RAFAEL M. ABAYA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

Petitioner Rafael M. Abaya passed the civil service examination for patrolmen
held on November 24, 1962. On March 3, 1964, he was appointed Manila patrolman
by respondent mayor Antonio J. Villegas.^[1] The Commissioner of Civil Service,^[2] respondent Abelardo Subido, approved this
appointment on May 20, 1964 with the following conditions: (a) subject to the
usual physical and medical examination; (b) provided that there is no pending
administrative case against the appointee; no pending protest against the
appointment; and no decision by competent authority that will adversely affect
the approval of said appointment.

On October 16, 1964, petitioner started service.

On May 18, 1965, the Commissioner addressed to the Mayor a communication
advising that because petitioner gave a false answer to his application for
patrolmen’s examination, he (Commissioner) cancelled petitioner’s civil service
eligibility derived therefrom, and that accordingly petitioner’s appointment was
anchored on eligibility fraudulently obtained. He directed that petitioner’s
employment “be terminated immediately”.

The false answer just adverted to is contained in petitioner’s verified
application aforesaid, dated November 15, 1962. Question No. 6 thereof
reads:

“6. Have you ever been accused of, indicted for or tried for the violation of
any law, ordinance, or regulation, before any court, or have you ever been
charged with or tried for any breach or infraction of military, naval, or
constabulary discipline before any military, naval, or constabulary tribunal or
other authorities ? (If so, give the date and state fully the nature of the
offense. A CERTIFIED COPY OF COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED WITH
APPLICATION. If already submitted, give date of submission and in connection
with what examination).”

To this question petitioner answered “No”. The fact, however, was that at the
time of the filing of the application there were cases pending against him in
the Fiscal’s Office and in the City Court of Manila. Cited were: Criminal Case
No. F-016885, for sjight physical injuries;^[3] Criminal Case No. D-095207, for trespass
to dwelling;^[4] Criminal Case No.
J-064029, for violation of section 844, Revised Ordinances;^[5] and I. S. No. 61-28520, for estafa.^[6]

The Mayor sought the opinion of the City Fiscal of Manila. The latter, on
June 7, 1965, opined that termination of petitioner’s employment “without prior
hearing on the alleged violation of law and civil service rules, would be
violative of the due process clause and the security of tenure guaranteed civil
service employees. (Sec. 1, Art. Ill and Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution; Sec.
32, R. A. 2260)”.

On June 9, 1965, the Mayor wrote the Commissioner, informing that in view of
the City Fiscal’s opinion he was proceeding administratively against
petitioner.

But, on June 15, 1965, the Commissioner sent the Mayor another directive
stating that a hearing would be “a useless act”; reiterating that petitioner’s
services be terminated; and reminding the city executive of the penal liability
under Section 44 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) in the
event of his failure to comply therewith.

The Mayor required petitioner to explain. In his answer, dated June 18,
1965,^[7] petitioner admitted “having made
a negative reply to Question No. 6” of his application for examination.

In a letter of October 18, 1965, the’Mayor terminated petitioner’s services
in the Manila Police Department, effective immediately.

Since May, 1965, respondent City Treasurer withheld petitioner’s salary.

On November 2, 1965, petitioner went to the Manila court on prohibition and
mandamus. Upon the petition therefor and the answer thereto, and the stipulation
of facts, the trial court, on June 15, 1966, rendered judgment, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioner
into the service, to pay his salaries accruing since May, 1965, without
prejudice to initiating the proper proceedings for the removal of the
petitioner. Respondents shall pay the costs.”^[8]

The case before us is solely upon appeal taken by the
Commissioner.

1. The constitutionally protected security of tenure is: “[N]o officer or
   employee in the divil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
   provided by law”.^[9]

   Section 32 of the Civil Service Law of 1959 echoes this precept with the
   provision that “[N]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed
   or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process:” Said
   Section 32 adds that the officer or employee complained of “shall be entitled to
   a formal investigation if he so elects, in which case, he shall have the right
   to appear and defend himself at said investigation in person or by counsel, to
   confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to have the attendance
   of witnesses and production of documents in his favor by compulsory process or
   subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. ” A civil service employee
   should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule
   with such unrelentless grasp that by now it would appear trite to make citation
   thereof.

   Two acts adverse to petitioner were done: Appellant Commissioner’s
   cancellation of his eligibility, and respondent Mayor’s order of
   dismissal, Concededly, however, there was no investigation prior to the
   cancellation of petitioner’s civil service eligibility and before he
   was eased out of the service. Consequently, petitioner was denied due
   process.

