OSCAR V. CO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABELARDO SUBIDO, AS COM­MISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, AND CECILIO O. ESTOESTA, AS ELECTION REGISTRAR OF THE COMMISSION ON ELE…

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, man­damus and quo
warranto, with prayer for preliminary in­junction.

Main protagonists are the petitioner Oscar V. Co and the
respondent Cecilio O. Estoesta,
both election registrar-appointees of the respondent Commission on Elections
(here­inafter called COMELEC), in reference to the office of muni­cipal
election registrar for Agoo, La Union, to which the
petitioner claims to be entitled and from which he prays that the respondent be
excluded.

The facts are indubitable. 
On November 2, 1964
the petitioner was extended by the COMELEC a provisional appointment as
“Election Registrar of the Commission on Elections”, without
statement of any specific official station. 
On November 9, 1964,
per a telegram-directive, he was “directed to report and assume duty as
election registrar for the municipality
of Agoo, province
of La Union”, which he
did.  He served in that capacity until September 6, 1966 when he was extended
a permanent ap­pointment as “Election Registrar in the Commission
on Elections for Sabangan, Mountain
Province”, and directed to
immediately proceed to his new station. 
On the follow­ing day, September 7, 1966, the respondent Cecilio O. Esto­esta was also
appointed “Election Registrar in the Commis­sion on Elections for Agoo, La Union”, which appointment was duly certified
by the Civil Service Commission and ac­cepted by the said respondent.  Viewing these moves as vio­lative
of civil service rules and regulations and as in­fringing upon his right to
security of tenure as election registrar of Agoo, La
Union, the petitioner declined the proferred
appointment and forthwith moved the COMELEC to reconsider its action in the
premises.  Thereafter, he came to this
Court on the present recourse.

The only issue to be resolved here is whether, under the
circumstances at bar, the appointment of the petitioner as election registrar
for Sabangan, Mountain Province, trench­es upon his
right to security of tenure as election registrar of Agoo,
La Union.  This question has since been
set at rest in Ibañez, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. L-26558, April 27, 1967, which arose from factual
circumstan­ces similar to those in the case at bar.  We there reaffirmed our adherence to the view
that “the rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to
the security of te­nure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved
is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station (Miclat vs. Ganaden, et al.,
G.R.L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro vs. Valencia, et al.,
G.R. L-18352, August 30, 1963).” 
Since there, as in the case now before us, the appointments relied upon
did not specifically state the particular stations to which the appointees were
appointed, and that the said ap­pointees were merely assigned to
specific places by means of subsequent separate directives or assignments, we
rejected the theory that they acquired any vested right to the places to which
they were thus detailed as to entitle them to the protection of the security of
tenure guaranteed by the Con­stitution. 
On this point we there made the pronouncement that –

“* * * the  prospective
appointees were enti­tled only to such security of tenure as the ap­pointment
papers concerned actually conferred – not in that of any place to which they
may have been subsequently assigned. * * *.  
As things stand, in default of any particular station stat­ed in their
respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the
petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them.  A contrary rule will erase altogether the
demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn be­tween appointment and assignment
as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers.”

In Ibanez vs. COMELEC, supra, we also made the following
observations which we consider pertinent to the case at bar:

“Nor is there necessity to dwell at length on the validity of
the appointments extended to the petitioners which do not state any specific
station contrary to the spirit and expressed mandate of the Permanent
Registration Act.  At the very least,
having accepted said appointments as they are and having reap­ed benefits therefrom, they cannot now be heard to im­pugn their
validity.  Besides, whichever way the ver­dict
on the question of validity may go, the petitioners will profit nothing by
it.  Were we to uphold said ap­pointments,
the petitioners’ cause will necessarily fail because, as aforesaid, the same
involves not an appointment to a particular station but a mere assign­ment to a
certain place in the interest of the service.  Upon the other hand, striking down said
appointments as void would virtually pull the rug from under the petitioners’
feet.  For, a void appointment confers no
rights whatsoever except, perhaps, those recog­nized under the de facto
doctrine, but definitely never so far as to entitle the incumbent to take
shelter under the aegis of the guarantee of security of tenure.  That the respondent Commission may have erred
in extending the defectively formulated ap­pointments relied upon is of no
moment.  The mistake, acquiescence and
tolerance of the proper officials resulting in the non-observance of legal
requirements do not bestow upon the petitioners any right to the positions in
question or to the guarantees provided by law.”

No valid reason has been advanced why the foregoing ratiocination
should not similarly control the present contro­versy.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed, at
petitioner’s cost.

Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., did not take part.