CONSTANTE PIMENTEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C. SALANGA, RESPONDENT.

Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition
is the right of respondent judge of the Court of First nstance
of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV)
to sit in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel.  Petitioner’s petition recites the facts that follow:

Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge, viz:

(1)
Civil Case 21-C, entitled “Pablo Festejo, et al., petitioners,
vs. Marciano Cabildo, et
al., respondents”, a special civil action for mandamus to compel payment
of salaries of elective and appointive municipal officials; petitioner is
counsel for principal respondent, Acting Mayor Brigido Vilog;

(2) Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, entitled “People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, vs.
Constante Anies, accused”,
for
frustrated murder; petitioner is the private prosecutor therein;

(3) Criminal Case C-93, entitled “People of the Philip­pines,
plaintiff, vs.
Romeo Pimentel, accused”, for frustrated homicide; petitioner is defense
counsel therein;

(4) Election Case 2470, entitled “Avelino
Balbin, protestant, vs. Clemente
Abaya, protestee,” an
election protest involving the office of mayor of Candon,
Ilocos Sur; petitioner is
counsel for protestant therein.

Petitioner’s misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant
in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent
judge upon averments of “serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and
incompetence.”^[1]
Petitioner seeks in the complaint therein to have respondent judge immediately suspended from office and,
after due notice and hearing, removed therefrom.  The judge’s return traversed the factual
averments.  Whereupon, this Court, on July 13, 1967, referred the
administrative case to Mr.
Justice Eulogio Serrano of the Court of Appeals “for investigation, report and
recommendation.” That case is
still pending.

On July 31, 1967,
petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case
21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid.  He there prayed that the records of those
cases be transferred to another sala, either at Narvacan or Vigan, both of Ilocos Sur.

On August 1,
1967, respondent
judge rejected the foregoing motion. 
He stood his ground with the statement that the administrative complaint
against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court; that
Civil Case 21-6 and Electoral
Case 2470 “are now on the final stages of termination” and transfer
thereof to another sala
“would only delay their final disposition, make the parties
suffer [from] further efforts and expenses”, and “would be
violative” of Administrative Order 371 of the
Department of Justice defining the court’s territorial jurisdiction; and that
he is “sworn to administer justice in accordance with the law and the
merits of the cases to be heard and decided by him.” Civil Case
21-C was then calendared for
August 10 and 11, 1967.

A move to
reconsider the foregoing resolution failed of its purpose.  Civil Case 21-C was rescheduled for hearing from August 10 and 11, 1967 to August 22 and 23, 1967.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner makes his case
along the following lines:  Immediate resolution
of the problem of disqualification “is a matter of profound importance, particularly
on his career and potential as a practitioner of law; his cases “may fall
by the accident of raffle into the sala of respondent
Judge” and he cannot “resign from an accepted case every time it
falls” therein; his clients will have “the natural hesitation to
retain as counsel one who is sort of unacceptable to the
presiding judge.” Petitioner winds up with a prayer that respondent judge
be stopped from further sitting in or otherwise trying or deciding the cases
heretofore mentioned.  He asks for the
issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte.

We now resolve the petition.

Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an
administrative case said counsel lodged against him?

The answer is to
be sought
within the terms of Section 1,
Rule 137, Rules of Court,^[2]
which reads in full:

“SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.  – No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
accord­ing to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.”

Petitioner says that, arguably, his case comes within the coverage of the second paragraph of the rule just quoted.  The theory
advocated is that the present (1964) rules for the first time provide a broad policy-oriented ground
for disqualification of judges.  It is submission that a judge may now be
barred from the bench in specific cases
for reasons other than those enumerated in the law.  He stressed that respondent judge, in the factual environment
presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he refused to
disqualify himself from acting in the
cases referred to.

Before the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules, came into being, law and
early jurisprudence gave no room for a judge, on objection of a party, to
disqualify himself, absent any of the specific grounds for disqualification set
forth in the law.  The following from People vs. Moreno [1949], 83 Phil. 286, 294, is expressive of the rule:  “To take or not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon the
discretion of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case.  It is his duty not to sit in its trial
and decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to
proceed with the trial and decision of the case.  He cannot shirk the responsibility without
the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction.”^[3]
Then came Del Castillo vs. Javelona,
G.R. No. L-16742, September 29, 1962,
from which sprang the added second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, afore-quoted.  In Del Castillo, the judge
inhibited himself from the case because the lawyer of the party defendant was
his first cousin.^[4]
The judge felt that if defendant should win, his blood relationship with
defendant’s lawyer might cast some suspicion on his integrity; but, if defendant be the
defeated party, it might bring unpleasant consequences.  Plaintiff protested the judge’s posture.  In upholding the judge, we declared:

