ALIPIO DAIS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE Y. TORRES AND LEONA IBAÑEZ, THE LATTER SUBSTITUTED BY HER ADMINISTRATOR ALFONSO DADIVAS, DEFENDANTS. ALFONSO DADIVAS, APPELLANT.

This is an appeal by the defendant Alfonso Dadivas, administrator of
the estate of the deceased Leona Ibañez, from a decision of Judge
Leonardo Garduño of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January
6, 1930. The other defendant, Jose Y. Torres, attempted to appeal, but
his bill of exceptions was not filed within the time fixed by law and
was disallowed by the trial judge. His petition for a writ of mandamus
was denied by this court (G. R. No. 36476).^[1] The decision of the trial court has therefore become final as to him.

On September 23, 1926 the plaintiff Alipio Dais filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, wherein he alleged that the
defendant Jose Y. Torres, taking advantage of the fact that he was
plaintiff’s attorney, by means of fraud and deceit induced the
plaintiff to sign a document which proved to be a sale with the right
of repurchase of plaintiff’s land for P10,000 in favor of Leona Ibanez,
mother-in-law of Jose Y. Torres; that the plaintiff never sold any land
to Leona Ibañez or to Jose Y. Torres or received any sum of money from
either of them; that by the wrongful acts of said persons the plaintiff
was damaged to the amount of P10,000.

Leona Ibañez denied
all the allegations of the complaint, set up a counterclaim of P3,000,
and in a cross-complaint alleged that on or about the month of May,
1926 the plaintiff had sold her a certain parcel of land for P10,000,
reserving the right to repurchase it on or before September 13, 1926;
that the plaintiff had failed to repurchase the property; that
immediately after the execution of said contract the plaintiff had
placed her in possession of the property, but that later he deprived
her of the possession of said land and refused to restore the
possession thereof to her, thereby causing her damages in the sum of
P11,000 and further damages at the rate of P7,000 a year.

The defendant Jose Y. Torres denied all the allegations of the
complaint, and alleged as a special defense that he had never
fraudulently induced the plaintiff to sign any document; that the
allegations of the complaint were malicious, libelous, and
incriminating, and that the plaintiff had instituted the action to
avoid paying said defendant’s fees as plaintiff’s attorney in civil
cases 1896 and 2051 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, and as a
counterclaim alleged that he was entitled to recover from the plaintiff
P25,000 as attorney’s fees and P50,000 as damages.

Plaintiff
in his answer to the cross-complaint of Leona Ibañez alleged as a
special defense that the document mentioned therein was the same
document which Jose Y. Torres through deceit had induced him to sign,
taking advantage of the fact that he was at that time representing the
plain- tiff in a case pending in court and that the plaintiff had no
opportunity to inform himself as to the contents of said document; that
the plaintiff did not receive any sum in consideration of the execution
of said document.

The dispositive part of the decision in question, which consists of seventy-two pages, is as follows:

“Por tanto el Juzgado es de opinion que debe fallar y falla: (a)
declarando nulo, sin ningun valor ni efecto, el documento de venta con
pacto de retro, Exhibit B, otorgado por Alipio Dais, a favor de Leona
Ibañez, y el gravamen que figura consignado en la contestacion
presentada por Alipio Dais en el expediente catastral No. 18, G. L. R.
O. Cadastral Record No. 714 intitulado El Director de Terrenos contra
Justo Abiertas y otros, de este Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Capiz,
referente al Lote No. 744, reclamado por Alipio Dais, Exhibit C; (b) ordenando al Registrador de Titulos de la Provincia de Capiz que cancele la inscripcion de lis pendens concerniente al terreno Lote No. 744 objeto de esta causa; (c)
condenando a los demandados al pago de una indemnizacion de P2,000 a
favor del demandante en concepto de daños y perjuicios, y de las
costas; y (d) absolviendo al demandante de las reconvenciones y contrademanda de los demandados.”

