RAMON A. GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, AND AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction.

Petitioner therein prays for judgment:

1)  Restraining: (a) the
Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from
performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the
ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions
Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Phil­ippines, approved on
March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to
said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any
disburse­ment from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No.
4913; and

2)  declaring said Act
unconstitutional and void.

The main facts are not disputed. 
On March 16, 1967,
the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1.    
R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses)
No. 1, pro­posing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Phil­ippines,
be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives
from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of
180, to be appor­tioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be accord­ing
to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall
have, at least, one (1) member;

2.    
R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention
to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of
two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
“elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;” and

3.    
R.B.H. No. 3, proposing that
Section 16, Arti­cle VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to author­ize
senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional conven­tion, without forfeiting their respective
seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos.
1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elec­tions
which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. 
At the hearing thereof, on October
28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of
respondents.  Moreover, Atty. Juan T.
David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Associa­tion — hereinafter
referred to as the PHILCONSA — were allowed to argue as amici
curiae.  Said counsel for the PHIL­CONSA,
Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise, prayed that the de­cision
in this case be deferred until after a substantially iden­tical case — brought
by said organization before the Commis­sion on Elections,^[1]
which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all
probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto for final
determina­tion, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both
cases.  In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this
Court the petition in G.R. No. L-28224 for review by certiorari of the
resolution of the Commission on Elections^[2]
dismissing the petition therein.  The two
(2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of
respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of
respondent in L-28224.

Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a
Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. 
He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class suit, for and in
behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.  Although respondents and the Solicitor
General have filed an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the
ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the
truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one.  In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the
Solicitor General ex­pressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of
the merits of the issues raised in said case.

The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is
to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines
and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever
source.  Despite his aforemen­tioned
statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains
that this Court has no jurisdic­tion over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon
the ground that the same is “merely political” as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.^[3]
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the
Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition
therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition
upon the ground:  a) that the Court has
no jurisdiction either to grant the re­lief sought in the petition, or to pass
upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that
the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render inoperational
the legislative department; and c) that “the failure of Congress to enact
a valid reapportionment law x x x
does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of
Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and
void.”

J u r i s d i c t i o n

As early as Angara vs. Electoral
Commission,^[4]
this Court – speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional
Convention and a respected professor of Consti­tutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel
– declared that “the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of power between
the several departments and among the integral or constitutional constituent
units thereof.”

It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito,^[5]
this Court, characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one,
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast
in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution – which was
being submitted to the people for ratification – satisfied the three-fourths
vote requirement of the fundamental law. 
The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,^[6] Avelino vs. Cuenco,^[7] Tañada vs. Cuenco,^[8]
and Macias vs. Commis­sion on Elections.^[9]
In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate;
in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf
of the party having the second largest num­ber of votes therein, of two (2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional and
act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the
House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been
made as nearly as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province.  Thus we rejected the
theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers
to Congress.^[10]
It is part of the inherent powers of the people – as the repository of
sov­ereignty in a republican state, such as ours^[11]
– to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.  Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.^[12]
Hence, when exer­cising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly.  When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their author­ity from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function,^[13]
for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are
the very source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to
the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say
on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.  Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a govern­ment of laws,
not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution.  Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that,
the Con­stitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,^[14]
the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,^[15]
despite the eminently political character of the treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Con­gress –
acting as a constituent assembly – violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand
taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,^[16]
the latter should be deemed modified accordingly.  The Members of the Court are unanimous on
this point.

The Merits

Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amend­ed, reads:

“The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution
or call a convention for that purpose. 
Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.”

Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be
proposed, either by Congress, or by a conven­tion called by Congress for that
purpose.  In either case, the vote of
“three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately” is neces­sary.  And, “such amendments shall be valid as
part of” the ‘Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the peo­ple for their
ratification.”

In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3
have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately.  This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said
resolutions are null and void because:

1.   
The Members of Congress, which
approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congress­men;

2.   
Congress may adopt either one
of two alternatives – propose amendments or call a convention therefore
– but may not avail of both – that is to say, propose amendment and call
a convention – at the same time;

3.   
The election, in which proposals
for amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be
a special election, not a general election, in which
officers of the national and local governments – such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 – will be chosen; and

4.   
The spirit of the Constitution
demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be sub­mitted
to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions – which,
allegedly, do not exist – as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to
have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments.

