MATEO J. PABULARIO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE HONORABLE POMPEYO L. PALARCA, CITY JUDGE OF ILIGAN CITY, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

Appeal by Pompeyo Palarca, as respond­ent
in Case No. 582 of the Court of First In­stance
of Lanao del Norte, from a decision thereof
granting the writ of certiorari therein
prayed for.

Said case had been instituted against Palarca
because, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Iligan City, he had denied a motion to quash, filed by the
petitioner in the aforementioned
certiorari proceeding, Mateo J. Pabulario, as defendant in Criminal
Case No. 1509-AF of said municipal court, the information therein alleging:

“That on or about July 26, 1961, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the juris­diction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the chauffeur and person in charge of a truck bearing Plate
No. T-9000 and owned by one Luois Lee, did
then and there wilfully, un­lawfully and feloniously
drive and operate the said truck while passing along the intersection of Sabayle and Luna Streets, this city in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations
and ordinances and without taking the necessary pre­caution to prevent
accident, to persons and dam­age to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence, said truck driven and operated by him to bump and
hit a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. AC-4528, driven and operated by one Florentino Ermac and owned by one
Carlos Suband, thereby causing actual damages to the
said passenger jeep in the total amount of P397.00, Philippine Currency, and
causing physical injuries to the following per­sons who were passengers of the
said passenger jeep, to wit:

“Physical injury to one Maemona Dinal de Panandegan, a passenger
of the jeep, to wit:

“Very slight bluish discoloration on left
arm near the anterior part of elbow, which injury will require medical
attendance for a period of from two (2) to three (3) days.

“Physical injury to one Macalewan Panandegan, a passenger of the jeep, to wit:

“Slight abrasion on the right lower ex­tremity
which injury will require a medical at­tendance for a period of from two (2) to
three (3) days.

to the damage and
prejudice of the said Carlos Subang in the aforesaid
sum of P397.00, Phil­ippine Currency.

“Contrary to and in violation of Article 365 in relation with Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.”

as well as Pabulario’s a motions to reconsider the order denying said
motion to quash.

The latter was predicated upon the theory that said information
charged more than one offense, namely, that of dam­age to property through
reckless imprudence and that of multi­ple slight physical injuries, likewise,
through reckless im­prudence.  Pabulario’s petition for certiorari in case No. 582 was, in
turn, anchored upon the proposition that said municipal court of Iligan City is without jurisdiction to hear the aforemen­tioned
Criminal Case No. 1509-Af, and that the order of Judge Palarca
denying said motion to quash and Pabulario’s motions
for reconsideration are null and void.

Inasmuch as the decision of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte sustained the foregoing contention of Pabu­lario, respondent Judge Palarca
interposed the present appeal, which we find to be well taken.  The issue in the case at bar is substantially
identical to that decided in People vs. Cano,^[1]
in which we held:

“The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that
the offense of slight physi­cal injuries thru reckless negligence cannot be complexed with that of damage to property with multiple
physical injuries thru reckless im­prudence, because ‘misdemeanor’ may not,
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, be complexed
with grave or less grave felonies.

“However, the information herein does not purport to complex
the offense of slight phy­sical injuries with reckless imprudence with that of
damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
impru­dence.  It is merely alleged in the
information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by
him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical
injuries, upon others less serious physical in­juries and upon still others
slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to property.  Ap­pellee and the
lower court have seemingly pre­sumed that said information thereby charges two
offenses, namely:  (1) slight physical in­juries
thru reckless imprudence and (2) dam­age to property, and serious and less
serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence — which are sought to be complexed.  This as­sumption
is, in turn, apparently premised upon the predicate that the effect or
consequence of defendant’s negligence, not the neg­ligence itself, is the
principal or vital factor in said offenses. 
Such predicate is not alto­gether accurate.

“As early as July 28,
1955, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, had the
occasion to state, in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace
of Bacolor, Pampanga (G. R.
No. L­-6641), that:

‘The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code)
that ‘”reckless imprudence’” is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it
and merely determines ‘”lower de­cree of
criminal liability”’ is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.  There are crimes that by their structure can
not be committed through imprudence: 
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc.  In truth, criminal neg­ligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt separately from
willful offenses.  It is not a mere
question of classifica­tion or terminology. 
In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is prin­cipally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the danger­ous recklessness, lack of care or fore­sight; the
“imprudencia punible“.
Much of the confusion has arisen from the com­mon use of such
descriptive phrases as “’homicide through reckless imprudence'” and
the like; when the strict technical of­fense is, more accurately
“’reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’;” or “‘simple imprudence
causing damages to property’.”

‘Were criminal negligence but a mo­dality in the commission of
felonies, ope­rating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the
one actually committed. 
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty
should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed wilfully. 
For each penalty for the wilful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligence variety.  But instead,
our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum if
the wilful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case.  It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.’

“Thirdly, regardless of whether the issue
adverted to above should be decided in the
affirmative
or in the negative, the proper procedure for the lower court was to
reserve the resolution thereof until after the case has been heard on the merits, when
decision is rendered thereon, there being no question that the court has
jurisdiction and can pro­perly try the defendant for damage to property and serious or less serious
physical injuries thru reck­less negligence. 
It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting
from a single act; or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the
imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties
for each of the aforesaid crimes, which, put together may be graver than the
penalty for the most serious offense.

“Fourthly, from the viewpoint both of trial practice and justice,
it is, to
say the least, doubtful whether
the prosecution should split the action against the defendant, by filing
against him several informations, namely, one for
damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
negligence, before the court of first instance, and another for slight physical
injuries thru reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace or municipal
courts.  One thing is, however, certain. 
Such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of
justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the
presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the municipal court
and the court of first instance.  Worse
still, in the event of conviction in the municipal court, and appeal to the court of first Instance, said evidence
would still have to be introduced once more in the latter court.

Herein petitioner-appellee has not
advanced any reason, and we find none, to warrant a departure from the
foregoing ruling.

It should be noted, also, that, assuming for the sake of argument
only, that the information under
consideration alleges two (2) different and separate offenses, it does not
follow that the municipal court of Iligan City had no
jurisdiction to hear the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 1509-AF, inasmuch as
the offense of damage to property amounting to P397.00, through reckless
negligence, and that of multiple slight physical injuries, through reckless
negligence, above referred to, are within
the jurisdiction of said court.  Again,
the order denying the motion to quash and the orders denying the motions for
reconsideration, even if hypothetically erro­neous, were not null and
void.”

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is here­by reversed and another
one shall be entered dismissing the petition in said Case No. 582 of the Court
of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, and denying the
writ therein prayed, with costs against petitioner-appellee
Mateo J. Pabulario.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
G. R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966.