INES MELGAR AND PEDRO NOEL, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. TOMAS DELGADO AND ALBERTA ALQUIZOLA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

After the appellants had filed their bill of exceptions and their
brief, the appellees moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground that the bill of exceptions was not filed in time.

In this case, twenty days after being notified of the judgment, the
appellants filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision, and
that the judgment was contrary to law. The court heard the motion and
denied it on August 18, 1928, in the presence of the appellants, who
were orally informed of the denial. But they were not notified in
writing of this order of denial until September 13, 1928, on which day
the appellants reiterated the exception they had taken in open court,
and gave notice of their intention to prepare a bill of exceptions,
which they filed on the same date, the 13th of September, and which the
court approved in its order of November 7,1928.

The basic argument of the appellees is that, as the appellants were
informed of the order dismissing their motion for a new trial in open
court on August 18, 1928, according to the doctrine laid down in Lay da
vs. Legazpi (39 Phil., 83), after such notification of the
order dismissing their motion for a new trial, they had only five days
within which to give notice of their intention to file a bill of
exceptions,, and after that notice they had only ten days within which
to file said bill of exceptions.

In reply to this argument, the appellants allege that although it is
true that they were notified in open court of the order denying their
motion for a new trial on August 18, 1928, nevertheless, said order was
not reduced to writing, nor were their attorneys notified of it in
writing until September 13, 1928, on which day they reiterated their
intention to present their bill of exceptions, and at the same time
filed it, and the court, as we have said, approved it on the 7th of the
following November.

The question raised by the parties is, in substance, a determination
of the day from which the period within which to file the bill of
exceptions in ordinary civil cases begins to run. If the period is to
be counted from August 18, 1928, when the appellants were orally
notified, it is evident that the bill of exceptions presented on
September 13, 1928, was out of time. But if, on the other hand, the
period is to be counted from September 13, 1928, when the appellants
were notified in writing that their motion for a new1 trial had been
denied, then the bill of exceptions was filed in opportune tiime.

We are of opinion that the period began to run from the day when the
appellants were notified in writing of the order denying their motion
for a new trial.

In the first place, Courts of First Instance, being courts of
record, are bound to keep a record of their proceedings, which must
appear in writing. According to the definition given in 2 Cyc, 657-658,
courts of record are those which are bound to keep, record of their
proceedings for a perpetual memorial and testimony thereof. This being
so, and applying it to the question under consideration, it cannot be
said that the appellants were notified of the order denying their
motion for a new trial, until said order had been reduced to writing
and filed in the clerk’s office.

In the second place, paragraph 2 of the Rules of the Courts of First
Instance provides that “as soon ay an order, decree, or decision is
filed by the judge, the clerk shall give notice by registered mail or
personally to both parties or their attorneys,” which shows that the
oral notification given in open court to the attorneys of both parties
is not the notification prescribed in paragraph 2 of the Rules of the
Courts of First Instance, which was made on September 13, 1928, when
said order was filed with the clerk of court.

In the third place, section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 1596 provides among other things: “* * * if,
however, the motion for a new trial was made on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to justify the decision, an exception may be
taken to the order overruling such motion, and such exception may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court as in other cases,” which shows that the
ruling on the appellants’ motion for a new trial, based, as stated, on
the insufficiency of the evidence, must be made in writing, as
otherwise, it could not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Inasmuch, therefore, as the order denying the motion for a new trial
was filed in the clerk’s office only on the 13th of September, on which
date the appellants were notified of it; and as said appellants
announced their intention to appeal on the same date, and forthwith
filed their bill of exceptions, it is manifest that, in accordance with
the doctrines laid down in Layda vs. Legazpi, supra, said bill of exceptions was filed in time and was duly approved by the court below.

Wherefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal taken by the appellants should be, as it is hereby, denied. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Johnson, Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.