THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE TOPACIO AND HUGO SANTIAGO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The appellants, Jose Topacio and Hugo
Santiago, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with
the crime of libel committed as follows:

“That on or about and during the month of
November, 1931, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the said Jose Topacio, conspiring and
confederating with Hugo Santiago who was and is the owner and manager
of the General Printing Press, a concern doing printing business in
said city, and both defendants helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously and for the purpose of
impeaching the reputation, integrity and honesty of Filemon Perez,
Secretary of Commerce and Communications of the Philippine Government,
both as Government official and as private individual, and with evident
intent to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write,
compose, print, publish, circulate, sell, and cause to be written,
composed, printed, published, circulated and sold at P0.20 per copy, a
large number of pamphlets titled ‘Who is the “Doctor of Graft”
Squandering the Gasoline Funds?’ presented and distributed as a
supplement to Justice, a so-called newspaper published and
edited in the English and Spanish languages and circulated from time to
time in said City of Manila, copy of which pamphlet is hereto attached
marked as Exhibit A and made an integral part of this information; that
with the statements, imputations and contents of said pamphlet, the
said accused tried to convey to and make believe and did in fact convey
to and make believe the public, among other things:

“That
the above-named Filemon Perez, as such Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, of his own initiative, against the usual practice,
without the recommendation of the proper authorities, with damage and
embarrassment to the public service and in violation of the terms and
spirit of the trust conferred upon him by the Philippine Legislature,
had authorized and caused the disbursement of an enormous sum of money
out of the gasoline funds of the Government for the construction of a
first class road known as the Espana Extension Road and a reinforced
concrete bridge which connect the City of Manila with the New Manila
Subdivision, merely to increase the selling value of the lots in said
subdivision and consequently the profits of the private owners thereof,
in consideration of a bribe given by said owners to said Filemon Perez
consisting in the free use by the latter and his family of a costly and
luxuriously furnished palatial residence located at No. 909 Taft
Avenue. the property of the owners of the said subdivision, without
paying for its rent and for the water consumed which said accused
estimate at not less than P9,000 per annum;

“That said
Filemon Perez being the officer called upon by law to approve
Government contracts for the purchase of supplies and materials and
public constructions representing millions of pesos, must have entered
in doubtful and shady contracts or deals which enabled him to make a
cash deposit of P24,000 in his bank account, as transactions in cash
covering big sums involve, as a general rule, grafts and crimes, as
shown in the cases of the former Secretary of Interior Albert Fall of
President Harding’s cabinet, and of Al Capone, the well known and
notorious gangster;

“That said Filemon Perez, availing
himself of his power and influence, taking advantage of his official
position, in connivance with the provincial board of Tayabas, his home
province, and under the false pretext that the Perez Park at Lucena
needed enhancement and widening caused the said board to start
condemnation proceedings of 8,653.80 square meters of a land belonging
to Simeon Perez, of whom Secretary Perez is the only son and heir, and
to pay for said land, assessed at P3,011.47, the alleged exorbitant
price of P59,749.64, thereby profiting himself greatly at the expense
of the Government whose interest he was called upon to protect;

“That Secretary Filemon Perez, in his effort to win notoriety and
idolatry from the people, astonished the Philippine Islands with his
noisy investigations, full of bluff and devoid of official ethics, when
all he deserved was the diploma of ‘Doctor of Graft’, and in this
connection established a parallel between said Filemon Perez and the
famous adventurer and greatest impostor of the 18th century,
Cagliostro, and reminded, as a coincidence, the case of Hamilton who,
according to said accused, was selling in New York water stock of
corporations he had organized while he was preaching about morality and
displaying his knowledge of proverbs and parables;

“That
in the said pamphlet the said accused Jose Topacio and Hugo Santiago
likewise printed and caused to be printed caricatures of the said
Filemon Perez and others, depicting in an unequivocal manner the
accusations and insinuations just above-mentioned, which accusations
and insinuations are entirely false, without foundation of fact and
highly libelous and offensive and have been made and published by said
accused solely for the purpose of impeaching the honesty, virtue and
reputation of said Filemon Perez and for the further purpose of
exposing as they did in effect expose, him to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule.

“Contrary to law.”

The defendants were tried on a plea of not guilty to the information.
After considering the evidence, the trial judge, E. P. Revilla, found
them guilty of the crime of libel as defined and punished in sections 1
and 2 of Act No. 277, and sentenced Jose Topacio to pay a fine of
P1,000 and Hugo Santiago to pay a fine of P300, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each of them to pay
one-half of the costs.

