PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ISMAEL MATHAY AND JOSE VELASCO, RESPONDENTS.

The Philippine Constitution
Association , a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and
organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino
citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting
Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of
the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his
representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized
by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor
General, was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.

Section 1, paragraph A, of
Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter
alia, that the annual salary of the
President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of
the House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present
compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers
and members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly
provides that “the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution”. Section 7 of the same Act provides
“that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and
Senators.

The Appropriation Act (Budget)
for the Fiscal Year July 1,
1965 to
June 30,
1966
(Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following items for the House of
Representatives:

“SPEAKER

“1. The Speaker of the House of
Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and P40,000 from
December 30, 1965 to June
30, 1966——-P29,129.00

“MEMBERS

“2. One hundred three Members of
the House of Representatives at, P7,200 from July 1 to December 29,1965 and
P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30,1966 ————–P2,032,866.00”

while for the Senate the corresponding
appropriation items appear to be:

1. The President of the
Senate——–P16,000.00

2. Twenty-three Senators at
P7,200——165,600.00

Thus showing that the 1965-1966
Budget (R. A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act No. 4134, approved
just the preceding year 1964.

The petitioners contend that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14,
of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides
as follows:

“SEC.
14. The
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred
pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in
the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their
places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.” (Emphasis supplied)

The reason given being that the
term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of
Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30,
1969 ; while the term of the members of
the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on
December 30,
1965 .

From the record we also glean
that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex “A”),
along the lines summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the
Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law involved (Annex
“B”); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion
on the matter be sought from the Secretary of Justice (Annex “C”, Petition).
Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the
PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or
before January, 1966, and before the former Justice Secretary could act,
respondent Aguiluz, as Acting Auditor General,
directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in audit
and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the
Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of the present action. The answer
of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to
institute the action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and
Members of the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the
answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the
Constitutional provisions, in so far as present members of the Lower House are
concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic
Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is that the expiration of the term of the
members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices to
make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the
members of the Senate.

The procedural points raised by
respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give
pause. As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law (cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, G.R.
No. L-23326, December 18,
1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, G.R.
No. L-10405, December 29,
1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825,
December 24,
1965;
Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Asso. vs.
Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3,
1965).
Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:

“The rule that a taxpayer can
not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure
or waste of state funds, is the minority doctrine.”

“On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as
parties defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts sought to be enjoined
were the respondents1 passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the
Representatives’ increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof,
only respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties defendant to this
action.

These preliminary questions out
of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the
Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the
contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased
compensation to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected
after the expiration of the term of those House members who approved the
increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office of the
Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?

It is admitted that the purpose
of the provision is to place “a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the
natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for
higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse
before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such
measure unless the need for it is clearly felt” (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol.
2, p. 867).

Significantly, in establishing
what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to “all
the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” in the same
sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This
unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
“expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved
the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference
in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives),
thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
“term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members
of the Senate and of the House”, underscores that in the application of Article
VI, section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or
Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole,
accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders
of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable
between the two chambers.

It is also highly relevant, in
the Court’s opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et.
seq.), the committee on legislative power in the Constitutional Convention of
1934, before it was decided that the Legislature should be unicameral in form,
initially recommended that the increase in the compensation of legislators
should not take effect until the expiration of the term of office of all members
of the Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the committee read
as follows:

“The Senators and Representatives
shall receive for their services an annual compensation of four thousand pesos
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective residences
when attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise fixed by
law: Provided. That no increase in this
yearly compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the terms of
office of all the Members of the Legislature that approved such
increase.” (Emphasis supplied)

The spirit of this restrictive
proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral legislature, was
carried over and made more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional
provision, which read:

“Provided, That any increase in
said compensation shall not take effect until after the expiration of the term
of office of the Members of the National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase.” (Aruego, 1, p. 297)

As recorded by the Committee on
Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:

“No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of
the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.”

Finally, with the return to
bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation
assumed its present form:

“No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.”

It is apparent that throughout
its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not been
altered. From the first proposal of the committee on the legislative power of
the 1934 Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause has been
to require expiration of the full term of all the members of the Legislature
that approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or
bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of
self-interest in its adoption.

