JOSE R. PAÑGANIBAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ELIAS BORROMEO, RESPONDENT.

These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney
are before us on the representations of the Solicitor-General that the
respondent appear and show cause, if any he has, why he should not be
proceeded against for professional malpractice. The respondent admits
that, in his capacity as notary public, he legalized the document which
is the basis of the complaint against him, and that the document
contains provisions contrary to law, morals, and good customs, but by
way of defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal
character of the document.

On November 25, 1931, Alejandro
Pabro and Juana Mappala, husband and wife, subscribed a contract before
the notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a regularly
admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The contract in question had
been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela.
Attorney Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document and had,
at least, some knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been
fully informed because of a difference in dialect. The contract in
substance purported to formulate an agreement between the husband and
the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine
and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man,
without opposition from either one of them.

Two questions
are suggested by the record. The first concerns the point of whether or
not the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose. The second
concerns the point, on the supposition that the contract did sanction
an illicit and immoral purpose, of whether a lawyer may be disciplined
for misconduct as a notary public.

The contract of the
spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the Spanish
Penal Code, as modified by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding,
however, that the more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code
should be given application, it is therein provided that the consent or
pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for
adultery or concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain
their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other
could be expected. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of
the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still remain
crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if
the offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a
matter of future contingency and is not a matter for legalization in
wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the contract to contain
provisions contrary to law, morals, and public order, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.

Passing to the
second question, we think there can be no question as to the right of
the court to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as notary
public, has been guilty of misconduct. To the office of notary public
there is not attached such importance under present conditions as under
the Spanish administration. Even so, the notary public exercises duties
calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the notary to
inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and to take
part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person
who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the
commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be held
responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who
performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral
character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of
disbarment. (See 2 Thornton on Attorneys At Law, pp. 1258, 1259; In re Chappell [1909], 115 N. Y. S., 868; In re Barnard [1912], 136 N. Y. S., 185; In re Arctander [1879], 1 N. W., 43; In re Ten-ell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; In re Adriatico [1906], 7 Phil., 173; U. S. vs. Kilayko [1916], 34 Phil., 796; De la Cruz vs. Capinpin and Albea [1918], 38 Phil., 492.)

It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating
circumstances, there may be taken into consideration (1) that the
attorney may not have realized the full purport of the document to
which he took acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of facts was
attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a notary
public has been revoked. Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to
exercise clemency and to confine our discipline of the respondent to
severe censure. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.