Each of the defendants filed a motion for a new trial in the lower
court on the ground that the trial judge had committed certain errors,
which were specified and discussed in the motions. These motions were
denied, and the defendants then appealed to this court.

The attorneys for Jose Topacio make the following assignments of error:

“I. The trial court erred in denying the accused
the right conferred upon him by the Organic Law, to obtain, through
compulsory process, evidence favorable to him that was essential in
this case, to wit: (a) Halim Ysmael’s income tax return for the year 1930; (b) Simeon Perez’s income tax returns for the years 1929 and 1930, and (c)
the report of the Insular Auditor’s investigation made in connection
with the administrative charges filed by Jose Topacio against Secretary
Perez.

“II. The trial court erred in denying the accused
herein the due process of law guaranteed to him by the Organic Law, by
examining and making appear in the records of the case the contents of
certain documents, examined only by the judge and by the prosecuting
attorney, denying the herein defendant the right to see the documents
in question, as well as his petition to have said documents placed in a
sealed envelope in order to give the appellate court the opportunity to
examine them.

“III. The trial court erred in refusing to
admit evidence regarding certain statements in the pamphlet relative to
the investigations made in the Bureau of Posts and the Bureau of Supply.

“IV. The trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence relative to
the traffic on the streets adjoining Taft Avenue, as well as to the
rent of houses situated in the same locality and similar to the house
of Mrs. Magdalena Hemady occupied by Secretary Perez.

“V.
The trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence regarding the
squandering of the gasoline funds by applying them to the construction
of a portion of O’Donnell Street, within the City of Manila, which
leads only to the house of Luis Francisco, Secretary Perez’s consulting
engineer.

“VI. The trial court erred in denying the
defendant’s petition that the report of the Constabulary to the effect
that Mrs. Magdalena Hemady is paying the gardener of the house occupied
by Secretary Perez be attached to the records of the case.

“VII. The trial court erred in declaring that Secretary Perez’s good
reputation as to his honesty and integrity in general has been proved,
and in preventing the defense from cross-examining and presenting
evidence having a direct bearing on certain acts which would establish
the nonexistence and falsity of such reputation.

“VIII. The
trial court erred in prohibiting the defense from proving Secretary
Perez’s embarrassing financial situation and the dissolute life he lead
during the period referred to in the pamphlet.

“IX. The
trial court erred in denying the defendant his right to be heard by
counsel in support of his motion for a new trial, also in violation of
the Organic Law, and in refusing to have such denial appear in the
records of the case.

“X. The trial court erred in not
finding as true all the facts alleged in the pamphlet, Exhibit A, which
the defendant has been permitted to prove, and the trial court erred
with respect to those facts which the defendant was not allowed to
prove, first, in not admitting the evidence presented in connection
therewith, and secondly, in not finding them as true, inasmuch as it is
entirely unjust to deny him the opportunity to prove them and then to
inform him that they have not been proved by him.

“XI. The
trial court erred in not finding that the extension of Espana Street to
New Manila was the scheme of Secretary Perez’s landlady and was carried
out with gasoline funds which he generously released contrary to the
prudent and wise recommendation of the Director of Public Works, thus
favoring his landlady, benefiting her to the extent” of millions of
pesos, and prejudicing thereby other public works previously undertaken
of much greater importance.

“XII. The trial court erred in
finding that Secretary Perez is paying rent for the house occupied by
him, located at 909 Taft Avenue and belonging to the owner of New
Manila, and in holding that ‘it is of no importance’ that the alleged
rent therefor is low as compared with the rent of other houses of
similar character.

“XIII. The trial court erred (a)
in holding that in the pamphlet, Exhibit A, a libelous accusation is
made in connection with the amount of P24,000 deposited by Secretary
Perez in his current account with the Philippine National Bank on
January 10, 1930, and in not holding that the amount of P24,000 in
question had, in fact, a questionable source, as proved by the fact
that it was surreptitiously returned to the provincial treasury of
Tayabas immediately after its withdrawal was denounced; and (b)
in holding that in the pamphlet in question, Exhibit A, Secretary Perez
was charged with causing unnecessary expropriation proceedings to be
instituted with reference to land belonging to his father to widen
Perez Park for the purpose of enriching the Perez family, and in not
holding that said expropriation was in fact unnecessarily made, as
alleged; that there was a complacent official conformity to the
exorbitant price paid therefor, and that, in the final analysis, the
person benefited thereby was Secretary Perez, of whom the members of
the provincial board and of the committee to appraise the property in
the expropriation proceedings of Tayabas are mere followers.

