THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, APPLICANT, VS. FLORENCIO SERAFICA ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS.

In cadastral case No. 5 of the
municipality of Asingan. Province of Pangasinan, G. L. R. O. Record No.
8694, final decree No. 30S05 and certificate of title No. 7154 to lot
No. 2246 were issued in favor of the brothers and sister, Aniceto, Jose
and Gregoria Abalos, declaring each of them to be the owner of an
undivided third of the land in question, together with the improvements
thereon. Aniceto Abalos died leaving as his heirs his widow Fulgencia
Sales and his children Paulino, Emiliana and Veronica, the last named
being two years of age. Gregoria Abalos, a widow, likewise died,
without issue. Her husband Cipriano Balila died before her. On January
20, 1928, Jose Abalos, by means of a public document, sold his share in
the said land, consisting of one-half, to the spouses Florencio
Serafica and Laureta Samson. On April 28, 1931, the actual owners
ordered the subdivision of the land in question. A plan thereof was
drawn up which was approved by the Director of Lands and lot No. 2246
was divided into lots Nos. 2246-A and 2246-B. It was understood that
the former lot was adjudicated to the Serafica spouses and the latter
lot, in equal and undivided portions, to the Abalos children Paulino,
Emiliana and Veronica.

Instead of instituting intestate proceedings of the deceased
Aniceto Abalos and Gregoria Abalos, the said actual owners resorted to
the cadastral case, and, in accordance with the provisions of section
112 of Act No. 496, filed a petition praying that certificate of title
No. 7154 be cancelled and that, upon payment of the lawful fees of the
register of deeds, the court order the issuance of new certificates of
title: to lot No. 2246-A in favor of the Serafica spouses, and to lot
No. 2246-B in favor of the aforesaid Abalos children Paulino, Emiliana
and Veronica, in undivided and equal shares.

After hearing the petition to which no opposition had been filed,
notwithstanding the notices issued, the court on February 28, 1933,
entered an order denying the petition on the ground that the Cadastral
Act, the Land Registration Act and the Code of Procedure in Civil Cases
and Special Proceedings do not permit of a declaration ,of heirs and
the partition of the estate of a deceased in cadastral or registration
cases, adding that the heirs of the original owners thereof should have
instituted proceedings for the summary settlement of the said estate
and obtained the corresponding orders of the probate court. The motion
for reconsideration, wherein the appointment of Fulgencia Sales as
guardian ad litem of her minor daughter Veronica was also prayed for, having been denied, all the petitioners appealed.

The appellants contend that the order appealed from violates the
provisions of section 112 of Act No. 496 which afford the remedy prayed
for by them under any of the circumstances therein stated, one of which
is when the right or interest of a registered owner has ceased to exist
by reason of the transfer thereof to other persons. The section in
question reads as follows:

“SEC. 112. No erasure, alteration, or amendment
shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of
the same by the clerk or any register of deeds, except by order of the
court. Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time
apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen
or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; or that any
error, omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name
of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the
registered owner has been married; or, if registered as married, that
the marriage has been terminated; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within
three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground;
and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper: Provided, however,
That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
open the original decree of registration, and that nothing shall be
done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other
interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good
faith, or his heirs or assigns, without his or their written consent.

“Any petition filed under this section and all petitions and motions
filed under the provisions of this Act after original registration
shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered.” The first question that arises is whether or
not the petition falls within the scope of the provisions of section
112 above quoted. According to the said provisions, “* * * any
registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by
petition to the court, upon the ground that registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been
created which do not appear upon the certificate; * * *.” The provision
is so extensive and clear in its scope that this court does not
hesitate to answer in the affirmative the question raised. Upon the
death of Aniceto and Gregoria Abalos, who were the registered co-owners
thereof, their rights and all their interest and participation in the
registered land in question were, by operation of law, transmitted to
their coheir Jose Abalos from whom the Serafica appellants derived
their title, and to the coheirs of Gregoria Abalos, and consequently,
the rights of the said original co-owners were extinguished giving rise
to new ones belonging to the said Serafica spouses and the coheirs of
Gregoria Abalos. These two cases of extinguishment of rights and birth
of new ones are precisely among those provided for in the section above
quoted and do not appear upon the original certificate of title which
is sought to be cancelled, whence this court does not see any good
reason to justify the conclusion that the petition in question is not
entirely within the scope of the provisions of the aforesaid section
112. In the case of Castillo vs. Valdez (53 Phil., 120 et seq.),
wherein Zambrano had filed a petition for the registration of his right
acquired through purchase of the land registered in the name of
Francisca Valdez, and the issuance of another certificate in his name,
upon cancellation of the original certificate of title, this court
correctly held that such petition had been filed in accordance with the
provisions of section 112.

