G.R. No. L-20745. September 02, 1966
DOLORES GRANADA, AND ESTRELLA GRANADA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BARRERA, J.:
Appeals reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, and sentencing petitioners to pay the respondent Philippine
National Bank the sum of P1,982.24 with interest thereon at 5% per
annum from August 20, 1940 and 10% on the principal as attorneys’ fees;
and the sum of P1,349.90 with interest at 5% per annum, from September
20, 1941, and 10% on the principal as attorneys’ fees, and costs.
There is no dispute as to the amounts involved; that they represent
the balances due and unpaid on sugar crop loans applied from and
granted by the PNB to Dolores, Estrella, [1]
Felisa, and Corazon, all surnamed Granada; that said loans were
personally received by the petitioners for which the corresponding
promissory notes were personally executed and signed by them, uniformly
worded as follows:
“On demand after date, for value received, I promise
to pay to the order of the Philippine National Bank at its office in
Bacolod or Manila, the sum of (amount in pesos stated), Philippine
currency, with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from date until
paid.“In case of judicial execution of this obligation or
any part of it, the debtor waives his rights under the provisions of
Rule 39, Section 12 of the Rules of Court.“In case it is
necessary to collect this note by or through an attorney-at-law, the
makers and indorsers shall pay 10% of the amount due on the notes as
attorney’s fees. Demand and dishonor waived. Holder may accept partial
payment reserving his right of recourse against each and all indorsers.”
The only issue raised by petitioners emanated from an amended
complaint filed by the attorney of the PNB branch in Bacolod,
Occidental Negros, wherein it was alleged that
“defendants Dolores Granada and Estrella Granada,
together with their sisters Feliza Granada and Corazon Granada, who are
now dead, as representatives of their parents, Cristeta Granada and Matias Granada,
borrowed from and were granted by, the plaintiff … sugar crop loan
… for the cultivation and production of sugar canes in Hacienda
Cristeta.”“that said … loan … was released to, and
received by, defendants Dolores Granada and Estrella Granada and their
sisters Feliza Granada and Corazon Granada, as representatives of their parents Cristeta Granada and Matias Granada, as evidenced by promissory notes hereto attached as Exhibits A, B, C,… etc., and made integral parts hereof.”
Solely on the strength of the phrase “as representatives of their
parents, etc.” inserted in the amended complaint, the petitioners
contended, and the trial court sustained the contention, that they are
not liable personally as they merely acted as agents of a disclosed
principal.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the court a quo after reviewing the facts and antecedents of the case.
It appears that in the original complaint filed by the
plaintiff bank, it was alleged that the defendants Dolores, Estrella,
Feliza, and Corazon, all surnamed Granada, secured sugar crop loans for
the crop year 1940-41 and 1941-42 from the plaintiff and received the
money as evidenced by various promissory notes attached to said
original complaint marked as Exhibits “A” to “F” and “G” to “P” that
the balances of said crop loans in the sums of P1,982.24 and P1,349.90
were not paid; hence, it was prayed that the defendants be sentenced to
pay the same, plus interests and costs. [2]
A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by the defendants
alleging prescription and that the signers of the promissory notes have
secured and received the amounts of the loans as “mere representatives
of their parents Matias and Cristeta Granada,”who were the owners of
Hda. Cristeta, and that the money was used for the maintenance and
support of the said spouses and their children Dolores, Estrella,
Feliza and Corazon, who were then still single and living with their
parents.
In answer to the motion, plaintiff reiterated that the documents
covering the loans were signed and executed by Dolores Granada, for
herself and as attorney-in-fact of Estrella, Feliza and Corazon, by
virtue of a duly notarized power of attorney, and that plaintiff bank
has no documents or evidence in its possession to hold the spouses
Matias and Cristeta Granada liable for the payment of the accounts. The
motion to dismiss was denied.
Thereafter, the defendants filed their answer, again alleging that
the promissory notes were signed by them as mere representatives and
administrators of their parents and that the plaintiff has been
informed by Cristeta Granada and her attorney-in-fact, Jose Granada
that the so-called accounts of “Granada Hermanas” were the accounts of
the spouses Matias and Cristeta and could be charged against their
properties known as Hda. Cristeta.
Subsequently, the defendants filed another motion calling attention
to their defense alleged in their answer and praying that in view
thereof “the plaintiff be given leave of court to amend the complaint
and include as principal party defendant Cristeta Granada, and the
defendants be allowed to file their answer, if they so desire.” The
motion was granted in an order of the following tenor, “x x x por el
presente se les concede a ambas partes autorizacion para presentar los
escritos enmendados que deseen presentar dentro del plazo
reglamentario.”
Accordingly, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this time
impleading Cristeta Granada, together with the original defendants, and
it was in this amended complaint that for the first time, the phrase
“as representatives of their parents” was inserted. There was no other
amendment in the complaint, and in the prayer, the plaintiff insisted
that judgment be rendered ordering defendants Dolores Granada, Estrella
Granada and Cristeta Granada to pay the plaintiff the amounts claimed
in the complaint, and granting such other relief as the court may deem
just and equitable.