“XIV. The trial court erred in holding that there was defamation in the
comparisons and cartoons contained in the pamphlet, Exhibit A.

“XV. The trial court erred in holding that the accused was actuated by implied and express malice.

“XVI. The trial court erred in not freely acquitting the accused, with the costs de officio.”

Hugo Santiago through his attorney alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:

“I. The trial court erred in not including in its
decision a statement of facts with respect to the defendant Hugo
Santiago, notwithstanding that he had made a request to that effect.

“II. The trial court further erred in not finding that the defendant
Hugo Santiago was not aware of the libelous character of the contents
of the pamphlet, Exhibit A, and that said defendant does not even
understand the English language, in which it was written by the
defendant Jose Topacio.

“III. The trial court likewise erred
in applying the old Libel Law as being more favorable to the defendant
Santiago in the instant case, instead of the Revised Penal Code, when
as a matter of fact the latter, in repealing the former, excludes the
mere proprietor of a printing office from those persons responsible for
the publication of a libel.

“IV. And, finally, the trial
court erred in not absolving the defendant Santiago, with all the
pronouncements favorable to him.”

The brief filed by the attorneys for Jose Topacio consists of two
volumes and contains a total of 943 pages, while the brief of the
Solicitor-General contains 190 pages. It was unnecessary to present
such prolix written arguments. This case relates to the official
conduct of Filemon Perez as Secretary of Commerce and Communications.
The gist of the most serious part of the matter complained of as
libelous is that Secretary Perez squandered the public funds derived
from the tax on gasoline, referred to as the “gasoline funds”, in
extending Espana Street to the property of Magdalena de Hemady, known
as the New Manila Subdivision, in the municipality of San Juan del
Monte, Rizal Province, in consideration of a bribe consisting of the
free use by Secretary Perez and his family of the house of Mrs. Hemady
at 909 Taft Avenue. The other defamatory matter consists of statements
and cartoons implying that the cash deposit of P24,000 made by
Secretary Perez in the Philippine National Bank on January 10, 1931 was
derived from some corrupt transaction, and comparing the conduct of
Secretary Perez to that of Ex-Secretary Fall, Al Capone, and Cagliostro.

The accused Jose Topacio was the Director of Posts, or the head of
one of the bureaus under the Department of Commerce and Communications.
On May 8, 1929, Filemon Perez as Secretary of Commerce and
Communications appointed a committee to investigate the Bureau of
Posts. This committee found many serious irregularities in the
administration of that bureau, and in submitting its report to the
Governor-General on January 9, 1930, Perez expressed the opinion that
Topacio’s usefulness as Director of Posts had terminated.

Administrative charges were filed against Topacio, and a civil
action was instituted to recover an alleged shortage in his accounts.
His property was attached. The result was that Topacio was forced to
resign on March 27, 1930, because he had lost the confidence of his
department head and of the Governor-General, but he was absolved from
the complaint in the civil suit. The decision in that case did not have
the effect, however, of exonerating Topacio from the administrative
charges, but merely exempted him from liability for the shortage in
question.

Aggrieved at the way in which his administration of the Bureau of
Posts had been investigated during his absence and his property
attached, and because he had been forced to resign, Topacio sought to
retaliate. He prepared certain data to induce some of the members of
the Philippine Senate to ask for the investigation of the Department of
Commerce and Communications, but failing in this effort he filed
charges against Filemon Perez as Secretary of Commerce and
Communications with the Governor-General on August 24,1931. A
preliminary investigation of these charges was made for the
Governor-General by the Insular Auditor, and the matter was apparently
dropped. Topacio then prepared and caused his codefendant to publish
the pamphlet now in question, which was widely circulated.

The defamatory statements complained of are libelous per se,
and the only defense available to the accused was to prove the truth of
the matter charged as libelous, and that it was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, in accordance with section 4 of Act
No. 277, which provides that in all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the court, and if it appears to the
court that the matter charged as libelous is true and was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted; otherwise he shall be convicted; but to establish this
defense, not only must the truth of the matter so charged be proven,
but also that it was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends.