Legality of
Congress and

Legal Status
of the Congressmen

The first objection is based upon Section 5, Arti­cle VI, of the
Constitution, which provides:

“The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be ac­cording to the number of their respective
inhab­itants, but each province shall have at least one Member.  The Congress shall by law make an apportionment
within three years after the re­turn of every enumeration, and not
otherwise.  Until such apportionment
shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number
of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elect­ed
by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts.  Each representative district shall comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.”

It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in
1960; that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years
thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members
became illegal; that Con­gress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto
Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that,
conse­quently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.

It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an
apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census made in
1960.  It did actually pass a bill, which
became Republic Act No. 3040,^[17]
purporting to make said apportionment. 
This Act was, however, declared uncon­stitutional, upon the ground that
the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to the number
of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines.^[18]

Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of
the failure of Congress to make a valid ap­portionment within the period stated
in the Constitution, Congress became an “unconstitutional Congress”
and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives
are de facto officers.  The major
premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on
“apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration,
and not otherwise,” is mandatory. 
The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said
apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with
such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its
Members have become de facto officers.

It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in
1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental
law.  The effect of this omission has
been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:

“x x x
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives
shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National
Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts.  x x x.”

The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration
of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is
dissolved or becomes illegal.  On the
contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to
function with the representative dis­tricts existing at the time of the
expiration of said period.

It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the
elections held in 1935.  This theory
assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the
first elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
or in 1938.^[19]
The as­sumption is, however, unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in
1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made.  Those who drafted and adopted the
Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period,
after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in
1938.

What is more, considering that several provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those on the legislative de­partment, were amended
in 1940, by establishing a bica­meral Congress, those who drafted and adopted
said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original
Constitution regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives,
must have known that the three-year period therefor
would expire after the elections scheduled to be held and actually held in
1941.

Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and
ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof
in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and
the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent
elections.

Then again, since the report of the Director of the Cen­sus on
the last enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the
three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963,
or after the Presidential elections in 1961. 
There can be no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of
Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure
bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure
officers.  Pursuant to the theory of
petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in
1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House
of Representatives, became illegal holders of their respective offices, and
were de facto officers.

Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year
period, without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing
the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of
Representatives, and we are not aware of any rule or principle of law that
would warrant such conclusion.  Neither
do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House
automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their
seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment.  In fact, neither our political law, in
general, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that
failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it maybe, would automatically
result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this
effect.

Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provisions of our
Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not
repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment
within three (3) years after the census of 1960.  Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were
presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions
creating Congress – with a House of Representatives composed of members elected
by qualified voters of representative districts as they exist­ed at the time of
said elections – remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the
House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers
owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment
within the period aforementioned.

Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment
of the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable
violation of the Constitution,^[20]
the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but, also their
main function.  This provision indicates
that, despite the vio­lation of such mandatory duty, the title to their
respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a
judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the
Constitution.  In short, the loss of
office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.

Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress
are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the
contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void.  In fact, the main reason for the existence of
the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts
of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute
be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public – as distinguished from the
officer in question – is concerned.^[21]
Indeed, otherwise, those deal­ing with officers and employees of the Government
would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the
position they hold, before dealing with them, or be­fore recognizing
their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the
limits of the authority vest­ed in their respective offices, positions or
employments.^[22]
One can imagine the great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result
in the absence of the de facto doctrine.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer
can­not be assailed collaterally.^[23]
It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings.  Neither may the validity of
his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto
officer.^[24]  And the reasons are obvious:  (1) it would be an indirect inquiry
into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto
officer, if within the compe­tence of his office, are valid, insofar as the
public is con­cerned.

It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases
at bar because the acts therein involved have not been completed and
petitioners herein are not third parties. 
This pretense is untenable.  It is
inconsistent with Tayko vs. Ca­pistrano.^[25]
In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano
objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he
had reached the age of retirement.  This
Court held that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was
at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed
collaterally.  It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was
concerned.  Tayko
was one of the parties in the aforemen­tioned suit.  Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet,
fin­ished hearing the case, much less rendered a decision therein.  No rights had vested in favor of any of the
parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge.  Yet, Tayko’s
objection was overruled.  Needless to
say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions
herein contested and Re­public Act No. 4913, are complete.  Congress has nothing else to do in connection
therewith.

The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the ob­jection
under consideration is untenable.

