PIO FELWA, GAS PAR PONCHINIAN, ALFREDO PACYAYA, LEONARDO CADIOGAN, WILLIAM CLAVER, MANUEL SUMEDGA, WILLIAM PACRAY, ALBERTO OYA-OY, ROMULO ZARATE, CENON BAUTISTA, ALEXANDER SUMED…

This is an original action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Petitioners herein are the
provincial governor, the elective members of the provincial board and some of
the important appointive officials of Mountain Province prior to June 18, 1966,
the date of approval and effectivity of Republic Act
No. 4695, which divides Mountain Province in to four (4) provinces to be known
as Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao. They
seek the declaration of unconstitutionality of said Act and to prevent its
enforcement by respondents herein, namely, the Executive Secretary, the Auditor
General, the Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the
Provincial Governor of Benguet, and the Assistant
Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Committee designated to implement the
aforementioned legislation. In their complaint, petitioners, likewise, prayed
for a writ of preliminary injunction, which this Court has not
issued.

Said Republic Act No. 4695 reads:

“An Act Creating The Province of
Benguet,
Mountain
Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao.

“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress
assembled:

“SECTION
1.
Mountain Province is hereby divided into four
provinces, to be known as Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao.

“SEC.
2. The
Province of Benguet shall comprise the
Subprovince of Benguet and the municipalities of Tuba,
Sablan, Itogon, La Trinidad,
Tublay, Atok, Boko, Kabayan, Kapangan, Bakun, Kibungan, Mankayan, and Buguias.

“SEC.
3.
Mountain Province shall comprise the
Subprovince of Bontoc and the municipalities of Barlig, Bauko, Besao, Bontoe, Natonin, Sabangan, Sadanga, Sagada, Tadian and Paraceles.

“SEC.
4. The
Province of Ifugao shall comprise the
Subprovince of Ifugao and the municipalities of Banaue, Lagawe, Hungduan, Kiangan, Lamut, Mayaoyao and Potia.

“SEC.
5. The
Province of Kalinga-Apayao shall comprise the
Subprovince of Kalinga and Apayao. “The municipalities of Balbalan, Lubuagan, Pinuk-puk, Tabuk, Tanudan, Tinglayan, Quirino and Liwan in the
Subprovince of Kalinga shall retain its status as the
Subprovince of Kalinga. The Municipalities of Luna,
Flora, Kabugao, Pudtol,
Conner and Bayag in the
Subprovince of Apayao shall retain its status as the
Subprovince of Apayao.

“SEC.
6. The
Provincial Capital of the Province of Benguet shall be La Trinidad; that of
Mountain Province shall be Bontoc; that of the Province of Ifugao shall be Lagawe; that of the Province of Kalinga-Apayao shall be Tabuk.

“SEC.
7. Except as
herein after provided, all provisions of law now or hereafter applicable to
regular provinces shall apply to the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao.

“SEC.
8. The
present elective provincial officers of Mountain Province shall, until their
successors shall have been elected and shall have qualified, be assigned to and
perform their duties as such officers in the corresponding province herein
created, to which said elective provincial officers belong as a member of the
particular tribe or ethnic group inhabiting said province: Provided, That they shall continue to
receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of approval of this Act
until the new readjustment of salaries, in accordance with existing law. Where
the position of provincial governor, in a newly created province, becomes vacant
as a consequence of the division herein effected and the incumbent vice governor
is assigned to said province in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the
law of succession shall apply and the vice governor shall automatically succeed
and shall hold office as such until his successor shall have been elected in the
election following approval of this Act and shall have qualified. All other
elective officers as may be necessary to fill in any of the said provinces
shall, for the time being, be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and shall hold office until
their successors shall have been elected in the election for provincial and
municipal officials following the approval of this Act, and shall have
qualified.

