THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. AURELIO BALISACAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.

On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:

“That on or about December 3, 1964, in the
municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting
upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel’s petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances.

Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense, because the latter was strangling him. And he
further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities.

Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the abovementioned
testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a decision
acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed therefrom.

This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed
its brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee’s brief was filed. After
being submitted for decision without appellee’s brief, the appeal was
certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving
questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5,
1966, We ordered it docketed herein.

The sole assignment of error is:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER’S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.”

Appellant’s contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged.
It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves
the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law
under the circumstances. (People vs. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563) In this case,
the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish
mitigating circumstances, for the purpose of fixing the penalty. Said
testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the
accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take
defendant’s plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:

“SEC. 3. Order of trial.– The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the following order:

“(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the charges.

“(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.

“(c)
The parties may then respectively offer, rebutting evidence only,
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.

“(d)
When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the
case is submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open
the argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal
may conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or
written, or partly written, but only the written arguments, or such
portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the
record of the case.”

In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.

This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that: “The People of the Philippines can not appeal if
the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.” The present
state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision
applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the
question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23,
1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. de Golez,
L-14160, June 30, 1960).

The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused
in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851;
People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In the present case,
it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty.
Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to
prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense.
Said testimony, therefore – as the court a quo recognized in its
decision – had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo
should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least
direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not
done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at
the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.^[1]

Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the
case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant.
In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack
of this fundamental prerequisite its action is perforce null and void.
The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is
no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a
claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur.
2d, 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d, 445).

It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the
trial judge below already gave credence to the testimony of the
accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way doubting
the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this
case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another
judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and
this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings under
another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial
with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and
judgment thereafter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Barrera, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., no part.

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^[1] Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court.