The Solicitor General argues on
behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the
Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the increase, they would
have just used the expression “term of all the members of the Congress” instead
of specifying “all the members of the Senate and of the House”. This is a
distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying
the component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a
unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution.

It is also contended that there
is significance in the use of the words “of the” before “House” in the provision
being considered, and in the use of the phrase “of the Senate and of the House”
when it could have employed the shorter expression “of the Senate and the
House”. It was grammatically correct to refer to “the members of the Senate and
(the members) of the House”, because the members of the Senate are not members
of the House. To speak of “members of the Senate and the House” would imply that
the members of the Senate also held membership in the House.

The argument that if the
intention was to require that the term of office of the Senators, as well as
that of the Representatives, must all expire the Constitution would have spoken
of the “terms” (in the plural)” of the members of 3 the Senate and of the
House”, instead of using “term” in the singular (as the Constitution does in
section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As previously observed,
the use of the singular form “term” precisely emphasizes that in the provision
in question the Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single
unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, “until the
expiration of the full term of
ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase”.

It is finally urged that to
require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before the effectivity of the increased compensation would subject the
present members of the House of Representatives to the same restrictions as
under the Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered whether
this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the 1940 constitutional
amendments. For under either the original limitation or the present one, as
amended, a maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four(4) is necessary before an increase of legislators’
compensation can take effect.

If that increase were approved in
the session immediately following an election, two assemblymen’s terms, of 3
years each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the increase
could become operative, because the original Constitution required that the new
emolument should operate only after expiration of the term of assemblymen
elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an
assemblyman’s term was then 3 years only. Under the
Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators hold office
for six (6) years.

On the other hand, if the
increase of compensation were approved by the legislature on its last session
just prior to an election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the
original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving
assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added. Once again,
an identical period must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of
the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a given election
four of the approving Senators’ full six-year term still remain to run.

To illustrate: if under the
original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an
increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until
after the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938;
i.e., the increase would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after
1935. Under the present Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964
with the participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be
collectible until December 30, 1969 , since the said Senators’ term
would expire on the latter date.

But if the assemblymen elected in
1935 (under the original Constitution) were to approve the increase in
compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new
compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four years later, since
the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval
of the increase) would end in December 30 of 1941.

Again, under the present
Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions immediately
preceding the elections in November of that year, the higher compensation would
be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later, because the most
recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators chosen by the
electors in November of 1963, and their term would not expire until December 30,
1969.

This coincidence of minimum and
maximum delays under the original and the amended constitution can not be just
due to accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the Constitutional
restriction on Congressional salaries has been maintained unaltered. But whether
designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument that by requiring
members of the present House to await the expiration of the term of the
Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are
placed in a worse position than under the Constitution as originally written.

The reason for the minimum
interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval of increases of
compensation just before an election by legislators who can anticipate their
reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be
nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of the
constitutional mandate.

In resume, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 , when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it in June
20, 1964
will have expired. Consequently, appropriations for such increased compensation
may not be disbursed until December 30,
1969 . In so far as Republic Act No.
4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the
disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING,
the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642)
purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December
30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article
VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the
respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any
disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134
for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before December 30,
1969. No costs.

Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring opinion of Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar
and Ruiz Castro, JJ..

CONCURRING
OPINIONS:

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Fully concurring with the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, I should like only to
mention a few thoughts related to some points contained therein.

As stated in the majority
opinion, it is argued by respondents that if it was intended that the increase
should take effect at the same time, the provision of the Constitution could
have been phrased as follows:

“No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Congress approving such increase.”

They maintain that in specifying
“the Senate” and “the House” instead of just using the word “the Congress” the
body obviously considered that inasmuch as the terms of the Representatives and
Senators under the legislature provided for, would not necessarily coincide, the
effective date of the increased salary of the Representatives could also be
different from that of the Senators

The fact that “Congress” is not
used in the provision in question, in my opinion, is rather an argument for the
petitioner herein. “Congress” is not used, obviously because after every four
years the Congress is dissolved. On the other hand, the term of a member of the
Senate, being six years, goes beyond the duration of one Congress and extends to
that of the next Congress. In other words, while the term of the members of the
House of Representatives coincides with the lifetime of the Congress, the term
of a member of the Senate goes beyond the existence of one Congress.