The next point to be considered is whether or not section 112 is
applicable to cadastral cases, the case at bar being of the same
nature. An affirmative answer is given by section 11 of Act No. 2259,
as amended, which provides, among other things, that except as
otherwise provided in the aforecited Cadastral Act, all of the
provisions of said Act No. 496, as well as those amendments thereto,
shall be applicable to cadastral cases.

Another fundamental question to be decided is whether or not a
petition of the nature of the one now under consideration may be filed
in the case in which the final decree of registration and the original
certificate of title were issued. There is not the least doubt in the
mind of this court that the last paragraph of section 112 of Act No.
496 definitely decides the question in the affirmative. Said paragraph
expressly provides that petitions of such nature shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered.

However, it is contended that by virtue of the provisions contained
in sections 89 to 98 of Act No. 496, lands registered under the Torrens
system or under the provisions of the Cadastral Act may not, in case of
the death of the registered owner thereof, be apportioned nor divided
among his heirs or the assignees of the latter, except by means of the
institution of testate or intestate proceedings of the said deceased
according as whether he died testate or intestate.

In the case of a registered owner who died testate, the settlement
of his estate should, of course, be made in accordance with his last
will, which would not be possible unless his will is first probated.
But should he die intestate, there is no reason why it would be
necessary to resort to the probate court and institute proceedings for
his intestate succession. This proposition is all the more clear
because, in this jurisdiction at least, it is an already well
established doctrine that when all the heirs are of lawful age and
their predecessor in interest has left no pending obligations, the said
heirs may apportion and divide the estate among themselves without
proceedings in court (section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person does not
exceed P6,000, his heirs may likewise summarily apportion and divide it
among themselves even when some of the said heirs are minors and there
are debts pending payment. In case an heir has unduly been omitted or
an outstanding debt left unpaid, the said heir or creditor may enforce
his rights within two (2) years from the date of the order directing
such settlement (sections 597 and 598 of the same Code). And the same
heirs, as co-owners or joint holders, may, independently of the
provisions of sections 596 and 597, institute an action for partition
prescribed by sections 181 et seq. of the said Code of Civil Procedure.

The theory advanced to the effect that in accordance with section
89 of Act No. 496, upon the death of the registered owner, title to the
property absolutely passes in all cases to his legal representative or
judicial administrator, so much so that in case he dies intestate the
institution of his intestate proceedings is inevitable, cannot be
sustained. The said section reads as follows:

“SEC. 89. Lands and any estate or interest therein
registered under this Act shall, upon the death of the owner, go to the
executor or administrator of the deceased in like manner as personal
estate, whether the owner dies testate or intestate, and shall be
subject to the same rules of administration as if the same were
personality, except as otherwise provided in this Act, and except that
the rule of division shall be the same as in the descent of real
property, or as shall be provided by will.”

In discussing the proposition just stated, we shall, of course,
leave out those cases in which the registered owner shall have died
leaving a will, because then the institution of his testamentary
proceedings would be necessary for the purpose of making a settlement
of his estate in accordance with his last will. However, when the
registered owner died intestate or in case he died testate his will is
annulled upon any ground, this court reiterates the opinion that even
under the provisions of section 89 it is not necessary to proceed to
the institution of his intestate proceedings nor to the appointment of
a judicial administrator.