“x
x x Obviously, Rule
126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge
upon being challenged and under which he should disqualify himself.  The rule, however, has
never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily
inhibiting
himself, in the absence of any challenge
by either party,
due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties. 
Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases
of voluntary inhibition, based on good,
sound and/our ethical grounds, is a matter
of discretion on the part of the
judge and the official who is empowered
to act upon the request for such inhibition.

x                               x                         x

x x x In other words,
while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not include nor
preclude cases and
circumstances for voluntary
inhibition which depends upon the discretion
of the officers concerned.“^[5]

The Del Castillo opinion
made the pointed observation that the cases cited by plaintiff are instances
where the judge was challenged – not cases of voluntary inhibition.  Indeed, as early as 1931, clear intimation
there was that voluntary inhibition upon sound grounds may be recognized, when
this Court said in one case^[6]:  “x x x It is true that if Judge Garduno had abstained from trying
the case at bar, there would have been less
susceptibility to suspicion.   But, as a matter
of law, the grounds for the motion of recusation do
not constitute a legal cause for the disqualification of a judge.”

Thus, the genesis of the
provision (paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137), not to say the letter
thereof, clearly illumines the course of construction we should take.  The exercise of sound discretion
– mentioned in the rule – has reference exclusively to a situation where a
judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case.^[7]
For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph Section 1,
Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise.  Better stated yet, when a judge does
not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been – he has to continue with the case.

So it is, that the state
of the law, with respect to the situation before us, is unaffected by
the amendment (paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137) introduced in the 1964 Rules.  And it is this: 
A judge cannot be disqualified by
a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

This is not to say that
all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved.  If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial
trial, induced by the judge’s bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order
a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice.  Such was
the view taken by this Court in Dais
vs. Torres, 57 Phil, 897, 902-904.  In that case, we found that the filing
of charges by a party against a judge generated “resentment” on the
judge’s part that led to his “bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the
decision.” We there discoursed on the principle of impartiality,
disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge” which “is
as old as the history ‘of courts.” We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the
circumstances obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial judge’s
findings were not influenced by bias or prejudice.  Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and
directed a new trial.^[8]

Efforts to attain fair,
just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal.  But, we are not licensed to indulge in
unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal.  It will
behooves this
Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because
counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him.  As applied here,
respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality.  He
has not thus far stepped to one side of the
fulcrum.  No act or conduct of his
would show arbitrariness or prejudice. 
Therefore, we are not to assume what responder judge, not otherwise
legally disqualified, will do in a case before him.^[9]
We have
had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a
party “will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing” is
“premature.”^[10] Prejudice is not to be
presumed.   Especially if weighed against
a judge’s legal obligation under his oath to administer justice “without
respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.^[11] To disqualify or not to disqualify
himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.

All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion
as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation
where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to
the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties.  A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation.  But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.  He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.  A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party
might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against
him.  That passion on the part of a judge
may be generated because of
serious charges of misconduct against him by
a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote.  He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. 
He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up
his mind to act in or withdraw from a suit
where that party or counsel is involved. 
He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others
involved therein.  On the result of his decision to sit
or not to sit may depend to a great extent
the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.  If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or
fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning
and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.  He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.

In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is
not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent
him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned.^[12]

Upon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and
pro­hibition is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Administrative Case 117, entitled “Constante P.
Pimentel, as President of the
“locos Sur Lawyers Association, complainant, vs. Angelino
C. Salanga,
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, Branch IV, Candon, Ilocos Sur, respondent.”

^[2]
Formerly Section 1, Rule 126, 1940 Rules of Court.  The second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is a new provision.

^[3]
See also:  Joaquin vs.
Barretto, 25 Phil. 281, 287; Perfecto vs.
Contreras, 28 Phil. 538, 543.

^[4]
This type of relationship was not yet a legal disqualification under the 1940
Rules; now, the 1964 rules expressly prohibit judges from trying cases where he
is related “to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity.

^[5]
Emphasis supplied.

^[6]
Benusa vs. Torres, 55 Phil. 737, 740; emphasis supplied.

^[7]
We recently applied paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137, and confirmed the
voluntary inhibition by a judge
upon his sound discretion in People vs. Gomez, G.R. No. L-22345, May 29, 1967.

^[8]
See also:  Government vs.
Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374, 377.

^[9]
See:  Perfecto vs.
Contreras, supra, at p. 543; U.S.
vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, 403; Benusa vs. Torres, supra, at p. 741;
People vs. Moreno,
supra, at p. 294; Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 101, 106.

^[10]  Arteche vs.
De la Rosa, 58 Phil. 589, 594.

^[11]
Section 3, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

^[12]
See:  Nacionalista
Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129.