“SEC.
9. The
present appointive provincial officers and employees of Mountain Province shall
likewise perform their respective duties as such in any of the four provinces
herein created which they shall individually choose within thirty days from the
date of approval hereof: Provided. That they shall continue to
receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of approval of this Act
until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with existing law. Such
appointive officers and employees as may be necessary to organize, or to
complete, the government personnel of either province shall be appointed as
provided by law.

“SEC.
10. The
incumbent Members of the House of Representatives shall continue to serve the
districts in which they are elected until their term of office shall expire,
after which each province shall be represented by one Member: Provided, That
the City of Baguio shall form part of the
representative district of the Province of Benguet.

“SEC.
11. Upon
effectivity of this Act, the obligations, funds,
assets and other properties of Mountain Province shall be divided equitably among
the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao by the
President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General.

“SEC.
12. This Act
shall take effect upon its approval.

“Approved,
June 18,
1966.”

Petitioners herein maintain that
this Act is unconstitutional and hence null and void, because: (1) it denies
equal protection; (2) one of the provisions thereof is not covered by its title;
(3) it creates congressional districts without the reapportionment provided in
the Constitution; and (4) the congressional districts thus created do not
consist of contiguous and compact territory.

I. The alleged denial of equal
protection is based upon the following premises, viz.:

(a) That the old
Mountain Province became a first class province
under the administration of its Governor, petitioner Lamen, who, pursuant to Republic Act No. 4695, retains said
position in the new Mountain Province, which, however, in view of the
divisions effected by said Act, is reduced to the category of a sixth-class
province. Upon the other hand, respondent Dennis Molintas, as Vice-Governor of the old Mountain Province and,
hence, subordinate of petitioner Lamen, as Governor
thereof, has become, in consequence of the contested legislation, the Governor
of Benguet, a second class province, and, hence,
higher, in this respect, in rank to his former superior officer, petitioner
Lamen, who, because of the same statute, has been
reduced to the category of Governor of a sixth-class
province.

(b) That, although by becoming
Provincial Governor of the new province of Benguet,
respondent Molintas vacates his former position as
Vice-Governor of the old Mountain Province, petitioner Pio Felwa, the senior member of
the provincial board of the old Mountain Province is retained, by Republic Act
No. 4695, in such position in the new Mountain Province, instead of filling said
vacant position of Vice-Governor of Mountain Province, pursuant to the order of
succession prescribed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2264, and Section 21,
paragraph 6, of Republic Act No. 180.

(c) That similarly, petitioners
Gaspar Ponchinlan and Castro
Lammawin, as elective members of the Provincial Board
of the old Mountain Province, are retained as members of the provincial board of
the new provinces of Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, respectively, instead of becoming
Vice-Governors thereof, pursuant to the rule of succession prescribed in said
Republic Act Nos. 180 and 2264, which are applied to – respondent Molintas, as Vice-Governor of the old Mountain Province,
who, pursuant to Republic Act No. 4695, becomes the Governor of the new province
of Benguet.

The foregoing arguments do not
prove that equal protection has been denied to petitioners herein, It is well
settled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subjects of legislation, and that a classification is reasonable where: (1) it
is based upon substantial distinction which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies, not only to
present conditions, but, also, to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally to
all those who belong to the same class.^[1]

We believe that these
requirements are sufficiently met in Republic Act No. 4695. It cannot be denied
that the offices of provincial governor and vice-governor on the one hand,^[2] are substantially different from those
of plain members of the provincial board,^[3] and those of appointive officers of the
provincial government,^[4] on the
other. The former are essentially executive in nature,
whereas plain members of the said board perform functions a partaking of a
legislative character, since the authority vested by law upon provincial boards
involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress. Indeed,
a good legislator is not necessarily an effective executive, and vice-versa.
And, this is specially true in provinces, like those created by Republic Act No.
4695, for its Inhabitants belong to the non-Christian and less enlightened
minorities of our population, and the administration of their public affairs
requires a special kind of tact, understanding and vision, which are not needed
in the Christianized regions of the Philippines. It goes without saying that the
equal protection clause does not require the identical treatment of appointive
and elective officers, insofar as the order of succession is concerned, because
they obviously belong to different classes, both constitutionally and
administratively.