In the first assignment of error of the appellant Topacio it is
contended that the lower court erred in not requiring the production of
the income tax returns of Halim Ysmaei and Simeon Perez and the report
of the Insular Auditor as to the result of his investigation of the
administrative charges of Jose Topacio against Secretary Perez. The
court was not authorized by law to require the production of these
income tax returns (Act No. 2833, as amended by Act No. 2926, section
14 [6], and sections 11 and 12 of Regulations No. 33 prescribed by the
Secretary of Finance). Furthermore, neither Halim Ysmael nor Simeon
Perez is involved in this case, and their tax returns were neither
relevant nor material. With respect to the preliminary report made by
the Insular Auditor to the Governor-General, which the Chief Executive
desired to treat as confidential, it is sufficient to say that, apart
from the fact this was a confidential report made to the
Governor-General, it does not appear that this report was relevant or
material or admissible. The accused in a criminal case does not have
the unqualified right to a subpæna duces tecum for the
production in court of any document that he or his attorney may wish to
examine, without any showing as to its relevancy, materiality, and
admissibility.

The second assignment of error relates to the refusal of the trial
judge to allow the attorneys for Topacio to examine the income tax
returns of Felipe Ysmael, Halim Ysmael, M. Hemady, and Juan Ysmael
& Co. to verify the statement of the fiscal, who had examined these
returns at the instance of the court, that there was no item of P30 for
rent in any of them, except in the return of Juan Ysmael & Co. for
1930; and the refusal of the lower court to forward said income tax
returns to this court in a sealed envelope. We find no merit in the
contention of the appellant. The lower court was not authorized by law
to require the production of these income tax returns at the instance
of the appellant, and no statement ought to have been made in the
record based on their contents; but the fact that the statement
complained of was made notwithstanding the objection of the fiscal was
not reversible error.

The lower court did not err in refusing to receive evidence as to
the statements in the pamphlet regarding the investigation of the
Bureau of Posts and the Bureau of Supply, because these statements did
not form a part of the matter charged as libelous in the information.

With respect to Topacio’s fourth assignment of error, we are of the
opinion that the lower court should have admitted the evidence as to
the rent of similar houses situated near that of Magdalena de Hemady,
which was occupied by Secretary Perez, but this was not reversible
error, because the appellant was permitted to present expert testimony
tending to show the reasonable rental value of the house in question.

There was no error in excluding evidence as to the traffic on the
streets near to Taft Avenue. The evidence as to the traffic on Taft
Avenue itself was in our opinion irrelevant and immaterial.

Evidence as to the construction from gasoline funds of a part of
Calle O’Donnell in the City of Manila, leading, as claimed by the
defense, to the house of Luis Francisco, a consulting engineer of the
Department of Commerce and Communications, was properly excluded,
because it was irrelevant and immaterial in this case.

The sixth assignment of error relates to the refusal of the court
to admit a report of the Constabulary tending to show that Magdalena de
Hemady was the person paying the gardener of the house occupied by
Secretary Perez. This report was clearly inadmissible. A court bases
its findings on the facts proved at the trial, and not on the
statements made in some report. Furthermore, it was admitted by
Magdalena de Hemady that she was paying for the services of the
gardener and for the water used in the garden. She explained that the
house occupied by Secretary Perez, No. 909 Taft Avenue, and the house
next door, No. 911, had a garden in common and that there was a
separate meter for the water used in the garden.

Under the seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the lower
court erred in finding that the good reputation of Secretary Perez was
proved, and in refusing to allow the defense to present evidence as to
specific acts which would prove the contrary. If it be true that under
the circumstances the defense had the right, as contended, to present
evidence tending to prove specific instances of misconduct on the part
of the offended party, not related to the matter complained of as
libelous, it was not reversible error to exclude such evidence, because
the good reputation of the offended party was presumed, and it was
unnecessary for the prosecution to prove it.

The eighth assignment of error relates to the refusal of the lower
court to permit the defense to prove the embarrassing financial
situation of Secretary Perez and the dissolute life that he was leading
during the period referred to in the pamphlet. Evidence to this effect
was irrelevant and immaterial. It was not related to the matter charged
as libelous in the information.

There was no reversible error in the refusal of the trial judge to
give the attorneys for the appellant an opportunity to argue orally
their motion for a new trial, as alleged in the ninth assignment of
error, because the reasons therefor were set forth and fully discussed
in appellant’s motion in writing. Furthermore, the motion was without
merit.

The tenth assignment of error, which is stated in very general
terms, may be disposed of in a few words. The only question at issue at
the trial was the truth of the published matter that was charged to be
libelous. The defense had no right to present evidence tending to prove
the truth of the statements in the pamphlet that were not referred to
in the information. It does not appear that the appellants were
deprived of a full and fair opportunity to prove the truth of the
libelous statements mentioned in the information.