Alternatives
Available

to Congress

Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains
that Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention
for that purposed, but it cannot do both, at the same time.  This theory is based upon the fact that the
two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive
“or.” Such basis is, however, weak one, in the absence of other circumstances
– and none has been brought to our attention – supporting the conclusion drawn
by the amicus curiae.  In
fact, the term “or” has, oftentimes, been held to mean
“and,” or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants
it.^[26]

It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose
amendments to the constitutional provisions on Congress, to be submitted
to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for
a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the
Constitution, in general.  In
other words, the subject-matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of
R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.  Moreover, the
amendments proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for
ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional con­vention called in R.B.H. No. 2.  Again, although the three (3) resolutions
were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately,
or one after the other.  In other
words, they were not passed at the same time.

In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in
the history thereof, anything that would negate the authority of different
Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to
pass the same in different sessions or different days of the same congressional
session.  And, neither has any plausible
reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said
resolutions on the same day.

Counsel ask:  Since
Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments,
why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of,
likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification
before said convention is held?  The
force of this argument must be conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom
of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it.  One seeming purpose thereof is to permit
Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional
convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their
seats in Congress.  Whether or not this
should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of
justice.

On this question there is no disagreement among the members of
the Court.

May Constitutional Amendments

Be Submitted
for Ratification

in a General Election?

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

“x x x The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose.  Such amendments shall be valid
as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.”

There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the
“election” therein referred to is a “special,” not a
general election.  The circumstance that
three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people
for ratifi­cation in special elections merely shows that Congress deem­ed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining.  It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion
of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people’s approval
independently of the election of public officials.  And there is no denying the fact that an adequate
appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of
personalities in­volved in general elections, particularly when provincial and
municipal officials are to be chosen. 
But, then, these con­siderations are addressed to the wisdom of holding
a plebi­scite simultaneously with the election of public officers.  They do not deny the authority of Congress to
choose either alternative, as implied in the term “election” used,
without qualification, in the above-quoted provision of the Constitu­tion.  Such authority becomes even more patent when
we con­sider:  (1) that the term
“election,” normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates
to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of
the Constitu­tion, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not “elec­tion,”
but “plebiscite.”

Petitioners maintain that the term “election,” as used
in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special
election.  Some members of the Court even
feel that said term (“election”) refers to a “plebiscite,” without
any “election,” general or special, of public officers.  They opine that constitutional amendments
are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and
vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused
exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may
reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the
merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by
extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political
considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.

This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for.  It is a goal the attainment of which should
be promoted.  The ideal conditions are,
however, one thing.  The question whether
the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amend­ment to
the people except under such conditions, is another thing.  Much as the writer and those who concur in
this opin­ion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to
subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Con­stitution what they
believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter
thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer
speculation.

The majority view – although the votes in favor thereof are
insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitu­tional – as ably set
forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.

Would the submission now of the

contested
amendments to the

people
violate the spirit of

the Constitution?

It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved
on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had
practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question.  Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No.
4913 provides:

(1)  
that “the amendments shall be
published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty
days prior to the election;”

(2)  
that “a printed copy of the
proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place
not later than October 14,
1967,” and that said copy “shall remain posted therein
until after the election;”

(3)  
that “at least five copies of
said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for
exami­nation by the qualified electors during election day;”

(4)  
that “when practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;”

(5)  
that “the Commission on
Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish
and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution;” and

(6)  
that the contested Resolutions
“shall be printed in full” on the back of the ballots which shall be
used on November 14, 1967.

We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are
palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that
proposals for amendment be “submitted to the people for their
ratification,” and that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a
constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendments sought to be
made.

These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the
people of the subject submitted to them for ratifica­tion, from the original
Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. 
Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200,
provides:

“Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall
be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed
copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted
in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office
building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of
April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the election.  At least ten copies of the Constitution with
the Ordinance append­ed thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at
each polling place available for examina­tion by the qualified electors during
election day.  Whenever practicable, copies
in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the Sec­retary of the
Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.”

The provision concerning woman’s suffrage in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:

“Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the
Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at
least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be
posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building
and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April,
nineteen hundred and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted there­in continually
until after the termination of the plebiscite. 
At least ten copies of the said Arti­cle V of the Constitution, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place avail­able for
examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite.  Whenever practicable, copies in the principal
native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the In­terior, shall
also be kept in each polling place.”

Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, re­ferring to the
1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:

“The said amendments shall be publish­ed in English and
Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty
days prior to the election.  A printed
copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city,
and pro­vincial government office building and in every polling place not later
than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein
until after the election.  At least ten
copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during election day.  When practicable, copies in the principal
native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall
also be kept therein.”

As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73
is to the effect that:

“The said amendment shall be publish­ed in English and Spanish
in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior
to the election.  A printed copy there­of
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city and provincial
government office building and in every polling place not later than February
eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until
after the election.  At least, ten copies
of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available
for examination by the quali­fied electors during election day.  When prac­ticable, copies in the principal
native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall
also be kept in each polling place.”

