G.R. No. L-22645. September 18, 1967
CARLOS CALUBAYAN AND EMILIA FERRER, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. CIRILO PASCUAL, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
ANGELES, J.:
This case was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on May 6, 1963, upon the filing of a complaint which,
so far as pertinent, is quoted hereunder:
"II
"The plaintiffs are the registered owners of two parcels of
land situated in the corner of 6th Avenue and F. Roxas
Streets, Grace Park, Caloocan City, known as Lots Nos. 1 and 3, Block No. 48 C of the
Subdivision Plan Psd-15136, being a portion
of Block No. 48-C of the Plan Psd-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, both covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7200 of the land records of the Province of Rizal. The
plaintiffs purchased these two (2) parcels of land from the Philippine Realty
Corporation on October 22, 1957.
"III
"The defendant is one of
the squatters occupying a portion of the above-mentioned parcels of land and upon plaintiffs’ acquisition
thereof, the latter, on several occasions, notified the said defendant that they are now the legal owners of
the said two (2) parcels of land and
requested the said defendant to see them so that necessary arrangement could be made under which the maid defendant may continue for the meantime using the portion of the
land that he has
been occupying. The defendant has
consistently ignored these requests and
until now he has not seen the plaintiffs with regard thereto.
"IV
"On February 2, 1963,
the plaintiffs notified the-defendant
that they now need the two (2) parcels of land in question and requested
him to vacate the same within, the period of twenty (20) days from receipt thereof.
The defendant received
the said letter on February 7,
1963 and in spite thereof,
he has refused and still continue to refuse to vacate the portion of the
above land in question which he has been illegally occupying.”
The defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, which is one for ejectment, the main basis for such contention being that the
action was filed in less than one year after the demand to vacate the premises. Plaintiff’s opposed the motion. On September
3, 1963, the lower court issued an order dismissing the case.
From the order of dismissal the plaintiffs appealed, contending
that the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the said case because
their purpose is not merely to eject the defendant but to recover possession of
the real property occupied by him.
Since, fundamentally, the nature and purpose of an action, and the
character of the relief sought are determinable from the averments in the
complaint,[1]
We have reproduced the pertinent allegations of the complaint.
The issue is whether upon
the averments of the complaint, the case should be treated as one for ejectment, cognizable by the inferior court, or for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana),
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
To begin with, it would
appear that although the defendant is regarded
by the plaintiffs as a "squatter" his occupancy of the
questioned premises had been permitted or tolerated even before the Philippine
Realty Corporation sold the lots to the plaintiffs. Otherwise, the latter
would not have found him on the
premises. It may be true that upon their
acquisition of the parcels of land in 1957, plaintiffs notified and requested
defendant to see them, but despite defendant’s failure to heed these requests, plaintiffs did not choose to bring an action in court
but suffered the defendant
instead to remain in the premises for almost six years. Only on February 2, 1963, did the plaintiffs for the first time notify
the defendant that "they now need the two parcels of land in
question" and requested him to vacate the same. In allowing several years to pass without
requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor filing an action to eject
him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant’s possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter‘s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[2] The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
This brings Us to the
question as to when the demand
to vacate should be considered in this case.
It is our impression
that it was not plaintiffs’ intention to eject the defendant on the several
occasions referred to in the complaint when they notified him that they were
already the owners of the parcels of land.
Plaintiffs merely wanted to make necessary arrangements with the
defendant so that the latter "may continue for the meantime using the
portion of the land they are occupying".
In other words, they were amenable to the creation of a land-lord-tenant
relationship between them and the defendant.
Under this circumstance, the one year period of unlawful detainer should be counted not from the time the defendant
ignored plaintiffs’ notification and invitation to see them, for these were only manifestations of plaintiffs’
desire to be recognized as owners of the parcels of land involved, but from
February 2, 1963, when a demand
to vacate was effectively made.
Even assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the various notifications for defedant
to see the plaintiffs could be construed as
demands upon the defendant to vacate, the length of time that defendant
detained the premises is to be reckoned with from the date of the last demand.[3] Plaintiff’s failure to file an action in
court shortly after defendant had ignored their previous notices is to be
considered as a waiver on their
part to eject the defendant in the meantime.
“There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a defaulting tenant
to remain in the rented property one month, one year, several years, or even
decades. That consent no matter how long
it may last, makes lawful tenant’s possession.
Only when that consent is withdrawn
and the owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owners right of possession asserted and the tenant’s
refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlawful because it is violative of the owner’s preferential right of
possession."[4]
The written demand upon the defendant to
quit the premises was made on February
2, 1963, while the complaint was filed on May 6, 1963.
The action having been filed in less than one year after the notice to
vacate, the case must be treated as one for ejectment
over which the inferior courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Of course, We have not overlooked nor disregarded the allegation
as to plaintiffs’ ownership of the parcels of land in dispute. But this allegation, when it is merely to
show the character of plaintiffs’ possession, does not bring the case within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. There seems to be no question as to
plaintiffs’ right of ownership and possession over the properties, for the
complaint does not pray for a declaration of such right. What is only necessary is for plaintiff to
gain possession of the premises by ousting the defendant, and this may be
attained by a summary action for ejectment which must
be filed within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
not with the Court of First Instance, as was erroneously done here, but with an inferior court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order of dismissal is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the
plaintiff-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Fernando JJ., concur.
[1]
Subano vs. Vallecer, G. R. No.L-11867 March
24, 1959.
[2]
John O Yu vs. Maximo de Lara, et al., G. R. No. L -16084, November
30, 1963, also
involving a forcible entry and detainer case in other
portions of the same subdivision formerly owned by the Philippine Realty
Corporation.
[3]
Cruz et al. vs. Atencio, G. R. No. L-11276, February 28, 1959; Zobel vs. Abreu, G. R. L-7663 January
31, 1956; Lucido vs. Vita, 25 Phil. 414.
[4]
Canaynay vs. Sarmiento,
79 Phil. 36. See also Casillan vs. Tomassi, G. R. No, L-16574, February 28, 1965; Richards vs. Gonzales, G. R. No.
L-14339, September 26, 1960;
Robles vs. Jose, 52 O.
G. 6193.