OTENG (BAGOBA) AND DAWAYA OR LAWAYA (BAGOBA), ASSISTED BY THEIR HUSBAND DATU BUALAN (BAGOBO), ABO (BAGOBO), AND YAEN (BAGOBA), PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. TAN KIEM TA (CHINESE…

“In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is rendered against the defendants, declaring that the writ of
execution issued by the justice of the peace of Davaothe attachment
levied by the sheriff on said property as well as the sale thereof to
Tan Kiem Ta in civil case No. 74 of Guianga, are nullvoid. The sale
made by Tan Kiem Ta to Jintaro Uehara is likewise declared nullvoidit
is ordered that the property in question be returned to the plaintiffs
who are declared the owners of the property described in paragraph IV
of the complaint. The defendants Tan Kiem TaJintaro Uehara are ordered
to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of f 1,900 as damagesthe further sum
of P80 monthly from January 1, 1933, until said property is returned to
the plaintiffs, with costs. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay to Tan
Kiem Ta the sum of P386.19, to be deducted from the sum of P1,900 as
damages.

“The defendant Juanita Duque is absolved from the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.”

To justify their appeal, the defendants assign nine alleged errors
committed by the lower court in its said judgment; but, in fact, the
only questions which the defendants-appellants raise in their brief may
be reduced to the following:

(1) Are the proceedings had in case No. 74 of the justice of the peace court of Davao, entitled “Tan Kiem Ta (alias
Beho) vs. Datu Bualan, for a sum of money”, wherein judgment was
rendered ordering said Datu Bualan to pay to Tan Kiem Ta the sum of
P524.63, plus legal interest thereon from August 6, 1929, the date of
the filing of the complaint, valid?

(2) Was Tan Kiem Ta a purchaser in good faith at the public auction
held pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said case No. 74, so
as to justify the transfers made by him to the herein defendants
Jintaro UeharaJuanita Duque, of the land bought by him under said
circumstances?

(3) Does the land, purchased by Tan Kiem Ta at public auction, as
above stated, belong to Datu Bualan or to the plaintiffsappellees
Oteng, Lawaya or Dawaya, AboYaen? and

(4) Are the defendantsappellants liable to pay damages to the
plaintiffsappellees for the occupation of the land in question from the
middle of April, 1931 ? Said case No. 74, of the justice of the peace
court of Davao originated from a complaint filed by the appellant
TanKiem Ta on August 6, 1929, alleging that Datu Bualan, husband of the
appellees OtengLawaya or Dawaya, owed him the sum of P524.63 plus
damages in the amount of f*640.50.

Although the form in which the complaint in question was prepared,
shows that it was intended to be filed in the justice of the peace
court of Davao, it was not filed there, in fact, but in the justice of
the peace court of Guianga which is a municipal district about 16
kilometers from Davao. The justice of the peace of the latter court,
who was at the same time the justice of the peace of Guianga, in the
summons which he issued on said date, ordered said defendant Datu
Bualan to appear in Davao, not in Guianga. After various incident of
the trial which was held in Davao without any objection on the part of
Datu Bualan,after said Datu Bualanthe appellant Tan Kiem Ta had
submitted the stipulation which now constitutes Exhibit B, said justice
of the peace, on August 23, 1929, entered judgment copy of which is
Exhibit C, ordering Datu Bualan to pay to Tan Kiem Ta the sum of
P524.63, with legal interest thereoncosts.

The law then determining the jurisdiction of the justices of the
peace of municipalitiesthose of provincial capitals,—and’it may be said
in passing that the justice of the peace who decided said case No. 74
was that of the capital of the province of Davao—was Act No. 2131.
Under the provisions of section 1 of said Act, amendatory to section 68
of Act No. 136, justices of the peace had exclusive jurisdiction to try
cases involving sums of money not exceeding P200, exclusive of
interestcosts;had concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of First
Instance in cases of the same nature where the amount involved exceeded
P200 but was less than ?600. Under the same provisions of said Act,
justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act also had jurisdiction to try cases of the
same nature where the amount of the demand did not exceed P2,000
exclusive of interestcosts, provided they had the necessary authority
of the Court of First Instance to that effect. The pertinent provisions
of said Act read as follows:

