CATALINA ASINAS, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND FRANCISCO MEDINA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ROMBLON AND FELISA ASINAS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original petition for the writ of prohibition filed
by Catalina Asinas, assisted by her husband Francisco Medina, against the Court
of First Instance of Romblon and Felisa Asinas, praying, for the reasons therein
given, that the respondent court be required to refrain from ordering the
payment of P200 to the respondent Felisa Asinas and permitting the latter to
intervene in the proceeding for the probate of Mauricio Asinas’ will, and the
administration of his estate; and the said respondent Felisa Asinas to refrain
from performing any act with respect thereto.

The pertinent facts necessary to the solution of the legal
question raised in the present instance, briefly stated, are as follows:

On August 9, 1926, an application for the probate of what
purports to be the will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, a resident of the
municipality of Looc of the Province of Romblon was filed in the office of the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Romblon.

Opposition was entered to said application by the respondent
Felisa Asinas, alleging that she is an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio
Asinas, and by Justo Asinas, brother of said deceased.

In view of the fact that the petitioner Catalina Asinas denied
Felisa Asinas’ right to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of said
alleged will, the court proceeded to determine whether said respondent is really
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Mauricio Asinas.

After hearing the parties, and upon consideration of the
evidence adduced, the respondent court, in spite of petitioner’s objection,
authorized Felisa Asinas to intervene in said probate proceeding as well as in
the administration of the said deceased’s estate, and granted her, moreover,
P200 travelling expenses for herself and her witnesses, chargeable to the funds
under administration.

The petitioner took exception to said rulings issued by the
respondent court and moved for a reconsideration, but said motion was denied by
its order of November 19, 1927.

The question to be determined in the present instance is
whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in authorizing the
respondent Felisa Asinas to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of the
alleged will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas and the administration of his
estate, as well as in ordering that the expenses incurred by her appearance in
court and that of her witnesses, amounting to P200, be charged to the funds
under administration.

Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in requiring the
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, for three
consecutive weeks, of the date fixed by the competent court for the probate of a
will, in order to afford all those interested an opportunity to appear and
oppose said probate, does not specify who are the interested parties who may
appear, nor what proof they must submit to show such interest.

In the case of Paras vs. Narciso (35 Phil., 244), this court
laid down the following doctrine:

“WILLS; PROBATE; PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS.—Before any person may
intervene in proceedings had in a Court of First Instance for the probate of a
will, he should be required to show an interest in the will or the property
affected thereby either as executor or otherwise, and strangers should not be
permitted over the objection of the real parties in interest to embarrass the
proceedings by meddling or intruding themselves in matters with which they have
no concern.

“ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERVENTION BY STRANGER.—But the mere fact
that a stranger has been permitted to oppose or contest the probate of a will is
not reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no objection
is interposed by any of the parties in interest. The judgment of the court in
probate proceedings is not based on the fact that there is or is not opposition
to the probate of the will, but upon the production of evidence which discloses
that there are or are not sufficient grounds for the admission of the will to
probate.”

A person alleging an interest in opposing the probate of a will
as an acknowledged natural daughter need not conclusively prove the existence of
such a civil status, or that such status has been judicially declared; it is
sufficient that there be prima facie evidence to that effect. This is
not only because the law does not require it, but because section 753 of the
same Code provides for the determination of the persons entitled to receive the
rest of the property in the said administration proceeding after the debts,
funeral and administration expenses have been paid. (Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5
Phil., 436; Torres vs. Javier, 34 Phil., 382; Severino vs. Severino, 44 PhiL,
343; Briz vs. Briz and Remigio, 43 Phil., 763.)

As to the respondent’s (Felisa Asinas’) right to intervene in
the appointment of an administrator and in the estate, that is nothing more than
a logical consequence of her right to oppose the probate of the will.

For the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
respondent court did not exceed its jurisdiction in permitting the respondent
Felisa Asinas, upon producing prima facie evidence of her condition as
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, to oppose the
probate of the said deceased’s will, and to intervene in the appointment of an
administrator of the property left by him.

With regard to the question as to whether or not the respondent
court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the expenses incurred by the
respondent (Felisa Asinas) and her witnesses be paid from the funds under
administration, this court laid down the following rule in the case of Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Abada (40 Phil., 124):

“The expenses of administration should be those necessary for
the management of the property, for protecting it against destruction or
deterioration, and possibly for the production of fruits; but the sum expended
by an administrator of an extensive administration of the estates of the
decedent cannot be considered ‘expenses of administration.’ “

There can be no doubt that the expenses incurred by the
respondent Felisa Asinas for her appearance and that of her Witnesses, with a
view to establishing her right to oppose the probate of Mauricio Asinas’ will,
cannot be considered as administration expenses, inasmuch as they are not
necessary either for the management of the property or its protection from
destruction or deterioration, or for the production of fruits. Although a Court
of First Instance has jurisdiction to authorize a judicial administrator of a
decedent’s estate to make certain expenses for the benefit of said estate, or to
approve those already made, such jurisdiction is confined to expenses strictly
necessary for the good management thereof.

In ordering, then, that the P200 expenses incurred for the
appearance of the respondent and her witnesses be paid out of, and charged to,
the funds under administration, the respondent court exceeded its
jurisdiction.

The respondent court’s resolution ordering the payment of said
expenses to be charged to the funds under administration, is final in character,
since by it a claim of the respondent (Felisa Asinas) is granted, without the
administrator or the petitioner having had a day in court, and notwithstanding
their subsequent opposition, thus giving an end to the controversy; and as such
it is appealable, without the necessity of waiting for the termination of the
administration.

As there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of justice, namely, an appeal, prohibition cannot lie (So Chu
and Limpangco vs. Nepomuceno and Reis, 29 Phil., 208; Quimpo vs. Salas, 41
Phil., 353).

Summarizing the foregoing, we hold:

1. That a Court of First Instance does not exceed its probate jurisdiction in
   authorizing one claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a decedent to
   intervene in the probate of the alleged will of said decedent, upon presentation
   of prima facie evidence of such civil status. And,

2. That although a Court of First Instance does exceed its jurisdiction in
   ordering the payment from the funds under administration of the expenses
   incurred by a presumptive heir for his appearance and that of his witnesses with
   a view to opposing the probate of an alleged will of his predecessor, because
   such expenses are not necessary to the management of the estate, or for its
   productivity, yet said decree being of a final character and appealable, and
   there existing a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such as an appeal, the writ
   of prohibition cannot be issued.

By virtue whereof, the remedy applied for is denied, and the
application is dismissed, with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.

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CONCURRING

OSTRAND, J.:

I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but I
think it well to call attention to the fact that the record indicates that the
respondent Felisa Asinas has not as yet established a prima facie case
as to her claim to the status of a recognized natural child of the
deceased Mauricio Asinas (see articles 131, 135 and 137 of the Civil
Code in connection with the cases of Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 736 and
Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 Phil., 401).