The Constitution, instead, uses
(1) “Senate” and “House of Representatives” and (2) adds “all” before “the
Members”, clearly Intending that no increase in the compensation therein
provided for shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the
most junior among the members of the Senate at the time the increase was
approved. Precisely, therefore, because the Constitution speaks of “Senate” and
“House of Representatives” instead of “Congress”, the prohibition against effectivity continues even after the end of the Congress
which approved the measure and, which amounts to the same thing, even after the
end of the term of the members of the House of Representatives approving the
increase. In specifying “the expiration of the full term of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase”, the Constitution leaves no doubt that until
after the condition is met as to the Senate, no Increase in the compensation
laid down for Senators and Representatives shall take effect.

It is also contended by
respondents that the Constitution in using “term” instead of “terms” shows the
clear intention to consider the “term” of the Senators independently from that
of the Representatives. The contention is untenable. The provision clearly uses
“term” in the general sense. For, otherwise, even in referring to members of the
Senate alone, it .should have used “terms” since the Senators had originally
different terms of office (two, four and six years), as provided for in Section
3 of Article VI of the Constitution, a provision contemporaneous with the one
involved herein. Yet just the same, the Constitution uses the word “term”
(singular) to cover all these different terms of office.

I am of the opinion therefore
that no other course is open to the Supreme Court in this case but to apply the
provision of the Constitution restricting the increase of salaries of Senators
and Representatives by subjecting it to a period of waiting. To forestall the
view that the Supreme Court thereby offends equity, because the other
Constitutional officers – including the members of said Court – are already
receiving their increased salaries under Republic Act 4134, suffice it to bear
in mind that it was within the hands of the legislators themselves, if they had
so desired, to have provided that the salary increases of the aforesaid other
Constitutional officers take effect at the same time as their own. In other
words, if they had thought it would be inequitable to grant salary increases to
others before they could receive their own salary increase – an argument which,
I am glad to note, has not been advanced – they could have easily provided that
the salary increases therein given be effective December 30, 1969* as in their
case.

I consequently reiterate my
concurrence.

RUIZ CASTRO, J.:

Republic Act 4134, increasing the
salary of all the members of Congress was approved on June
20, 1964 . In the light of the
constitutional prohibition or limitation embodied in section 14 of article VI of
the Constitution, when does such increase in salary take effect? Shall effectivity be this year 1966 for the members of the House
of Representatives, considering that the full term of the members thereof who
participated in the approval of the salary increase has expired? Even if the
full terms of all the members of the Senate, as composed in 1964, have not
expired? Or shall effectivity be only on
December 30, 1969 , after the expiration of the full
term of the senators elected in 1963?

I fully adhere to and support the
position taken by my esteemed brethren, Justices J. B. L. Reyes, Jose P. Bengzon and Calixto Zaldivar. Their thoroughgoing treatment of the issue
effectively exploits logical, historical and empirical
considerations leading quite Inevitably to the firm conclusion that the salary
Increase provided for by Congress in 1964 can take effect, for any and all
members of Congress, only after the expiration of the full term of the senators
elected in 1963, that is to say, only after December 29, 1969.

There is, however, a vital aspect
of the problem that, in my view, requires not only projection but emphasis as
well. This is the language of the pertinent constitutional prohibition or
limitation which by itself forcefully compels the very conclusion arrived at by
the majority of the Court.

We cannot overemphasize the
essential role of language. It is one of the distinctive qualities of man,
especially of modern thinking man. Man does feel and analyze his intellectual
and material experiences; but more than this, he has the ability to articulate,
and through articulation he manages synthesis and brings forth the creation and
evolution of culture, literature, science and law. In the process, the unceasing
effort is to say what is meant and to mean what is said.

Now, then, is the constitutional
prohibition or limitation on congressional salary increases stated? “No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such Increase.” This statement has a literal message of striking
clarity. The phrase “No Increase in said compensation shall take effect”
establishes the character of the provision as a prohibition or limitation, as
can be seen from the unqualified words “no increase”. The words “until after the
expiration of the full term” impart the period of time during which the
prohibition or limitation operates, after which period the Increase in
compensation can take effect. Whose full term must first expire before the
increase can take effect? It is the full term “of the members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving such increase.” The immediate as well
as lasting Impact of these words is that what must first expire is the full term
of the members of both houses of Congress approving the increase. It cannot be
the full term of the members of either house, nor yet the full term of the
members of the Senate, or that of the members of the House of Representatives.