The reduction In class of
Mountain Province is not material to the Issue of equal protection.^[5] It may not be amiss to add, also, that
such reduction is not made by Republic Act No. 4695, but Is a mere effect of the
limited revenues of the territory comprised in the new Mountain Province, as
compared to that of Benguet;^[6] that the territory of each of the four
(4) provinces established by the Act in question merely follows the traditional
political division of the region commonly known as Mountain Province, based upon
the tribes or ethnic groups inhabiting the same; and that, being a resident of
the Municipality of Sagada, which is part of the new
Mountain Province, petitioner Lamen cannot be made
Provincial Governor of any of the other three (3) provinces into which the old
Mountain Province has been divided, without violating the very policies of our
laws on public corporations which petitioners cite in their favor. By the same
token, respondent Molintas, who resides in La
Trinidad, which is the provincial capital of the new
province of Benguet, cannot, without impinging upon
said policies, be made provincial governor either of the new
Mountain Province, or of Ifugao, or Kalinga-Apayao.

II. Petitioners assail Republic
Act No. 4695 upon the ground that the provision thereof reading:

“x x
x Where the position of provincial governor, in a
newly created province, becomes vacant as a consequence of the division herein
effected and the incumbent vice governor is assigned to said province in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, the law of succession shall apply
and the vice governor shall automatically succeed to the position of governor in
said province and shall hold office as such until his successor shall have been
elected in the election following approval of this Act and shall have
qualified.” (Section
8.)

pursuant to which former Vice-Governor
Molintas becomes provincial governor of Benguet, upon the ground that it is not included in the
title of said legislation, reading: “An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao.”

This pretense is absolutely
devoid of merit, for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to
provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof. In other words, the
above quoted provision of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 4695 is manifestly
germane to the subject of this legislation, as set forth in its title. III.
& IV. The Constitution ordains:

“The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective Inhabitants, but each province shall have at least
one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years
after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the
same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall
be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and
compact territory.”

Pursuant to this Section, a
representative district may come into existence: (a) Indirectly, through the
creation of a province – for “each province shall have at least one member” In
the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The requirements
concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the
territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not
apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces,
under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of
the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers
to that which is made by an Act of
Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority
of that statute -which cannot provide otherwise – nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.

There is no constitutional
limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a
province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to
exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the
Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As
a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other
provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts,
without complying with the aforementioned requirements.^[7]

Then, again, petitioners’
allegation to the effect that the new representative districts resulting from
the creation of the new provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, do not
comprise contiguous and compact territory, has been controverted by respondents and has not been sufficiently
proven.

Last, but not least, the
constitutional command to the effect that “each representative district shall
comprise xxx contiguous and compact territory” is, not absolute, but, qualified
by the phrase “as far as practicable.” In the case at bar, the delimitation of
the provinces involved therein is based upon the tribes or ethnic groups
inhabiting the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition herein is hereby
dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

IT IS SO
ORDERED.

Reyes, J. B.
L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz
Castro JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., on
leave.

^[1]Aleja
vs. GSIS, G. R. No. L-18529 (February 26, 1965); People vs.
Solon, G.R. No. L-14864 (November 23, 1960); People vs. Vera (65 Phil.
56); People vs. Cayat (68 Phil. 12);
Laurel vs. Misa (42 Off. Gaz.,
2847).

^[2] Rev. Adm. Code, Sec. 2082; Rep.
Act 2264, Sec. 4.

^[3] Revised Administrative Code,
Sections 2096, 2102, 2105, 2106.

^[4] Revised Administrative Code,
Section 2088, 2092, 1673, 1910-1911, 593-597; Republic Act No. 1082, Section
2.

^[5] Barbier vs. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27.

^[6] Revised Administrative Code,
Section 2067-A.

^[7] Republic Acts Nos. 505, 711,
1414 and 2228.