for a reexamination of his
age, and, when a reexamination was made by Dr. E. R. Pelican, one of
the officers who examined him previously, he was certified to be under
21 years of age when he arrived in this country. On the other hand, the
board of special inquiry, which personally examined the immigrant, was
of the opinion that, taking into consideration his physical
development, his fully developed muscles, the noticeable wrinkles on
his forehead, and his rough and hardened skin, he was more than 25
years old. This description is important because, according to Gui Eng,
he was a mere student while in China and that he came here for the
purpose of continuing his studies.

At the hearing of this
petition in the court below, no evidence was presented other than that
introduced at the hearing before the immigration authorities. It would
appear, therefore, that the only evidence relied upon by the
petitioner-appellee on the question of Gui Eng’s age, was the last
opinion given by Dr. Pelican.

In Dy Keng vs.
Collector of Customs (40 Phil., 118), this court has had occasion to
pass upon the probative force of an opinion similar to that given by
Dr. Pelican. In that case, the principal issue was whether or not Dy
Keng was a minor. When the matter was referred to the quarantine
officers, they declared that, in their opinion, Dy Keng was close to
and probably over 21 years of age. This court declined to give credit
to said opinion on the ground that it contained no particular fact or
facts on which the appellate court could judge whether or not said
officers were misled. In the case before us, the opinion of Dr. Pelican
is contained in the following indorsement:

“Respectfully
returned to the Insular Collector of Customs, with the statement that
it is the opinion of the undersigned that this immigrant was under 21
years of age on April 22, 1930.”

The other question raised here relates to the identity of Gui Eng as a son of the herein petitioner-appellee.

While
in ordinary cases it is the peculiar province of the trial court to
pass upon the credibility of witnesses, in immigration cases the rule
is different. This is because in the latter cases seldom, if ever, any
evidence is introduced other than that presented at the hearing of the
case before the administrative authorities. In Loo Sing vs.
Collector of Customs (27 Phil., 491), this court held that the courts
will not modify the decision of the immigration authorities when their
conclusions are based upon some evidence. In Leong Guen vs.
Collector of Customs (31 Phil, 417), this court also held that the
conclusion of a board of special inquiry that a Chinese alien
attempting to enter the Islands was not a minor, will not be changed or
modified if there exists some evidence to support the conclusion.
Again, in Sing Jing Talento vs. Collector of Customs (32 Phil.,
82), this court held: “The customs authorities, in passing upon the
question of the right of Chinese aliens to enter territory of the
United States, act more or less as a jury in ascertaining what are the
facts. They have an opportunity to hear, to see and to weigh the
testimony of the witnesses and to judge of their credibility. Customs
authorities are under no obligation to believe the declarations of
witnesses when their manner and conduct is such as to cause suspicion
or disbelief in their veracity, even though such declarations are not
disproved by other witnesses or other proof. The mere fact that the
immigration officers do not accept certain sworn statements is not of
itself sufficient to justify the courts in taking jurisdiction of the
cause upon the ground that there exists an abuse of authority.” This
doctrine was followed in Tan Puy vs. Collector of Customs (36 Phil., 900); and Lim Cheng vs.
Collector of Customs (42 Phil., 876). It is only where there is no
proof whatever to sustain the order, or where no fair hearing was
granted, or where there was an arbitrary disregard of the conceded or
undisputed facts, that a writ of habeas corpus will issue. (Co Puy vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 409; Dy Keng vs. Collector of Customs, supra; and Quan Far vs. Collector of Customs, 40 Phil., 779.)

After reviewing the record of this case, we are of the opinion that
there is no sufficient ground to nullify the findings and decision of
the board of special inquiry.

The judgment appealed from
must, therefore, be reversed and the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus denied, with costs against the appellee. So ordered.

Street, Vickers, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.