The appellant Alfonso Dadivas makes the following assignments of error:

“I.
The trial court erred in not giving due weight and credit to the letter
of the appellee Exhibit 7 and the contract Exhibit 6.

“II.
The trial court erred in holding that the signature of the appellee on
the right hand margin of the cadastral answer Exhibit C filed by him is
not genuine and that the annotation of encumbrance (‘gravamen’) in said
exhibit was written posterior to the filing of same and without the
knowledge of appellee.

“III. The trial court erred in holding that the deed of sale Exhibit B is null, void and without any effect.

“IV.
The trial court erred in dismissing the cross-complaint of the
appellant Leona Ibañez and in not adjudicating the damages claimed by
the said appellant against the appellee in the said cross-complaint.

“V. The trial court erred in awarding damages to the appellee for the sum of P2,000 against the appellant Leona Ibañez.”

In his brief the appellant says:

“Said
decision can hardly be called a ‘decision’ for it is more of a brief
for the appellee and a ‘charge’ or ‘complaint’ against the other
defendant Jose Y. Torres. This attitude of the trial judge Hon.
Leonardo Garduño is probably due to the fact that at the time the
present case was tried and decided the strained or hostile relation
between said judge and the other defendant Jose Y. Torres was at its
climax for said defendant attorney Jose Y. Torres filed his charges
against the trial judge which has been acted upon by this Hon. Court.”

It appears that the trial of the case was begun on September 16, 1927,
but was continued to July 11,1929. There is nothing to indicate that
the defendants were responsible for the delay in resuming the trial of
the case. On the date mentioned Jose Y. Torres asked for the transfer
of the trial to the next month on the ground that his principal
witness, Andres Quiachon, was sick, and that Torres’ wife, Maria Basa,
whom he wished to present as a witness, was in Manila. Judge Garduño
refused to grant the transfer.

Torres then filed a motion of
recusation, in which he challenged the competency of Judge Garduño to
hear and decide the case and prayed him to abstain from doing so for
the following reasons:

1. That in the month of January, 1929, the said Jose Y. Torres filed a complaint against Judge Garduño with the Supreme Court;

2. That by reason of said complaint the Supreme Court ordered Judge
   Garduño to remove from his court room the iron cage where he was
   accustomed to keep persons accused of crimes of violence during the
   trial of their cases;

3. That the said Jose Y. Torres filed another complaint against Judge Garduño, with the necessary specification of facts;

4. That many of the charges were for partiality, bias, and hostility
   against the said Jose Y. Torres in various cases, and that the present
   case was particularly mentioned in both complaints;

5. That said defendant honestly believes that taking into consideration
   said incidents Judge Garduño cannot administer impartial and unbiased
   justice in any case where said defendant is either a party or attorney;

6. That Judge Garduño entertains hatred, ill will, and prejudice against
   said defendant, as evidenced by a public address at Calivo, Province of
   Capiz, on June 21, 1929, wherein he held the defendant up to public
   ridicule, and repeated said action in the court room at Capiz on July
   2, 1929;

7. That for the sake of justice, fairness, and a square deal Judge Garduño should abstain from hearing this case.

Judge Garduño overruled the motion on the ground that it was without merit.

It
appears from an examination of the record of the charges filed by
Attorney Torres against Judge Garduño that the first charges were filed
on June 17, 1929, and that as a result thereof Judge Garduño was
ordered to remove from the court room the iron cage hereinabove
mentioned; that other charges of a serious nature were filed on June
28, 1929, and that Judge Garduño’s answer thereto was filed on
September 6, 1929; that supplementary charges were filed on October 28,
1929; and that the Solicitor-General began the investigation of the
charges on February 22, 1930.

It is true therefore, as
alleged by the appellant, that certain charges filed by Attorney Jose
Y. Torres against Judge Garduño were pending investigation at the time
of the trial and the decision of the case now before us.