In their answer to the amended complaint, defendants Dolores and
Estrella Granada reproduced and reiterated their allegations in their
answer to the original complaint.
Cristeta Granada, in her answer under oath, significantly denied
that she has given or granted any authority to Dolores, Estrella,
Feliza and Corazon, or to any of them, to borrow money or secure a loan
in her behalf from the bank.
Replying to the answer to the amended complaint of the defendants
Dolores and Estrella Granada, the plaintiff again averred that as
alleged in the original complaint, Dolores, Estrella, Feliza and
Corazon were personally, jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the payment of the amount of the loans, as
that is what appears in the promissory notes and the borrowers did not
inform the bank when they applied for and secured the loan that they
were acting as agents for and in behalf of their parents, and the
filing of the amended complaint joining Cristeta Granada as a party
defendant was in obedience to the order of the court issued upon motion
of the original defendants, and “in order to be relieved of any
liability, it is incumbent upon defendants Dolores and Estrella to
prove or help the plaintiff prove that they acted as representatives of
their parents.”
Thereafter, trial was held and plaintiff presented the promissory
notes whose genuineness and due execution were unquestioned; proof of
the receipt of the loans by defendants and the amounts still unpaid
thereon in spite of demands. All this evidence was admitted without
objection on the part of the defendants.
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals, as already stated, reversed the decision of the court a quo and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning thus:
“As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s
pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it.
However, that is not an absolute and inflexible rule. Every admission
is to be taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side
with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on
the other side. The reason for this is that, where part of a statement
of a party is used against him as an admission, the court should
consider and weigh any other portions connected with the statement
which tend to neutralize or explain the portion which is against
interest. In other words, while the admission is admissible in
evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole
statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an
integrated unit for, as said by the Supreme Court, although acts or
facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted,
however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission
was made through palpable mistake. (Irlandia vs. Pitargue, 22 Phil.
383.)“From the pleadings filed by the parties it clearly
appears that the cause of action stated in the original complaint was
against Dolores, Estrella, Felisa and Corazon, surnamed Granada, for
the payment of the loans which they obtained from the bank in their
individual and personal capacity, as evidenced by the promissory notes
in question. x x x.“The foregoing facts culled from the
pleadings of the parties have persuaded us to believe, and we so hold,
that in filing the amended complaint containing the allegation which
has become the bone of contention in this appeal, the plaintiff had
acted through a mistaken belief that the adverted allegation in the
amended complaint did not constitute an amendment of its cause of
action, and this matter was made known to the court and the defendants
when in its reply to the motion to dismiss it stated that it ‘has no
document or evidence in its possession to hold the spouses Matias and
Cristeta Granada liable to the payment of the accounts.’, and it
honestly relied on the belief that the defendants, Dolores and
Estrella, surnamed Granada, had the necessary evidence to establish the
fact. At any rate, guided by the provisions of the rules of court that
‘These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.’, the amended
complaint may be treated as stating two or more statements of a claim
in a single cause of action, which is permitted under Section 9, Rule
15, or it may be considered as including several defendants in the
alternative against any of which plaintiff may be entitled to relief, a
course of action sanctioned by Section 13, Rule 3. There are cases
where the facts essential to the party’s claim or defense are within
the knowledge of the adverse party, as to be unable to state them with
certainty. He may, however, know that one out of two or more sets of
facts is true, without knowing which. In such a case, plaintiff is
allowed to make alternative statements of his claim under Section 9,
Rule 15. (Everett vs. Asia Banking Corporation, 59 Phil. 512, 526,
cited in 1 Moran 235, 1957 ed.) On the other hand, Section 13 of Rule 3
‘gives the plaintiff the right to include alternatively several
possible defendants when he is uncertain against which of them he is
entitled to relief, as x x where a defendant may have been acting
either as an agent or a principal. x x And the above provision is
applicable although the right to relief alleged to exist against one of
the defendants may be inconsistent with the right to relief against the
other, as where A is sued as principal and B is joined in the
alternative, if A should be found to have been B’s agents.’ (1 Moran
71, 1957 ed.) The amended complaint in the instant case may not be a
model pleading for an alternative statements of the claim or against
two or more defendants in the alternative; however, judging the said
complaint from a liberal standpoint as ordained by the Rules and
considering that in the prayer judgment is asked against all the
defendants, Dolores Granada, Estrella Granada and Cristeta Granada, it
is within the jurisdiction of the court to render such judgment as the
facts warrant against all or some of the defendants for the payment of
the amount claimed by the plaintiff.”
Taking into account the circumstances of this case, we find no
error committed by the Court of Appeals, both in the assessment of the
facts and the application of the law on the matter in dispute. It is
evident that the plaintiff bank, in amending the complaint conformably
with the order of the trial court, never intended to change the cause
of action which was embodied in the original complaint.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., on leave, no part.
[1] Dolores and Estrella Granada are the herein petitioners, Felisa and Corazon having died before the action was brought.
[2] See p. 1, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision, Annex E of the petition.