” ‘SEC. 68. Civil jurisdiction and powers.—In
all civil actions, including those mentioned in section two
hundredsixty-two to two hundredseventy-two as hereby amended,
inclusive,chapter eighteen of Act Numbered One hundredninety, arising
in his municipality,not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First
Instance, the justice of the peace shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the value of the subject matter or amount of the
demand does not exceed two hundred pesos, exclusive of
interestcosts;where such value or demand exceeds two hundred pesos but
is less than six hundred pesos, the justice of the peace shall have
jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance. * * *

* * * * * * *

” ‘* * * Provided, however,
That justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces organized under
the Provincial Government Act may by assignment of the respective judge
of the Court of First Instance in each case have like jurisdiction
within the province as the Court of First Instance to heardetermine
cases originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance in which the
subject of litigation is capable of pecuniary estimationthe value of
the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed two thousand
pesos exclusive of interestcosts, * * *.'”

The justice of the peace of Davao tried said case No. 74 without
the necessary authority of the judge of the Court of First Instance of
said province,therefore it necessarily follows that ill entering
judgment therein against Datu Bualan, he acted in violation of law.

The amount determining the jurisdiction of a court is not that
proven at the trial but the amount stated in the pleadings. This is
precisely what may be inferred from the terms of the law just cited, in
view of the phrase “the amount of the demand” used therein. Therefore,
there is no doubt but that the only possible answer to the first
question raised isshould be in the negative.

As to the second question, Tan Kiem Ta could not in any manner be a
purchaser in good faith because in his case it cannot be considered
that there has ever been any valid sale for the reason that said act
was vitiated by a fundamental defect, that is, the order authorizing it
was nullvoid for lack of jurisdiction of the judicial officer who
issued it;the law presumes that said purchaser knew said defect because
it provides that ignorance of its provisions excuses no one from
compliance therewith.

As to the third question, the preponderance of the evidence
supports the conclusion that the land, which the plaintiffsappellees
attempt to revindicate from the defendantsappellants in this action
belongs to them who are brotherssisters named Oteng, Lawaya or Dawaya,
AboYaen, the former two being wives of the plaintiff Datu Bualan. They
had inherited it from their deceased parents Ang-inEbag, who had
cultivated, occupiedpossessed it for several years. Upon the death of
said spouses, their said children took possession thereof as
owners,leased it for five years, prior to that in which the defendant
Tan Kiem Ta took possession thereof by virtue of the purchase made by
him at said sale at public auction had under the writ issued by the
justice of the peace of Davao in said case No. 74, which this court
declares nullvoid, to several Japanese from whom they collectedreceived
as rent an amount equivalent to 10 per cent of the monthly production
of said land. The circumstance that Datu Bualan declared said land for
taxation purposes in his own namenot in that of his said two wives and*
of his brother-in-lawsister-in-law AboYaen, respectively, does not
prove that he was the true owner of the land in question (Casimiro vs.
Fernandez, 9 Phil, 562), particularly because said plaintiff testified
that the land in question did not belong to him but to his said two
wivesbrother-in-lawsister-in-law,because it has also been
satisfactorily proven that it is customary among the Moros,the
plaintiffs-appellees in question are Moros, to declareregister the
properties of the wife in the name of the husband, in the
municipalprovincial treasuries, for purposes of taxation. Therefore,
the third question should be decided by declaring the appellees Oteng,
Lawaya or Dawaya, AboYaen, owners of the land in question.

As regards the last question, it mayshould be stated that the
evidence shows that the monthly production of the land in question, in
abaca alone, is at least 200 piculs; that the current price of said
textile in Davao is P5 a picul;that the share which said
plaintiffsappellees used to receive as rent from the lessees thereof
was 10 per cent of said production. From the time Tan Kiem Ta took
possession of the land in question about the middle of April, 1931, the
plaintiffsappellees ceased to receive the share which belonged to them.
It is just, therefore, that they be indemnified for it. The lower
court’s conclusions in this respect are supported by the evidence.

In brief, this court holds that the appellants’ appeal as well as
the alleged errors assigned by them as committed by the lower court, is
not well founded.

Wherefore, the judgment of said court being in accordance with law, it is affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Street, Abad-Santos, Hull,Vickers, JJ., concur.