The eleventh and twelfth assignments of error relate t the
construction of the extension of Espana Street to the subdivision known
as New Manila belonging to Magdalena de Hemady and the occupation of
her house, No. 909 Taft Avenue, by Secretary Perez. Topacio alleged in
effect in the pamphlet entitled “Who Is The Doctor Of Graft’
Squandering The Gasoline Funds”, Exhibit A, that Filemon Perez as
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, of his own initiative and
against the usual practice, and with prejudice to the public service
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the Philippine
Legislature, authorized and caused the disbursement of large sums of
money out of the gasoline funds of the government for the construction
of a first class road and a reinforced concrete bridge connecting the
City of Manila with the New Manila Subdivision merely to increase the
selling value of the lots in said subdivision and the profits of the
owners thereof, in consideration of a “present” given to him by the
said owners consisting of the use by him and his family of the costly
and luxuriously furnished house at No. 909 Taft Avenue without paying
any rent therefor; that he should pay for this house not less than
P9,000 a year; that he accepted the “present” by occupying the house in
consideration of the allotment of gasoline funds for the benefit of the
private interests of New Manila. These statements form the basis of the
present criminal action. The truth of them is not proved by the
evidence. The plan of extending Calle Espana did not originate with
Secretary Perez or Mrs. Hemady, the owner of the New Manila
Subdivision. It was contemplated in the Burnham Plan, and the
authorities concerned had considered the matter at various times long
prior to the appointment of Secretary Perez. Mrs. Hemady was, of
course, keenly interested in its construction because it would make her
property more accessible, and especially in having the proposed new
road pass through her property, and she was the person primarily, if
not chiefly, benefited. It was the district engineer of Rizal Province,
and not Secretary Perez, that first proposed to build the new road
through the New Manila Subdivision. The first allotment of P15,000 from
the gasoline funds on December 29, 1928 was made by Secretary Perez
after consultation with the Director of Public Works for the survey and
study of the project. The location of the proposed road had not been
determined at that time, although it appears that Mrs. Hemady or her
agents assumed that it would pass through her property and published
advertisement to that effect. Whether or not the proposed road should
be built was a matter for the determination of the administrative
authorities concerned. Certainly the construction of the road out of
the gasoline funds under the control of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications did not under the circumstances constitute any such
abuse of discretion as to warrant the inference that it was built
solely for the purpose of enriching the owners of the New Manila
Subdivision or in consideration of a bribe.

It appears from the evidence that Mrs. Hemady had constructed a
residence in New Manila and had vacated her house in Taft Avenue, and
that she was willing to rent it to a suitable tenant; that Secretary
Perez had to move from the house that he had been occupying in
Pennsylvania Street because the owner was returning and wished to
occupy it; that Mrs. Perez engaged the house at 909 Taft Avenue about
the end of March, 1930 for a rental of P200 a month, and the owner
agreed to make certain repairs; that Secretary Perez began to occupy
the house in question on June 1, 1930.

It is contended by the appellant that Secretary Perez did not pay
any rent for the use of this house, and that if he did pay rent it was
less than the reasonable rental value of the property. The evidence
shows that Filemon Perez paid rent at the rate of P200 a month. This
fact is evidenced not only by the receipts presented in evidence, but
also by the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Hemady and the fact that Filemon
Perez claimed the corresponding deduction for rent in his income tax
return for 1930, which was filed five or six months before Topacio
presented his charges against Perez to the Governor-General. It is a
fact that Secretary Perez appears to have been paying less than the
reasonable rental value of the house in question, but the Hemadys
explained their willingness to accept P200 a month from Secretary Perez
because their chief concern was to have the house in good hands. If it
be true that the Hemadys were willing to rent the. house to Secretary
Perez for somewhat less than its market value, whatever may have been
their reason for doing so, that fact does not constitute any proof that
Secretary Perez had allotted the funds for the construction of the
Espana extension in consideration of a bribe. Whether or not under the
circumstances he should have leased the house of the owner of the New
Manila Subdivision is a question of delicacy. The mere fact that he
leased it for P200 a month did not justify the defamatory statements in
Exhibit A.

