BASILIA ARAYATA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FLORENTINO JOYA ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

In this instance both parties have appealed from the judgment
of the, Court of First Intsance of Cavite, the dispositive part of which, as
amended, is as follows:

“Wherefore, the testamentary clauses and dispositions made by
the late Cecilio Joya concerning one-half of the property left by the deceased
and pertaining to the plaintiff, are hereby declared void in so far as they
infringe upon said plaintiff’s right, as being contrary to law; the certificate
of sale of lot No. 1058, Exhibit 9, executed by the deceased in favor of
defendant Florentino Joya is null and void, and the plaintiff is hereby declared
the sole and exclusive owner of said lots, or such portions thereof or their
value, as the plaintiff may be entitled to as a result of the liquidation of the
testamentary estate; and each and every one of the defendants, Florentino,
Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, and Delfin and Felicisima
Blancaflor, are hereby ordered to deliver lots Nos. 1031, 1058, 1086, 1153, and
2352 to the administrator of the estate of the deceased in order that he may
proceed to the liquidation, partition and distribution of the latter’s estate in
accordance with the law and this judgment, as soon as it becomes final and
executory, the Director of Lands being hereby ordered to cancel the certificates
of transfer of said lots Nos. 1031, 1058, 1086, 1153 and 2352 registered in the
name of said defendants, Florentino Joya on his own behalf and that of Pablo
Joya, Felicisimo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor,
with the costs of the action against the defendants. So
ordered.”

In support of her appeal, plaintiff-appellant assigns the
following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its decision, to
wit: (1) The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff owner of only one-half
of lots Nos. 1031, 1058, 1086, 1153 and 2352, as conjugal property possessed
with the deceased Cecilio Joya, instead of holding her to be the absolute and
exclusive owner of said lots, in accordance with section 16 of Act No. 1120; (2)
the lower court erred in not holding the document of sale of lot No. 547,
Exhibit 10, fraudulent; (3) the lower court erred in amending its judgment of
December 17, 1926, thereby exempting the defendants from the obligation to pay
plaintiff the products of the lots in question, from the year 1920 until their
restitution; (4) the lower court erred in amending its judgment rendered on
December 17, 1926, ordering the delivery of all the lots in question to the
administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya, in order that he might
proceed to the liquidation and distribution of the latter’s estate in accordance
with the law and its judgment; (5) the lower court erred in not passing upon
petition contained in the complaint to the effect that defendant, Florentino
Joya, who was appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya
in case No. 1241, be relieved from such duty; (6) the lower court erred in
denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

The defendants-appellants, in turn, assign the following
alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its decision, to wit: (1) The
trial court erred in annulling the clauses and provisions of the decedent
Cecilio Joya’s will, Exhibit Y, with respect to one-half of the property left by
said decedent; (2) the trial court erred in holding the certificate of sale of
lot No. 1058, Exhibit 9, executed by the deceased Cecilio Joya in favor of
defendant Florentino Joya, to be null and void; (3) the trial court erred in
finding that when plaintiff signed the agreement of partition, Exhibit 7, she
was unaware of the contents of the same, and that said agreement of partition
has not become legally effective as against the plaintiff; (4) the trial court
erred in holding it to be a fact admitted by both parties that lots 1153 and
2352 were not donated by Pedro Tiongco to Cecilio Joya, the corresponding
certificates of transfer by donation, Exhibits F and G, notwithstanding; (5) the
trial court erred in giving more credit to the testimony of the plaintiff
Basilia Arayata than to that of the defendant Florentino Joya; (6) the trial
court erred in admitting plaintiff’s Exhibits J, M, N and N-1; (7) the trial
court erred in ordering each and every one of the defendants, Florentino,
Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla Delfin and Feliciana Blancaflor to
deliver lots Nos, 1031, 1038, 1086, 1153 and 2352 to the administrator of the
estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya in order that he might proceed with the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the said deceased’s estate in
accordance with the decision rendered in this case by said trial court; (8) the
trial court erred in holding plaintiff to be the sole and exclusive owner of the
lots in question, or such portions thereof, or their value as may be due her as
a result of said liquidation.