2. But the thrust of appellant’s argument is that formal investigation is
   unnecessary because petitioner has admitted that he made “a negative reply to
   Question No. 6 of his application for examination”, heretofore transcribed. From
   this, appellant draws the conclusion that petitioner made a “false negative
   answer” and that formal investigation would be but an act of supererogation.

   We go to the controlling principle. Rule II, Article 4, of the Civil Service
   Rules,^[10] in its proviso, reads:

   “That when an applicant for examination intentionally makes a false
   statement of any material fact in his application, or practices or attempts to
   practice any deception or fraud in connection with his examination, the
   Commissioner shall invalidate his examination and such offense shall be
   ground for his removal from the service.”

   The accent is on the word intentionally. The fact that petitioner
   made an answer which is at war with the truth does not connote the idea that it
   was intentionally made. Conceivably, situations may exist which could bring up
   that answer to the level of one given in good faith. Without evidence, we are
   loathe to tar and feather petitioner as a perjurer. Short of an inquiry which
   proves that the false answer was intentionally made, we cannot attribute thereto
   a meaning which would make a felon out of petitioner. It should then go without
   saying that the vitality of the constitutional principle of due process cannot
   be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation of an employee’s civil service
   eligibility and/or his dismissal from service — without hearing — upon a
   doubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense
   against civil service rules. It is pertinent here to recall that good faith is
   always presumed;^[11] In the context just
   presented, we are constrained to state that petitioner received less than a fair
   treatment. Due process, in the end, merely is “the embodiment of the sporting
   idea of fair play”.^[12]

   And again we say that petitioner was not accorded his right to due
   process.

3. The prematurity of petitioner’s complaint is next relied upon by appellant.
   Appellant’s thesis on this score is that petitioner has not exhausted
   administrative remedies — he did not appeal from the order of dismissal, but
   went straight to court.

   Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule.

   Such exhaustion is not necessary here. And for a number of reasons.
   First, because in the situation in which petitioner was found,
   dismissed from the job, denied his pay and with a family to support, it is easy
   to perceive that he had to look up to the courts for speedy relief. In this
   factual environment, administrative remedy — appeal to the Civil Service Board
   of Appeals — is not expeditious and adequate.^[13] Second, the question presented is
   “purely a legal one”; the controverted act is “patently illegal”,^[14] and “nothing of an administrative nature
   is to be or can be done”.^[15]
   Third, petitioner was denied due process.^[16] Each of the three instances just mentioned —
   and they are all present here — is an exception to the rule of exhaustion of
   administrative remedies. Petitioner’s reinstatement becomes ministerial; payment
   of his back salary merely incidental to reinstatement.^[17]

UPON THE RECORD, we vote to affirm the judgment under
review. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

^[2] Hereinafter
referred to as Commissioner.

^[3] Dismissed on February 19,
1963.

^[4] This case was dismissed
on August 12, 1959, long before petitioner filed the application for
examination.

^[5] Id.,
dismissed provisionally on December 4, 1957.

^[6] Apparently filed in the City Court as
MC-E-110004, this case was dismissed on February 14, 1963. See p. 5,
petitioner’s memorandum filed with the lower court on January 5,
1966.

^[7] This answer is not
attached to the record.

^[8] By
resolution of this Court of May 25, 1966, respondents Mayor and City Treasurer
of Manila were ordered to cause the payment of withheld salaries during the
period from May to October 18, 1965.

^[9] Section 4, Article XII,
Constitution.

^[10] Adopted
pursuant to Sec. 16(e) of the Civil Service Act of 1959; italics
supplied.

^[11] Article 527, Civil
Code.

^[12] Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33, cited in Tañada and Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., Vol. I, p. 85. See also: Lisenba vs.
California, 314 U. S. 219, 236, 86 L ed., 166, 180; Galvan vs. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530, 98 L. ed., 911, 921.

^[13]
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, L-15982, May 31, 1963.

^[14] Gonzales vs. Hechanova, etc., et al., 60
O.G. No. 6, pp. 802, 806, and cases cited; Cariŕio, et al., vs. Agricultural
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, et al., L-19808, September 29,
1966.

^[15] Tapales vs. President
and Board of Regents, etc., L-17523, March 30, 1963.

^[16] Borja vs. Moreno, etc., et al., L-16487,
July 31, 1964.

^[17] Tan vs.
Gimenez, etc., et al., L-12525, February 19, 1960.