G.R. No. 36893. February 24, 1933
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
HULL, J.:
Pasay Transportation Company was granted by an order of the Public
Service Commission, dated October 5, 1928, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity for the operation of an auto-truck service
along certain streets in the City of Manila between the Divisoria
Market and Velasquez. After a few days partial operation the company
requested permission of the Public Service Commission to suspend
operation of that line on account of the ruinous competition it was
meeting from the Manila Electric Company. On December 29, 1928, the
permission was granted with the statement that if within slightly over
thirty days, namely January 31, 1929, the Pasay Transportation Company
has not resumed its service on said line they would proceed1 to the
cancellation of the certificate involved. No further action was taken
by either the Pasay Transportation Company or the Public Service
Commission until September 17, 1931, when the company notified the
commission that they were going to resume operation on this line. On
the 18th of September, 1931, the company asked for a modification of
the route formerly given to a route that virtually duplicates that
maintained by the Manila Electric Company for over two years preceding
and also requested authority to reduce their fares. Without any hearing
the Public Service Commission on September 22, 1931, granted the
requests of the Pasay Transportation Company, and the next day the
Manila Electric Company filed a motion requesting the revocation of the
approval of the commission of September 22, 1931, and that the order of
December 29, 1928 be enforced. This motion was denied and the Manila
Electric Company brings the case here for review.
Formerly
the Public Service Commission adopted the sound policy that duplicate
bus service through the crowded and narrow streets of the City of
Manila would not be in the public interest and permitted joint use of
streets only when they were for a short distance and merely incidental
to the main route. In their present orders they have, without any
hearing and without taking any evidence whatsoever, disregarded not
only this sound principle, but also the principles laid down for their
guidance by this court in Batangas Transportation Company vs.
Orlanes (52 Phil., 455). If a route that was not entirely parallel in
1928 engendered ruinous competition it is hard to understand why a more
parallel route would not bring improper competition in 1931.
The Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., lays great stress upon the fact
that its right to operate was not formally terminated, and insists that
it has a property right of value that can only be taken away after
hearing. (Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Jureidini, 53
Phil., 560.) It does not regard the other side of the picture that by
receiving a grant it owes a duty to the public to comply with the
conditions and duties of the grant.
It likewise treats of no
moment that it only used the permission in a meager way for a couple of
days when it asked for suspension and for almost three years it flouted
and set at naught the clear instructions of the Public Service
Commission to resume operation under the penalty of having its
certificate cancelled. It made no investment for equipment and risked
nothing trying to develop business. On September 18, 1931, it had at
most a mere technical right (Reyes vs. Orlanes & Banaag Transit Co., G. R. No. 35562)[1].
The commission, without any hearing, did not permit the resumption of
the service but, in fact, authorized the inauguration of a new line and
to call such an action a modification of the certificate heretofore
issued is hardly a recital of the true facts. The orders of the
commission of September 22, 1931, being issued without any hearing and
without receipt of any evidence, must be vacated and set aside as this
court upon review can not state that they are reasonably supported by
the evidence. With costs against the respondent and appellee[2]. So ordered.
Villamor, Villa-Real, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
[1] Promulgated April 29, 1932, page 964, post.
[2]
Modified by resolution of March 20, 1933.