IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT RE­GARDING THE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 14, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 22, SERIES OF 1964 OF ORMOC CITY, ORMOC S…

Appeal from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Fifth
Branch, in a declaratory relief proceeding to test the validity of a Municipal
Ordinance of the City of Ormoc,
which as amended reads as follows:

“SECTION 1. City Tax.- There shall be paid to
the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar (B-Sugar)
locally sold or sold within the Philippines a city tax of Twenty Centavos
(P0.20) per picul and one percentum
(1%) on the gross sale of its derivatives and by-products produced
by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, or by any other sugar mills [sic] in Ormoc
City.”

The above amendatory ordinance was enacted on October 28, 1964 and took effect
immediately after approval.  The lower
court sustained its validity in its decision of January 28, 1965.

The appeal must fail and the decision of the lower court
affirmed.  The question before this Court
is one of power.  From and after June 19, 1959, when the Local
Autonomy Act was enacted, the sphere of autonomy of a chartered city in the
enactment of taxing measures has been considerably enlarged.  In the language of the statute:

“SECTION 2. Taxation.- Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority
to impose municipal license taxes or
fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges
in chartered cities, municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to
secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the
city, the municipal council of the municipality, or the municipal district
council of the municipal district; to collect fees and charges for services
rendered by the city, municipality or municipal district; to regulate and
impose reasonable fees for services rendered
in connection with any business, profession or occupation being conducted within
the city, municipality or municipal district and otherwise to levy for public
purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees: Provided, That
municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case impose any percentage
tax on sales or other taxes in
any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax,
except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code: *
* *.”

In a number of decisions starting from City of Bacolod v. Gruet^[1]
to Hodges v. Municipal Board^[2]
decided early this year, such broad taxing authority has been implemented and
vitalized by this Court.

The last mentioned-case, Hodges v. Municipal Board, restated the
controlling doctrine in this wise:

“No special difficulty attends the resolution of the main
issue.  Heretofore, we have announced the
doctrine that the grant of the power to tax to chartered cities under section 2
of the Local Autonomy Act is sufficiently plenary to cover ‘everything,
excepting those which are mentioned’ therein, subject only to the limitation
that the tax so levied is for ‘public purposes, just and uniform’ (Nin Bay Mining Company v. Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, G. R
No. L-20125, July 20, 1965).  There is no showing, and we do not believe it
is possible to show, that the tax levied, called by any name, -percentage tax
or sales tax – comes under any of the specific exceptions listed in section 2
of the Local Autonomy Act.  Not being
excepted, it must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.  As the maxim goes, ‘Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus
non exceptis‘.  Since its public purpose, justness and
uniformity of application are not disputed, the tax so
levied must be sustained as valid.”

In the light of the above, it cannot be said that the ordinance
suffers from a constitutional or statutory infirmity as claimed in the first
alleged error.  Nor is
petitioner-appellant any more successful in its claim in the second assigned
error that the ordinance suffers from the taint of illegality, it being in
restraint of trade.  In the absence of a
clear and specific showing that there was a transgression of a constitutional
provision or repugnancy to a controlling statute, an objection of such a
generalized character deserves but scant sympathy from this Court.  Considering the indubitable policy expressly set forth in the Local Autonomy Act,
the invocation of such a talismanic formula as “restraint of trade”
without more no longer suffices, assuming it ever did, to nullify a taxing
ordinance, otherwise valid.

WHEREFORE, the judgment a quo is hereby
affirmed.  Without
costs.

Reyes, JBL, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon J., are on official leave.

^[1]
L-18290, January 31, 1963.  Cf. Hodges v. Municipal Board,
L-18129, January 31, 1963.

^[2]
L-18276, January 12, 1967.