PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ISMAEL MATHAY AND JOSE VELASCO, RESPONDENTS.

Philippine Constitution Association versus Mathay

The Case

This is a suit by the Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, against the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines. The association asks the Supreme Court to permanently enjoin these officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries fixed by Republic Act Number 4134 to the Speaker and the members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The case matters because it fixes the meaning of the constitutional waiting period on legislative salary increases: the Court holds that the terms of all the members of both chambers who approved the increase must expire before a single peso of it may be paid.

Procedural History

The case began as an original action in the Supreme Court, not as an appeal from any lower court. Upon receiving a written protest from the association, the then Auditor General asked the Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law, but the Solicitor General instead suggested that an opinion be sought from the Secretary of Justice. The matter was endorsed to the Secretary of Justice, but before that official could act, the Acting Auditor General directed his representative in Congress, the Auditor of the Congress, to pass in audit and approve payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the appropriation act then in force. Hence the filing of this action. Ismael Mathay, the incumbent Auditor General, was later substituted for the former Acting Auditor General.

Facts

On June 10, 1964, Republic Act Number 4134 was approved. Its first section fixed the annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives at 40,000 pesos each, and that of the Senators and members of the House at 32,000 pesos each, thereby raising the compensation of 16,000 pesos and 7,200 pesos per annum for the presiding officers and members respectively as set in the Constitution. The section expressly provided that the salary increases fixed therein shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Section 7 of the same act provided that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.

The Appropriation Act for the fiscal year from July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, Republic Act Number 4642, carried items for the House of Representatives paying the Speaker at 16,000 pesos from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and at 40,000 pesos from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966, and paying one hundred three members at 7,200 pesos from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and at 32,000 pesos from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966. For the Senate, the corresponding items kept the President of the Senate at 16,000 pesos and the twenty-three Senators at 7,200 pesos. The budget thus implemented the increase for the Speaker and the members of the House, but not for the Senate.

The association protested, arguing that this implementation violated the Constitution. The term of the eight Senators elected in 1963, who took part in approving the increase, would expire only on December 30, 1969, while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval expired on December 30, 1965. The respondents answered that the expiration of the term of the House members who approved the increase sufficed to make the higher compensation effective for the present members of the House, who were elected in 1965, regardless of the unexpired terms of the Senators who likewise approved it.

Issues

• Whether or not the association, suing as a taxpayer, has the personality to restrain the respondents from disbursing public funds under an allegedly unconstitutional law.
• Whether or not the members of the House of Representatives are indispensable parties defendant, so that their non-joinder defeats the action.
• Whether or not Section 14 of Article VI of the Constitution requires that the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives who approved the increase must have expired before the increase becomes effective.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14 of Article VI of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, provides:

SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

This is the provision whose waiting period the Court construes, and against which it measures both the salary law and the appropriation act.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that as taxpayers the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The Court noted that the rule denying a taxpayer, in his individual capacity, the right to enjoin an unlawful expenditure of state funds is the minority doctrine.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no need to join the members of the House as defendants. The acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in audit and approval of the payment of the increased salaries, not the collection or receipt thereof, so only the respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties defendant.

On the main issue, the Court held that the Constitution requires the expiration of the full term of all the members of both chambers who approved the increase. The Court stressed that the provision refers to all the members of the Senate and of the House in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction between them, and speaks of the expiration of the full term in the singular despite the difference in the terms of office of six years for Senators and four for Representatives. The Court read this as treating both houses as indivisible components of one single Legislature, since the enactment of laws rests on the entire legislative body and responsibility therefor is not apportionable between the chambers. The Court traced the restriction from the 1934 Constitutional Convention through the unicameral draft and the 1940 amendments, finding that the plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered: to require expiration of the full term of all the members of the Legislature that approved the higher compensation, in order to circumvent the influence of self-interest in its adoption.

The Court rejected the argument that the framers would have said term of all the members of the Congress had they meant both chambers, calling it a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together constitute the Congress. It likewise rejected the arguments drawn from the use of the words of the and of the singular term, and held that requiring the present House members to await the expiration of the Senators' terms does not place them in a worse position than under the original Constitution, since under either version a maximum delay of six years and a minimum of four years is necessary before an increase can take effect. The Court closed with the rule that the increased compensation is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House that approved it will have expired, and that the appropriation items authorizing earlier disbursement are void.

Doctrine

Under Section 14 of Article VI of the Constitution, no increase in the compensation of legislators takes effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. The two chambers are treated as one single unit for this purpose; it is not enough that the terms of the members of the House who approved the increase have expired while the terms of the approving Senators have not. A taxpayer has standing to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Where the acts sought to be enjoined are the passing in audit and approval of payment, the auditing officials alone are the proper parties defendant.

Disposition

The Court granted the writ of prohibition, declared void the items of the 1965-1966 Appropriation Act that authorized disbursement of the increased compensation before December 30, 1969, and enjoined the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress from approving and passing in audit any such disbursements before that date, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the waiting period runs until the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House who approved the increase has expired, because the two chambers act as one Legislature. Examiners use this case to test taxpayer standing and the constitutional restriction on legislative salary increases, especially the trap of arguing that the expiration of the House members' terms alone suffices.