The key word is the particle
“and” “And” is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning “together with,”
“Joined with” (Punk and Wagnalls New Standard
Dictionary of the English Language, p. 105); “along or together with,” “added to
or linked to,” used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with
clause (Webster’ s New International Dictionary, p. 98). The word “and” does not
mean “or”; it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union, “binding together,” “relating the one to
the other” (See 3 Words and Phrases, 569-571.).

As understood from the common and
usual meaning of the conjunction “and,” the expiration of the full term of all
the members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the House of Representatives. From the perspective of
semantics, it is undeniably perceived that those who framed the constitutional
provision, when they utilized the word “and,” stated what they meant and meant
what they stated.

There is, to be sure, a specific
rule of interpretation that would allow “or” to be interchanged with “and,” in
which event a negation of the concept of joinder would
ensue. But this is the exception rather than the general rule. The exception is
resorted to only when a literal Interpretation would pervert the plain intention
of the writer or draftsman as gleaned from the overall context of the writing
and/or from external factors. This does not obtain in the provision under
discussion. Indeed, a departure from the general rule and a resort to the
exception would pervert section 14 of article VI. Note the parity of
compensation of the senators and the members of the House of Representatives. If
the expiration of the full term of the members of the Senate would be considered
as separable from the expiration of the full term of the members of the House of
Representatives, despite the conjunction “and,” then the result would be to
allow members of the House of Representatives to enjoy the increase in
compensation ahead of the senators, thereby producing a disparity of
compensation. Furthermore, if the framers of the provision were concerned with
the realities of the term of office of the senators and that of the
representatives, more than with the reality of the parity of compensation, then
they should have staggered the effectivity of
entitlement to the increased salary and allowed the first group of senators
elected after the approval of the increase to enjoy such increase.

The prohibition or limitation may
be stated elsewise: “The full terms of all the members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such Increase must
first expire before an increase in compensation can take effect.” Would the
literal meaning of the provision still be in doubt?

The framers of the constitutional
provision under discussion certainly were not wanting of competent legal
stylists. With much more reason, then, must they be regarded as having achieved
a unity of intention, statement and meaning. These
experienced stylists could have so easily phrased the provision differently to
conform to a different intention. For example, it could have been:

“x x
x until after the expiration of the full term of all
the members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives approving such
increase, as the case may be,” But this was not done, and we cannot deviate from
what able stylists have plainly stated in the plain
language.

---

ZALDIVAR, J.:

During the third regular session
of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines House Bill No. 6190 was
approved, and this bill was signed into law on June 20, 1964 by the President of
the Philippines and became Republic Act 4134.

Section 1, paragraph A of
Republic Act 4134 provides, among others, that the
annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be forty thousand pesos, and that of the Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall be thirty-two thousand pesos each.
The paragraph ends with this sentence: “The salary Increases therein fixed shall
take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”

The pertinent provision of the
Constitution as far as the effectivity of any law
increasing the Compensation of the Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives is concerned reads as follows:

“x x
x No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full tern of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving such increase, x x x” (Article VI, Section 14 of
the Constitution)

Inasmuch as House Bill No. 6190
was passed during the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the
Philippines, in 1964, said bill was approved by the House of Representatives
whose members were elected in the elections of November, 1961 and whose term of
office would expire on December 29, 1965; and by the Senate whose membership was
composed of: eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959 and whose term
would expire on December 29, 1965; eight Senators who were elected in November,
1961 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1967; and eight Senators who
were elected in November, 1963 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1969.

Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
writing the opinion of the Court in the case now before Us, interpreting the
effectivity clause in paragraph A, Section 1 of
Republic Act 4134 in relation to the pertinent provision of Article VI, Section
14, of the Constitution, hereinabove quoted, says that the increased
compensation provided by Republic Act 4134 for the Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives will not take effect until December 30, 1969. I concur
with this opinion because it will not be until December 29,
1969 when
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives that approved the increase in 1964 would expire. And I also
agree with the opinion that in so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (Appropriation
Law for the fiscal year 1965-1966) authorizes the disbursement of the increased
compensation for the Members of the House of Representatives prior to
December 30,
1960
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

My opinion in this regard is
based upon a personal knowledge of how the constitutional proviso, Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our
present Constitution. It was the Second National Assembly which amended our
original Constitution. I was a humble Member of the Second National Assembly,
representing the province of Antique
.

