G.R. No. 39110. November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CESAR SYQUIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
STREET, J.:
action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar
Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco,
infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of
recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand
pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of
a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and
Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for
the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per
month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the
defendant, the trial court entered a decree requiring the defendant to
recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for
him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the
action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the
plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief
sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision
which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned,
the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and
an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila, being possessed of
a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente
Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was
accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia
Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken
on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her
acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which
Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the
early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and
placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who was expected to
christen the baby. This note was as follows:
“Saturday, 1.30 p. m. “Rev. FATHER,
“The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
“CESAR SYQUIA”
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the
eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was
abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a
paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and
cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that “junior”
(meaning the baby to be, “Syquia, jr.”) might be strong, and promising
to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all
necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this
end he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the
birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in
Saint Joseph’s Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for
during confinement.
When Antonia was able to leave the
hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at
No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a
year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and
electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however,
the defendant’s ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a
second pregnancy, the defendant decamped, and he is now married to
another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time
came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the
arrangements for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre,
quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant
to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity,
within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code,
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment
thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that
a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and
capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is as
yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem
here presented of the recognition of an unborn child is really not
different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition
of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and
resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living
child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.
It is contended, however, in
the present case that the words of description used in the writings
before us are not legally sufficient to identify the child now suing as
Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded.
The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre
are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then
conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would
thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it
was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia,
jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to
acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is
removed by the letters Exhibits F, G, H, and J. In these letters the
defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby
which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in
her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in
order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter
(Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to
the sufficiency of the acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment
contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be
made in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of
indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this
point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by
putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or
admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of
paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being
carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that
the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the
trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by
the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said
Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts
already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the
conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that
our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in the writings above referred to must be taken
in connection with the facts found by-the court upon the second point.
It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant
supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together
with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and
until Antonia became enceinte a second time, when the idea
entered the defendant’s head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period
during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status
of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to
evince the father’s resolution to concede the status. The circumstance
that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was
started is unimportant. The word “continuous” in subsection 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.
What has been
said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant’s appeal. With
respect to the appeal of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the
trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff,
Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise
is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the
faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features
necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof
upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no
necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of
the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in
this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the
Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as
to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
VILLA-REAL, J., with whom concur AVANCEÑA, C. J., and IMPERIAL, J.:
The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the
defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly acknowledged his
paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his;
and secondly, that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant Cesar
Syquia, justified by his direct acts, as required by article 135 of the
Civil Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of and signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:
“Rev. PADRE: “La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
Exhibits
F, G, H, and J, which are letters written by the said
defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee Antonia L. de
Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: “No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo manches. Acuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. * * *”
Exhibit G, Feb. 24, 1931: “Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? * * *.”
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: “Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. * * *.”
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: “Cuidate bien y junior tambien * * *.”
Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:
“Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
“1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.”
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.), commenting on said article, says:
“Con
arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de
si es posible admitir por otro medio la prueba de la paternidad
natural. Entendemos que no, porque el articulo es terminante y la
intencion de la ley mAs terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.ª
que ‘no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino en los casos de
delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad
indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con
ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de estado’, y esto mismo es lo que se
ordena en el presente articulo.“No puede, pues, prosperar
la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural,
aunque solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el
reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito, en la posesion
constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en
causa por delito de violacion, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la
sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demanda, y no puede admitirse otra
prueba que la conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente
del padre que en el reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa a los actos
directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren la posesion
continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos podran
utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil,
debiendo el juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija
a la investigacion de la paternidad.*******
“En
cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase
presente que no basta hacerlo por incidencia; es indispensable que se
consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del
padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin,
como se ordena en la base 5.ª antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley
de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros
particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objeto el
reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues,
ese objeto la manifestacion que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser
hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a
una persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin
embargo, en cada caso decidiran los tribunales, y cuando el escrito por
si solo no reconozca de un modo suficientemente expresivo la pater
nidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la
posesion constante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo,
y con arreglo a su numero 2.º”
Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs.
Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are
those established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the
first of which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his
paternity, “When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he
expressly acknowledges his paternity.” The writing that is required by
said provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must
contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a full and
clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order
that it may serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said
child should he afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put
together, each not being complete in itself, should be necessary in
order to obtain a full and complete expression of acknowledgment by a
father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to
investigate paternity would be violated.
By the mere reading
of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to
the herein plaintiff-appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot
ascertain which is the “creature that is coming in June”, which the
defendant-appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to
the priest is his, nor who is the “junior” that he recommends to said
Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone
of said letters from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus
was enceinte at the time, that the “junior” was the being she
was carrying in her womb, and that it was the “creature that is coming
in June.” To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove that
Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that
as a result of such relations the woman became pregnant, and that she
gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly constitutes an
investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of
the documents, which is prohibited by law.
Either taken
alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit
C is insufficient to constitute a “indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia,
in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael
Loanco,” as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
* * * * * * *
“2.
When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of
the father himself or that of his family.”
The majority decision bases its conclusion on the second point on
Exhibits C, F, G, H and J and the following facts, as found by the
lower court in its decision:
“Cuando la
demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado
Cesar Syquia llamo a su comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera,
medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de Manila, para
que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la
demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital
San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de 1931
asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de nacimiento
Exhibit E.“Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael
Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la demandante
Antonia L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila,
entregando a dicha demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el
pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el contrato
para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.”
Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence for the
purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior
date to the birth of said child they can not be considered as direct
acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of natural child,
as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be born with legal
capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs. Leynes, G. R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).
It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to
be given to the child Ismael when it was baptized, so that the name of
its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which
were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of
the witnesses during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the
uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural
child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
“*
* * Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by
Don Telesforo, we find that he visited the mother of the plaintiff;
that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support
of the plaintiff; that he told one witness that the plaintiff was his
son; that the plaintiff called him ‘Papa,’ and that Don Telesforo
answered to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don
Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to him;
that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a
position in a commercial house.* * * * * *
“All
these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff
possessed continuously the status of a natural child. They may have a
tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but
that is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize
the child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that recognition
must appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in
acts which show that the son has possessed continuously the status of a
natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which comes
short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It
must appear that it was the intention of the father to so recognize the
child as to give him that status, and that the acts performed by him
were done with that intention.”
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain says:
“En
la sentencia de 5 de julio de 1906 declarase que para justiticar la
posesion de estado de hijo natural se requiere que los actos sean de
tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la
paternidad, la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal
en las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente,
sino continuadamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tienen el mismo
valor que el reconocimiento expreso.“En el mismo criterio
restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el
hecho de que dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños, sufragando el
gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la demandante, los
besaba, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado;
el de que subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los seis hijos
que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el padre; y
el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el
finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que tenia y
era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los menores, no son
suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal
confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o
convencimiento en que una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a
hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de poner a estos
hijos en la posesion de tal estado.”
It
will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that
the herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to
acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there
exists not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly
acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the said child
has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child of the said defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or
that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.