The thirteenth assignment of error relates to a deposit of P24,000
in cash made by Secretary Perez in his current account in the
Philippine National Bank on January 10, 1930 and the expropriation by
the provincial board of Tayabas of certain land belonging to Simeon
Perez, father of the offended party in this case. It is alleged that
the lower court erred in finding that there was any defamatory
imputation in the pamphlet with respect to this deposit, and in holding
that according to said pamphlet the expropriation had been made for the
purpose of enriching the Perez family. It is stated in the pamphlet
that “transactions in cash in such a big amount mean generally an
attempt or endeavor to hide the source of the fund involved therein;
that, nowadays, even commercial transactions of small scale are covered
by checks, so the deposit in cash made by Secretary Perez may be
considered as an attempt to hide the real source of such a deposit of
P24,000.” The force of the insinuation is not destroyed by the fact
that the writer added that he did not mean to say that Secretary Perez
got the P24,000 in cash from any contract or any shady deal, because he
went on to say that transactions in cash covering big amounts involve
as a general rule graft and crimes, as shown by the case of
Ex-Secretary Albert Fall, a member of the Harding’s Cabinet, and also
that of Al Capone, a notorious criminal, whose transactions were all in
cash, according to the report of the United States Treasury Department.
Following the same tactics, the writer of the pamphlet said that if it
be granted that the case of Secretary Perez was an exception to the
rule, he owed it to himself and to the people to explain the real
source of such a big deposit in cash, and then attempted to show that
Secretary Perez could not have legitimately obtained this sum from any
source. The defendant Topacio then compared the conduct of Secretary
Perez to that of Ex-Secretary Fall, who was convicted of having
accepted a bribe in the guise of a loan. No argument is necessary to
show the defamatory nature of these statements and their implications.

We do not express any opinion as to the condemnation proceedings,
which apparently are still pending. Suffice it to say that the evidence
does not show that Secretary Perez was in any way responsible for the
alleged irregularities.

In the fourteenth assignment of error it is alleged that the lower
court erred in holding that there was defamation in the comparisons and
cartoons contained in the pamphlet, Exhibit A. We have already referred
to the comparison drawn between Secretary Perez and Ex-Secretary Fall.
In the pamphlet Secretary Perez is compared both in the text and in the
cartoon to Cagliostro, “the greatest impostor of the eighteenth
century”. In another cartoon Secretary Perez is represented as leaning
from the window of his house at 909 Taft Avenue and shovelling money
from the gasoline funds into the Espana extension road leading to New
Manila. This cartoon bears the legend “Very busy granting allotments of
gasoline funds to Espana Road”. The lower court did not err in finding
these comparisons and cartoons to be defamatory.

It is contended that the lower court erred in finding that the
accused acted with implied and express malice, and in not freely
acquitting the accused, with the costs de oficio. As we have already
stated the defamatory statements complained of are libelous per se. In
such a case malice is implied. This implied malice or malice in law was
not overcome, because the accused did not prove the truth of the
libelous matter. Furthermore, the evidence of record shows express
malice or malice in fact, because it clearly appears that the accused
Topacio was actuated by a desire to impeach the reputation, integrity,
and honesty of Secretary Perez as a government official and to force
him to resign because of the alleged misfeasance and malfeasance in
office.

Coming now to the contentions of the attorney for the appellant
Hugo Santiago, we find no error in the decision appealed from. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code does not, as claimed, exempt the person
who prints or publishes a libel from responsibility therefor. The
Spanish text of the first two paragraphs of this article reads as
follows:

“Personas responsables.—Es responsable de una difamacion
por escrito u otros medios analogos el que la publicare o exhibiere o
la hiciere publicar o exhibir.

“El autor o editor de un libro o folleto, o el director o editor de
un diario, revista o publication por entregas, sera responsable de las
difamaciones contenidas en los mismos en igual extension que su autor.”
One meaning of the Spanish verb “publicar” is: “imprimir o dar a luz
cualquier libro, cualquier obra dirigida al publico, para que todo el
mundo pueda leerla.” It is clear therefore that article 360 includes
not only the author or person who causes the libelous matter to be
published, but also the person who prints or publishes it. The evidence
shows that Hugo Santiago was not only the owner of the printing plant
where the libelous matter in question was printed, but that he was the
manager thereof, and examined the manuscript of his codefendant. We
cannot credit his testimony to the effect that he had no knowledge of
the contents of the pamphlet in question, because he did not understand
English. The cartoons alone were sufficient to give him an idea as to
the contents of the pamphlet. Furthermore, there is prefixed to the
pamphlet the following statement: “The responsible for this pamphlet is
Jose Topacio, 219 San Andres, Manila.” We do not doubt, judging from
the form of this statement, that it was inserted by the printer himself.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.