The three important amendments
that were incorporated in our Constitution by the Second National Assembly in
1940 were the provisions regarding (1) the establishment of a bicameral
legislature composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate, to take the
place of the then existing unicameral legislature known as the National
Assembly; (2) the change in the term of the office of the President of the
Philippines, and the Vice-President, which formerly was for a period of six
years, to that of four years, with the proviso that no person shall serve as
President for more than eight consecutive years; and (3) the creation of the
Commission on Elections.

It is regrettable that the
deliberations of the Second National Assembly on the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution were mostly done in caucuses behind closed doors, and the
discussions were not recorded. It was during the first special sessions of the
Second National Assembly in September, 1939 when discussions on proposed
amendments to the Constitution were held. It was only after the proposed
amendments had been approved in caucuses when the amendments were embodied in a
resolution and submitted to the National Assembly in open session. The
amendments as approved in caucuses were embodied in Resolution No.38 and adopted
on September 15, 1939 . However, during the second
regular sessions in 1940 Resolution No. 38 was amended by. Resolution No. 73
which was adopted on April 11, 1940 . That is how the amendments came
to be known as the 1940 Amendments. Those amendments were approved in a
plebiscite that was held on June 18, 1940 .

I still have vivid recollections
of the important points brought up during the deliberations in caucus over
proposed amendments and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too the
influences that worked, and the pressures that were brought to bear upon the
Assemblymen, in the efforts to bring about agreements on very controversial
matters and thus secure the- insertion of the desired amendments to the
Constitution. The discussions on the proposed amendments affecting the
legislative branch of the government were specially of
interest to us then because we were in some way personally affected, as most of
us were interested in running for reelection.

It is not my purpose here to
impose on anyone my recollections of matters that were brought up during our
caucuses then, but I only wish to emphasize the fact that my concurring opinion
in the decision of the case now before Us has for its basis my honest and best
recollections of what had transpired, or what had been expressed, during the
caucuses held by the Members of the Second National Assembly in the
deliberations which later brought about the 1940 amendments.

I distinctly remember that the
proposed amendment to change the legislature from unicameral to that of
bicameral, just as the proposal to change the term of office of the President
from six years without reelection to that of four years with one reelection, at
first met very strong opposition by a considerable group of Assemblymen. But
somehow the opposition was finally subdued, so to say. In the case of the
legislature, the basic idea of having two chambers of the legislature – one
chamber serving as a check to the other – was accepted. It was then considered
as a wise idea to have the Senate as the upper chamber, to be composed of
members who would be elected at large, and it was expected that those who would
be elected to the Senate would be men of national prestige; prestigious because
of their known integrity, in their record and experience as a public servant, or
in their prominence as a successful member of his profession. It was even said,
then, that the Senate would be a training ground for future Presidents of the
nation. And so, when it was agreed that a bicameral legislature would be
provided in the Constitution, the next matter that had to be considered was the
tenure of office of the members of each of the two chambers of the legislature.
As far as the term of the members of the lower chamber, to be known as the House
of Representatives, there was no disagreement over the idea that their term be
for a period of four years, to coincide with the term of the President. But as
far as the term of office of the members of the upper chamber, to be known as
the Senate, there was at first a divergence of opinion. There was a group that
supported the idea that the term of the members of the upper chamber be four
years, similar to that of the House of Representatives, so that in the national
elections that would take place every four years there would be elections for
President, Vice-President, and all the members of the Congress of the
Philippines. However, there was a very strong advocacy on the part of top
political leaders at that time that the Senate should be made a continuing body,
such that the complete membership of that chamber should not be elected during
the national elections that would take place every four years.

