LEON DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON BIENVENIDO CHINGCUANGCO, ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA AND TOMAS IMPERIO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction principally
assailing an order of the Court of Agrarian Relations denying a motion to stay
execution of its judgment dispossessing the tenant until he is indemnified for
alleged expenses and improvements.

As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a parcel of land
owned by respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
Said land became the subject matter of litigation between said parties before
the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos.
2652-NE ’61 and 2909-NE ’62. And on July 12, 1963, a decision was rendered
therein, the dispositive portion running as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (l) ordering the ejectment of Leon
del Rosarlo from the landholdlng in question subject to Section 43 and Section
50, paragraph (a), R.A. No. 1199, as amended by R.A. No. 2263, and (2) ordering
Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del Rosarlo the value of the excess rentals received
by him for the agricultural years 1961-62 and 1962-63.”

Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Courtof Appeals on March 26,
1965.

Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian
Relations a motion for execution of the afore-stated Judgment. Del Rosario
however opposed it, on the ground that he has a right of retention over the land
until he is indemnified for expenses and improvements, alleging that in the
present case he is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian
Relations, on November 18, 1965, issued an order for the Issuance of a writ of
execution, stating that the judgment had become final and executory, and that
Del Rosario’s claim for indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for
determination, but cannot stop execution of said judgment. Del Rosario filed a
motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the same court on December 14,
1965. And on December 16, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution was
issued.

Petitioner Del Rosario then filed, on December 27, 1965, the present special
civil action herein.

Respondents, on January 4, 1966, were required by Us to answer the petition;
and on January 8, 1966, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction
addressed:

“To: Hon. Bienvenido Chingcuangco (reg.-spl.-del.)
Judge, Court of
Agrarian Relations
Cabanatuan City
The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija
(reg.-spl.-del.)
Cabanatuan City”

stating:

“NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You, your agents, your
representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your behalf are hereby
restrained from implementing the Writ of Execution dated December 16, 1965, in
CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE-61 and 2902-NE-62 of the Court of Agrarian Relations of
Cabanatuan City entitled ‘Leon del Rosario, plaintiff versus Tomas Imperio,
defendant.'”

On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer Further developments came
by way of two petitions for contempt: First, a petition filed by respondent
Imperio dated February 5, 1966, to declare petitioner’s counsel in direct
contempt, on the alleged ground that in his petition herein said lawyer cited a
fictitious authority. Second, a petition filed by Del Rosario, dated June 20,
1966, to cite for contempt respondent Imperio, and three non-parties, the Chief
of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija (Eduardo Dumlao), and
policemen Remigio Baldonado and Romeo Miguel, for having allegedly sought to
eject Del Rosario from the land in question notwithstanding this Court’s
preliminary injunction. To this a supplementary petition for contempt was filed,
dated July 25, 1966, alleging further that with the full backing of said
policemen, Imperio caused the plowing and harrowing of the landholding and
prevented Del Rosario from reaping the crops therein.

After the respective parties had filed their comments to the petitions for
contempt, We deferred their resolution until consideration of this case upon the
merits.

At issue on the merits of this petition for certiorari is the proper
interpretation or application of Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 (Agricultural
Tenancy Act) which provides:

“SEC. 43.—Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee.—With the creation
of the tenancy relationship arising out of the contract between the
landholders-lessor and tenant-lessee, the latter shall have the right to enter
the premises of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful enjoyment thereof. He
shall have the right to work the land according to his best judgment, provided
the manner and method of cultivation and harvest are in accordance with proven
farm practices. Upon termination of the relationship, he shall be entitled
to one-half of the value of the improvements made by him, provided they are
reasonable and adequate to the purposes of the lease.” (Italics
supplied).

in relation to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, stating:

“Rule 15.—Writ of Execution “Section 1. Requisites for Issuance of Writ of
Execution in Case of Final Judgment Ejecting Tenant.—In cases where the
dispossession is authorized by final judgment no writ of execution shall issue
unless upon certification of the corresponding Judge that the tenant has been
fully indemnified of his claim under Section 22 of Republic ilct No. 1199 in
case of share tenancy or under Section 43 thereof in case of leasehold
tenancy.”

It is the position of respondents that Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 merely
grants the tenant the right to recover one-half of the value of improvements he
made on the land, without giving him any right of retention over the land until
he is so reimbursed. As to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, they contend that the same had been superseded with the
advent of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R. A. 3844), effective August 8,
1963, which replaced the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations with the Rules
of Court (Sec. 115, R.A. 3844). And, they emphasize that there can be no vested
right on procedure, arguing that petitioner’s right under the former Rules of
the Court of Agrarian Relations cannot be anything more than procedural.

