ROBERT B. VAN STAVERN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE W. H. SCHNUPP, DECEASED, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO MA. SISON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND VICTORIANO YAMZON…

Original application for certiorari based on the orders of the Court of
First Instance of Manila approving the entry and payment of an
attorney’s lien in behalf of respondent Victoriano Yamzon for P1,200.

The original orders were issued shortly after the death of Schnupp and
before any personal representative was appointed. The attorney’s lien
was based on a written contract which authorized the payment of P1,000
when the amount of the judgment had been collected, though at the time
that the attorney’s lien was enforced only a portion of the judgment
had been collected.

The motion requesting approval of the
attorney’s lien was served upon the opposite parties in the original
action, and it is claimed that the adverse party, section 37 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, is the original adverse party in the action,
but this is not a true interpretation of that section. The adverse
party is one whose interest is adverse to the claims presented. If it
is taxing attorney’s fees in the original action, the original parties
would be the adverse party, but here desiring the payment of money
which otherwise would pass to the administrator, the administrator is
obviously the adverse party, and the motion should have been served
upon him. However, it is to be noted that after the appointment of the
administrator and after the full amount of the judgment had been
collected, a motion was made to vacate the former orders of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. As the contract was in writing, as at that
time the services had been fully performed, and as there is no claim
that the amount to be paid was excessive, notwithstanding that the
original orders might have been improvidently and prematurely issued,
the facts did not require the lower court to set aside and vacate the
original orders relating to the fees of P1,000, and the orders
complained of will be allowed to stand so far as the P1,000 attorney’s
fees are concerned.

As to the P200 item an entirely
different state of facts is shown. When respondent Yamzon learned of
the death of Schnupp, he sent a telegram of condolences to the widow
and likewise sent her P200 by telegram. Whether this was an advance to
the estate, to the widow, or a mere gratuity to the widow, it is not
necessary at this time to determine. It certainly was not an advance of
an attorney in connection with the necessary expenses of litigation
that would permit it to be included as a part of an attorney’s lien,
and so far as this P200 item is concerned, the orders of the Court of
First Instance of Manila approving of such an item as an attorney’s
lien are in excess of its jurisdiction and are null and void.

Petition for certiorari based on the P1,000 item is denied but is
granted as to the P200 which respondent should be required to forthwith
repay to the estate, without prejudice to whatever right respondent
Yamzon may have, if any, to recover from either the estate or the widow.

In view of the nature of the case, it will not be necessary to elevate
the record, but the Court of First Instance of Manila is directed to
take action in accordance with the above opinion.

Petitioner
submitted for the consideration of this court as Exhibit D, a letter
making reflections upon the courts and upon an attorney. The letter
contains what are obviously the emanations of a person of unsound mind.
It was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant to the question
presented in the application for certiorari in this case and should not
have been submitted by the attorney for petitioner. It is stricken from
the record, and the court trusts that our emphatic disapproval of
submitting such matters will cause the attorney for petitioner not to
engage in a similar-practice in the future.

No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concur.