The main difference between the present situation and that
obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law
enacted therefor. 
The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political
parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution – except,
perhaps, the woman’s suffrage – and, consequently, debated thereon at some
length before the plebiscite took place. 
Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an
issue on the amendments now being contested and have, ac­cordingly, refrained
from discussing the same in the current political campaign.  Such debates or polemics as may have taken
place – on a rather limited scale – on the latest proposals for amendment, have
been due principally to the ini­tiative of a few civic organizations and some
militant mem­bers of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon.  A legislation cannot, however, be nullified
by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it
sufficiently.  Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the
time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law
enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the
passage or approval of the law.

Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment,
the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a consti­tutional angle, of the
submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends
– in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this
phase of the case, constitute the minority – upon whether the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fair­ly apprise the people of the gist,
the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is – under R.B.H. No. 1
– the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives,
from 120 to 180, and – under R.B.H. No. 3 – the authority given to the members
of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if
elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting
their seats in Congress.  We – who
constitute the minority – believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of
the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by
R.B.H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines.  It is not improbable, how­ever, that they are
not interested in the details of the ap­portionment, or that a careful reading
thereof may tend, in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof.  Upon the other hand, those who are more
sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of
the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling
places and the text of the contested resolutions, as printed in full on the
back of the bal­lots they will use.

It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more,
may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R.B.H. No. 3 upon the work of the
Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic.  But, then, nobody can foretell such effect
with certainty.  From our viewpoint, the
provi­sions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R.B.H. No. 3 permits Con­gressmen to retain their seats
as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of
delegates to the Convention.

We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished
and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors
affect the wisdom a Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and
3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same.

The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power
to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines
set forth in the funda­mental law is not in derogation of the principle of
separation of powers, pursuant to which each departments is supreme within its
own sphere.  The determination of the
conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people
is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere.  We do not believe it has been satisfac­torily
shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act
No. 4913.  Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof.  But, then, no law is perfect.  No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement.  Otherwise, no legislation
would be constitutional and valid.  Six
(6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3
violate the spirit of the Constitution.

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and
invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby,
dismissed, and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pro­nouncement
as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs fully
with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of Jurisdiction.

Sanchez, J., renders a separate
opinion.

Reyes, Dizon, and Angeles, JJ., concur in the
result reached in the separate opinion of Justice Sanchez.

Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur in the
separate opinion of Justice Sanchez.

---

^[1]
Urging the latter to refrain from implementing Republic Act No. 4913 and from
submitting to a plebiscite in the general elections to be held on November 14, 1967, the
Constitutional amendments proposed in the aforementioned R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.

^[2]
Dated October 30, 1967.

^[3]
78 Phil., 1.

^[4]
63 Phil., 139, 157.

^[5] Supra.

^[6]
81 Phil., 818.

^[7] L-2851,
March 4 and 14, 1949.

^[8]
L-10520, February 28, 1957.

^[9]
L-18684, September 14, 1961.

^[10]
Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[11]
Section 1, Art. II, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[12]
Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[13]
Of amending the Constitution.

^[14]
And, inferentially, to lower courts.

^[15]
Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII, of the Constitution.

^[16] Supra.

^[17]
Approved, June 17, 1961.

^[18]
Macias vs. Commission on Elections, supra.

^[19] Under
the original Constitution providing for a unicameral legislative body, whose
members were chosen for a term of three (3) years (Section 1, Art. VI, of the
Original Constitution).

^[20]
Section 1, Article IX, of the Constitution.

^[21] Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los
Angeles, 37 Phil., p. 192; Nacionalista Party vs.
De Vera, 85 Phil., 126; Codilla vs. Martinez,
L-14569, November 23, 1960.  See, also,
State vs. Carrol, 38 Conn., 449; Wilcox vs.
Smith 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan’s Case, 122 Mass., 445;
23 Am. Rep., 323.

^[22]
Torres vs. Ribo, 81 Phil., 50.

^[23] Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, supra.

^[24]
People vs. Rogelio Gabitanan, 43 O.G., 3211.

^[25]
53 Phil., 866.

^[26]
50 Am. Jur., Sec. 282, pp. 267-268, citing Heckathorn v. Heckathorn,
284 Mich 677, 280 NW 79, citing RCL; Robson v.
Cantwell, 143 SC 104, 141 SE 180, citing RCL; Geiger v. Kobilka, 26 Wash 171, 66 P 423, 90 Am St. Rep. 733 and many
others.

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