There is no merit to the view that Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the
Court of Agrarian Relations is not applicable in this case for having been
abrogated with the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Said Code, it
is true, provides that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the
Rules of Court. (Sec. 155, R.A. 3844) And neither the Rules of Court then
obtaining nor the present Rules of Court contain a similar, provision requiring
payment to the tenant of one-half of the value of his improvements before there
can be execution of a judgment dispossessing him. Nonetheless, since the Rules
of Court was applied to the Cburt of Agrarian Relations only on August 8, 1963,
pursuant to Republic Act 3844 as afore-stated, its effectiveness to pending
cases as of that time, such as the Instant case, should follow the norm set
forth in Rule 133 therein: “These rules … shall govern all cases brought after
they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending, except
to the extent that in the opi- nion of the court their application would not be
feasi- ble or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall
apply.”

Should it turn out that indeed petitioner tenant had made Improvements on the
landholdlng, – a point not for Us now to decide – then Section 43 of Republic
Act 1199 clearly givss him the right to one-half of their value, thereby
Imposing upon the landholder disposses- sing him the correlative duty of paying
the same. The rule prevailing during the pendency of this case in the Court of
Agrarian Relations required that this account be settled before any judgment of
ejectment can be executed. It is therefore not difficult to see that to apply
the Rules of Court, which do not contain a similar provision, would be unjust to
the tenant. In this event, the former procedure is to be followed, namely,
Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Respondent Imperio’s argument that petitioner failed to show that
improvements were in fact made should be addressed to the Court of Agrarian
Relations. The point is that the tenant’s claim for reimbursement under Section
43 of Republic Act 1199 should first be threshed out, determined and resolved
“before the tenant can be dispossessed by writ of execution. This recourse is
but in accordance with the policy of the law to protect the rights of tenants
upon the principle of social Justice (Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199).

The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges petitioner’s
counsel of having cited a fictitious case and a non-existent ruling. The record
bears out that petitioner’s counsel alleged in page 5 of the petition for
certlorari herein, thus:

“Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, predicated on
Section 43 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, supra, has been upheld
to be valid by this Honorable Tribunal so that now no writ of execution can be
issued unless it is complied with first (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad,
et al., O.R. No. L-121447), This ruling, in effect, created and established or
confirmed the prior substantial right of a tenant to in- demnification before he
is finally ejected from his holding.”

Petitioner’s counsel obviously had in mind this Court’s decision in Paz
Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as
docket number L-121447 instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight
typographical mistake not sufficient to place him in contempt, especially
because the names of the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel’s
interpretation of this Court’s decision in said case, or of what the ruling
therein “in effect” created, established or confirmed, the same are mere
arguments fully within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a deception
urged upon this Court. The first petition for contempt is therefore without
merit.

The second petition for contempt is against respondent Imperio and three
others, not parties herein: the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, Eduardo Dumlao; policeman Remlgio Baldonado; and, policeman Romeo
Miguel. Said petition as well as the supplemental petition thereto, allege that
respondent Imperio, with the aid of the three law enforcement officers,
disturbed petitioner in the possession and cultivation of the land, on June 13,
1966; caused its plowing and harrowing on June 27, 1966; and prevented the
petitioner from reaping the second rice crop on July 16, 1966, The foregoing
acts, if true, would be a ground for contempt only if at the time this Court’s
writ of preliminary injunction was issued, respondent court’s writ of execution
had not yet been carried out. From the sheriff’s return,^[*] however, it would appear that respondent
Imperio was placed in possession of the land by virtue of the writ of execution
as of December 18, 1965. This Court’s preliminary injunction, restraining
implementation of the writ of execution, was issued only on January 8, 1966.
Respondents, therefore, may not be held in contempt. Nonetheless, the premature
implementation of the writ of execution being illegal, petitioner should be
restored to peaceful and undisturbed possession of the landholding, until his
claim for payment of improvements (one-half of their value) is settled by
respondent court.

WHEREFORE, respondent court’s orders of November 18,
1965 and December 14, 1965, denying petitioner’s motion to stay execution
pending settlement of his claim for one-half of the value of alleged
improvements, as well as the writ of execution already issued, are hereby set
aside; respondents are ordered to restore petitioner to the landholding, and to
proceed according to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the former Rules of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, by first determining petitioner’s claim for improvements
under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199, before issuing a writ of execution for
the said tenant’s dispossession. The petitions for contempt are denied for lack
of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.