It will be noted that section 89, in providing that lands and any
estate or interest therein registered shall, upon the death of the
owner, go to the executor or administrator, at the same time includes
the saving clause “except as otherwise provided in this Act”, thus
making it understood that although the said provision is mandatory, it
is not absolute in all cases, particularly when under the provisions of
the said Act the appointment of a judicial administrator, which in
substance is provided for therein, may be dispensed with. In other
words, although the rule is mandatory in its terms, it is not, however,
inflexible nor invariable. The expression just quoted cannot mean
otherwise. In reality it constitutes an exception of the said law
itself, which permits that in cases which may be heard and decided
under the provisions of section 112, the appointment of an
administrator is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with.

Act No. 496 was promulgated after Act No. 190 and it is to be assumed that the Legislature, in formulating sections 89 et seq.,
had in mind the provisions of sections 181, 596 and 597 of the Code of
Civil Procedure then in force, which permit the apportionment and
division of the estate of a deceased person without the necessity of
resorting to the appointment of an administrator. Undoubtedly, it is
for this reason that it inserted the aforesaid exception in order to
make possible and practicable the distribution and adjudication of
property registered under the Torrens system as well as that not
registered thereunder whenever the case falls under the provisions of
section 112. This court is of the opinion that it was not the intention
of the Legislature to subject registered real property to more
intricate and cumbersome proceedings than unregistered property merely
because the former was registered under a system of recent creation. It
cannot be contended that the institution of intestate proceedings and
the appointment of a judicial administrator afford greater security
than extrajudicial or summary settlements, because in either case the
rights of every person who may have an interest therein are invariably
safeguarded and duly protected. Under the procedure authorized by
section 112, the court taking cognizance of a petition acquires
complete jurisdiction to determine all the questions raised therein and
renders no decision until after notice has been served upon all parties
who might have an interest therein. For this reason this court cannot
see any substantial difference between the decision rendered under
section 112 and that which may be rendered in an intestate proceeding
instituted solely for the purpose of determining who are the heirs of
the registered owner and to what share each is entitled. These steps
may likewise be taken in the proceedings authorized and followed under
section 112.

From the foregoing considerations it may be inferred: that the
petition filed by the appellants is entirely within the scope of the
provisions of section 112 of Act No. 496; that this section is
applicable to the Cadastral Act, No. 2259, under whose provisions
certificate of title No. 7154, which is sought to be cancelled, was
issued; that in passing upon a petition of this nature, the court which
takes cognizance thereof exercises complete jurisdiction to determine
all questions that may arise therefrom, provided those questions do not
involve the review or reopening of the final decree of registration
entered in the case; that in order to determine the shares of the
co-owners and coheirs there is no necessity of a previous declaration
of heirs by a probate court, and, lastly, that neither is there any
necessity of instituting intestate proceedings of the deceased Aniceto
and Gregoria Abalos so that the person who may be appointed
administrator may take charge of the land in question.

However, the Justices who concur in this decision are of the
opinion that, in order to better safeguard the rights of those who may
have an interest in the land, the trial court should proceed to the
publication of the petition in the manner provided in section 597 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and that a guardian ad litem
should first be appointed to legally represent the minor Veronica
Abalos. If after the said publications and the subsequent hearing, the
material and essential allegations of the petition appear to have been
proven, then the said court shall grant the said petition, approve the
subdivision plan, cancel original certificate of title No. 7154 and
require the register of deeds to issue new certificates of title to the
new lots in favor of the respective actual owners thereof.

Wherefore, the appealed order is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo so that it may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor Veronica Abalos, order the publication of the petition in
the manner prescribed in section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and, if the essential allegations thereof are proven at the hearing,
grant the said petition, approve the subdivision plan, cancel
certificate of title No. 7154 and order the register of deeds, upon
payment of his lawful fees, to issue new certificates of title, to lot
No. 2246-A in favor of the Serafica spouses, and to lot No. 2246-B in
favor of the heirs of Aniceto Abalos, pro indiviso and with a statement of their respective shares, without special pronouncement as to costs of this instance. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

BUTTE, J.:

I concur in the result.