The following are the pertinent and uncontroverted facts
necessary for the decision of this case:

Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased
parents the right of lease to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Cruz de
Malabon, municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite. On June 4,1906, Cecilio Joya
married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government
acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with
the’provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the
Philippine Commission. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio
Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the
Government/ under said Act No. 1120, which were designated as lots Nos. 1031
(Exhibit C), 1058 (Exhibit D), 1086 (Exhibit E), 1153 (Exhibit F), 2352 (Exhibit
G) and 547 (Exhibit H). As the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire
under the law was limited, lots Nos. 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for
sale. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them,
supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred
his right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation, as appears from Exhibits F
and G. These transfers were approved by the Director of Lands and noted in the
proper registry book. On April 24, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot
No. 1058 to Florentino Joya in consideration of the sum of P2,000 said
conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the
proper registry book (Exhibit 9). On May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his
right to lot No. 547 to Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of
the sum of P450, said conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands
and registered in the proper registry book (Exhibit 10). On April 27, 1919,
Cecilio Joya executed a will devising lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya, lot No.
1086 to Pablo Joya, lot No. 1031 to Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, lot No.
1153 to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, lot No. 2352 to Feliciano and
Asuncion BobaSilla, and lot No. 547 (Exhibit Y) to Marcelina and Francisca Joya.
At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the payment of the
price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in
question except lot No. 547, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy
their products. On may 10,1920, lots Nos. 2352, 1086, 1153 and 1031, were
transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Cecilio Joya. (Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6.)

On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his
executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate
to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper
proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary proceedings, the
executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the
legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein
plaintiff’s opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained by
fraud.

The questions to be determined in this appeal are purely legal,
and, briefly, are as follows: (1) Were Cecilio Joya’s conveyances of his
interest in lot No. 1958 to Florentino Joya and in No. 547 to the sisters
Marcelina and Francisca Joya fraudulent? (2) Were Cecilio Joya’s legacies of
lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153 and 2352 to the other defendants null and void? (3)
Has the plaintiff-appellant, as the surviving spouse, exclusive right to all the
lots in question? (4) In case she has, is she entitled to the possession and
products thereof?

As to the first question, the pertinent part of section 16 of
Act No. 1120 says the following:

“SEC. 16. * * * In case the holder of the certificate shall
have sold his interest in the land before having complied with all the
conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be
entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon presenting his
assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for
registration.”

It will be seen that the holder of a certificate of sale of
friar lands has a right to sell his interest therein, even before having fully
paid the purchase price and upon presentation of the certificate of transfer to
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration,he is subrogated to all
the rights of the holder of the certificate.

The evidence shows that during his lifetime Cecilio Joya
conveyed his interest in lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya for the sum of P2,000,
said conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands, and registered in
the proper register book of said office. (Exhibit 9.) His right to lot No. 547
was also conveyed by Cecilio Joya to Marcelina and Francisca Joya during his
lifetime, said transfer having been approved by the Director of Lands, and
registered in the proper book in the Bureau of Public Lands. (Exhibit 10.) Said
conveyance having been made in accordance with the provisions of the law,
Florentino Joya on the one hand, and Marcelina and Francisca Joya on the other,
were subrogated to all of Cecilio Joya’s rights to said lots, and there is
nothing in the record to show conclusively that said conveyances were
fraudulently obtained. The fact that the testator included said lots in his will
and disposed of them in the form of legacies in favor of said persons, does not
in itself show the existence of any fraud. At most, it may be held as an act of
ratification.

In regard to the second and third questions, that is, whether
or not the legacies are null and void, and the plaintiff-appellant, as the
surviving spouse, is entitled exclusively to the lots in question, the pertinent
part of said section 16 of Act No. 1120 provides as follows:

“SEC. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a
certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof,
prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow
shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in ,the certificate upon
showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of
the same.”

In the case of Jocson vs. Soriano, as administrator of the
intestate estate of Silvestre Estacion (45 Phil., 375), this court, interpreting
the above-quoted legal provision, laid down the following doctrine:

“FRIAR ESTATE LANDS; RIGHTS OF THE WIDOW OF THE PURCHASER AFTER
THE DEATH OF THE LATTER.—Under the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120, the
widow of a purchaser of a parcel of land belonging to the Friar Estate,
purchased by the Government, after the death of her husband (the purchaser), is
entitled to have a patent issued to her for the lands purchased, upon a proper
showing that she has completed the payment of the purchase price. The right
granted to the original settlers of the friar estate lands to purchase the
parcel or parcels occupied by them at the time of the purchase by the
Government, is a right conceded by the Government, analogous to the homestead
laws. A homestead privilege does not terminate on the husband’s dieath, but is
transferred to his widow and his family. A homestead selected by the husband in
his lifetime vests absolute in his surviving wife, and her rights are governed
by the law in force at the time of the death of her husband. Neither does she
lose said right by a second marriage upon the death of her husband, the
purchaser. She may continue to occupy the whole of the
homestead.”