The filing of these charges by Attorney Torres almost
inevitably gave rise to resentment on the part of Judge Garduño,
leading to bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the decision. For
example, on page 29 the trial judge said: “Por tanto de ser verdad lo
que alega y afirma Alipio Dais, el documento Exhibit B es fraudulento,
es producto de un fraude, preparado habilidosamente y ejecutado por el
Abogado Torres con el doble fin, o de cobrarse unos cuantiosos
honorarios a que no tenia derecho por medio de una extorsion, o de
apoderarse de una hacienda agricola simulando una compra por medio de
su suegra Leona Ibañez, y parece ser que su finalidad actual es hacer
real un contrato imaginario sobre la venta del lote numero 744, y tras
de ello, cobrarse aun honorarios indebidos.” And on pages 60 et seq.:
“Que el abogado Torres es capaz de elaborar el fraude que se le imputa,
dan muestras de su caracter y afan de enriquecerse a costa de sus
clientes los Exhibitos siguientes.” The trial judge then describes a
certain mortgage, the complaint in case No. 2184, and four charges of
malpractice against Torres, none of which appears to have been relevant
in the case at bar.

The trial court then said: “Estas quejas administrativas
culminaron con una suspension del Sr. Jose Y. Torres del ejercicio de
su profesion de abogado hasta que la Corte Suprema disponga otra cosa.”

Section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no judge,
magistrate, justice of the peace, assessor, referee, or presiding
officer of any tribunal shall sit in any cause or proceeding in which
he is pecuniarily interested, or related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, nor in which he has been counsel, nor in which
he has presided in any inferior judicature when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

Although a judge may not have been disqualified under said section,
nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not
given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge’s bias or
prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary,
in the interest of justice.

It was said in State vs.
Board of Education (19 Washington, 8; 67 A. S. R., 706, 713), that the
principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part
of the judge is as old as the history of courts; in fact, ‘the
administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon
this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and pervading
the whole system of judicature, and it is the popular acknowledgment of
the inviolability of this principle which gives credit, or even
toleration, to decrees of judicial tribunals. Actions of courts which
disregard this safeguard to litigants would more appropriately be
termed the administration of injustice, and their proceedings would be
as shocking to our private sense of justice as they would be injurious
to the public interest. The learned and observant Lord Bacon well said
that the virtue of a judge is seen in making inequality equal, that he
may plant his judgment as upon even ground. Caesar demanded that his
wife should not only be virtuous, but beyond suspicion; and the state
should not be any less exacting with its judicial officers, in whose
keeping are placed not only the financial interests, but the honor, the
liberty, and the lives of its citizens, and it should see to it that
the scales in which the rights of the citizen are weighed should be
nicely balanced, for, as was well said by Judge Bronson in People vs.
Suffolk Common Pleas (18 Wend., 550): “Next in importance to the duty
of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner
as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.”

Contrary to the contention of appellee’s attorney, the appellant has
not lost his right to have the evidence reviewed by his failure to
assign as error the order of the court overruling his motion for a new
trial, because he has made assignments of error raising issues of fact.
(Granados and Granados vs. Bandelaria, 45 Phil., 505.)

An examination of the record of this case shows that the decision must
turn on the credibility of the witnesses, and in such a case the trial
judge is in a better position than the appellate court to decide as to
the truth or falsity of their testimony.

The importance of
the trial court’s findings of fact has been recognized by this court in
many decisions. That doctrine is based upon the assumption that such
findings of fact have been made by a fair and impartial judge. This
court in the consideration of cases on appeal has a right to the
assurance that the trial court’s findings of fact are free from bias or
prejudice.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we
do not feel assured that the trial judge’s findings were not influenced
by bias or prejudice, and in the interest of justice we have decided to
set aside the judgment as to the appellant and to order a new trial.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is set aside as
to the appellant Alfonso Dadivas, and the case is remanded to the lower
court for a new trial before another judge. Without a special finding
as to costs.

Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Resolution of January 14, 1932.