We have seen, in discussing and solving the first question,
that the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands, who has not fully paid
the purchase price may transfer and convey his rights, but that the transferee
or grantee is not subrogated to all the transferor’s rights until the transfer
has been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the registry book
in the Bureau of Public Lands. In other words, in order that a transfer of the
rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally
effective, it is necessary at a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and
submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and
registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a
holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. It provides, however, that in
case of the death of said holder, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to
receive the title to the land, upon compliance with the requirements of the law.
If, as it was held in the aforecited case of Jocson vs. Soriano, the right
conferred by Act No. 1120 on the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands
is similar to that conferred on the holder of a “homestead,” and if the latter
has no right to dispose of said certificate by will to the prejudice of his
surviving spouse and of his children (29 C. J., 930, par. 342), then, by
analogy, the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands cannot dispose of
his rights to said lands by will to the prejudice of his widow and children.

The provisions of the Civil Code referring to conjugal property
cannot be applied in this case, as was done by the trial court, because the law
regulating the acquisition, disposition, and transmission of rights to the friar
lands acquired by the Insular Government, lays down rules in conflict with the
aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code; and as the said Code is of a general
character, while Act No. 1120 is a special law, the latter should prevail.

With respect to the fourth question raised, namely, whether or
not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the
products of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government, which, by virtue
of the law, pass exclusively to the surviving spouse upon compliance of the
legal requirements, the answer must be in the affirmative. The defendants, who
are in possession of the said lands, cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code relative to possession in good faith, inasmuch as the principle on which
the right of a holder in good faith is based is the belief that his possession
is with just title under claim of ownership.

While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the
property given them in the will and may take possession of their respective
portions upon the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an
administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the
possession of the property of estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless
he consents to the heirs continuing in possession thereof. But such consent does
not, however, relieve the administrator of all responsibility for the management
of the same and its fruits; because until the judicial partition is made, said
property continues to belong to the testamentary estate. (Pimentel vs. Palanca,
5 Phil., 436; Fernandez vs. Tria, 22 Phil., 603.)

Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead
ignorance of the fact that until a judicial partition of the property left by
Cecilio Joya is made, said property belongs to the latter’s estate and it,
together with its products, is subject to the payment of the testator’s debts,
if any. Only after judicial partition has been made do they acquire the title to
their respective legacies, if the latter are valid. (Santos vs. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil., 895.)

We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the
defendants were void. If the lands, which are the subject matter of said
legacies and which are in the possession of the defendants, still belong to
Cecilio Joya’s estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been made of the
property he left, which is subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of
his debts, said defendants cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with
respect to possession in good faith insofar as the fruits are concerned; because
even when the legacies are valid they are acquired only. When the latter are
judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because, while said
lands are under administration, the administrator is obliged to render an
account of his management of the same and the products thereof.

In conclusion, then, we hold that the defendants are not
entitled to the possession of the lands in question or their products, and they
are bound to return them to the herein plaintiff-appellant, after deducting the
necessary expenses for cultivation and preservation. (Art 453, Civil Code.)

Summarizing all that has been said above, we find:

1. That Cecilio Joya’s transfers during his lifetime of lot No. 1058 to
   Florentino Joya and lot No. 547 to the sisters Marcelina and Francisca Joya,
   with the approval of the Director of Lands, are bona fide, and
   therefore legal and valid.

2. That Cecilio Joya’s legacies in his will of lot No. 1031 to Delfin and
   Felicisima Blancaflor, lot No. 1086 to Pablo Joya, lot No. 1152 to the brothers
   Agustin and Pedro Joya, and lot No. 2352 to Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla are
   null and void, being contrary to the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120,
   which grants his widow, the herein plaintiff-appellant, the ownership of the
   lands purchased and not transferred by him during his lifetime, provided that
   she complies with the legal requirements for the purchase of the same.

3. The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the exclusive ownership and
   possession of the aforementioned lots Nos. 1031, 1086,1153, and 2352 and to
   their fruits, after deducting the necessary expenses of preservation,
   cultivation and production.

For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, and
it is ordered that Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, Delfin and
Felicisima Blancaflor return lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153, and 2352 to the
plaintiff-appellant, Basilia Arayata, together with their products, or the
latter’s equivalent in cash from the year 1920 until their restitution,
deducting the necessary expenses of cultivation, preservation, and production.
Without any special pronouncement as to costs, it is so ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.