Finally, it was agreed that the
members of the Senate, which was decided to be composed of twenty-four, would
have a term of six years, one-third of which number would be elected every two
years. The idea of having elections of one-third of the membership of the Senate
was adjusted to the situation that in between two national elections there were
the elections for local officials. The question regarding the term of office of
the Members of the first Senate to be elected under the Constitution as amended
was settled by inserting a proviso that the first senators elected should, in
the manner provided by law, be divided equally into three groups: the senators
of the first group to serve for a term of six years, those of the second group
to serve for a term of four years, and those of the third group for a term of
two years (Article VI, Section 3). And for the purposes of the first elections
under the amended Constitution Commonwealth Act No. 666 was enacted by the
National Assembly providing, as far as the first Senate was concerned, that “The
Senate shall, within ten days after it shall have been organized with the
election of its President, determine by lot which of the elected Senators shall
belong to the group who shall serve six years, which to the group who shall
serve for four years, and which to the group who shall serve for two years.”
(Section 9, Com. Act Ho. 666)

When the matter regarding the
compensation of the members of both chambers came up for deliberation, there
were proposals that the Senators be given more compensation than the Members of
the House of Representatives, and a number of proposals were presented regarding
the amount of compensation that would be paid to the Senators or to the
Representatives, as the case may be. This matter was the subject of long
discussions. It was finally agreed that the amount of compensation for the
Senators and for the Members of the House of Representatives be the same, and it
was fixed at P7,200.00 per annum each, including per diems and other emoluments,
exclusive only of traveling expenses in going to and returning from the
sessions. There was an increase of P2,200.00 over the
P5,000.00 per annum that the Members of the National Assembly were receiving at
the time. It is thus seen that in the matter of compensation the sense of the
Members of the Second National Assembly who amended the Constitution in 1940 was
to provide for an equal compensation for the Members of the Senate and to the
Members of the House of Representatives.

When the matter regarding the
increase in the compensation of the Senators and of the Representatives came up
for consideration, there was unanimity among the Assemblymen in support of the
idea that members of the Congress of the Philippines may approve a law
increasing their compensation, but that no Member of the House of
Representatives or of the Senate that approved the law increasing the
compensation should receive the increased compensation, during their term of
office when the increase was approved. I remember that the question as to when
the increase of compensation as approved by the Members of the Congress of the
Philippines should take effect was the
subject of a prolonged and heated discussion. Many Members of the National
Assembly wanted to continue with the provision of Article VI, Section 5 of the
original Constitution that “No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.” I have taken note
that no less than eighteen members of the Second National Assembly in 1940 were
members of the 1934 constitutional convention that drafted the original
Constitution, and it was this group of Assemblymen that were zealous in
maintaining the idea that one full term of a member of the legislature
subsequent to the approval of the increase in compensation should be made to
lapse before the increase shall take effect. But this idea could not be insisted
upon because while that was feasible in the case of Members of the National
Assembly which was a unicameral body, that idea could not be adopted in a
bicameral body where the term of office of the members of one chamber was not
the same as that of the members of the other chamber. I recall that it was
finally agreed to simply adopt the constitutional precept that no Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may receive any increase in compensation,
as approved by the House and the Senate of a particular Congress, before the
expiration of the term of all the members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate that approved the increase. Inasmuch as the term of the Members of
the House of Representatives is shorter than that of the Senators, it was
understood that the expiration of the term of the Members of the Senate that
approved the increase should be awaited before the increase in compensation
would take effect. As finally worded by the Committee on Style of the Assembly,
and that Committee on Style was headed by the illustrious and indefatigable
Assemblyman Gregorio Perfecto, who later became a worthy member of this Court,
that constitutional precept which be-became part of
Section 14, Article VI of the amended Constitution was worded as follows:

“No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.”

It should be noted that the
above-quoted portion of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution talks of the
“expiration of the full term of all the Members” then followed by the words “of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.” This
proviso contemplates not the Representatives or the Senators who voted in favor
of the increase, but the Senate and the House of Representatives as a body that
approved the increase. And so, because the understanding of the amending
Assemblymen was that the effectiveness of the increase should take place after
the expiration of the term of the Senators with the longest term among the
Members of the Senate that approved the increase the constitutional proviso was
so worded “shall take effect until after the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.” It will be
noted that this Section 14 starts with using the words “Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives” in referring to the compensation to be received by
each, they are considered individually, But in the matter of determining the
time when the increase is to take effect they are considered as collective by
the use of the phrase “all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase.” The use of the word all includes every
Member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, regardless of whether
or not he or she voted affirmatively for the increase. It is the House and the
Senate that approved the increase. And so because the effectiveness of the
increase depends on the expiration of the term of all the members of both
chambers it stands to reason that all the members of the two chambers were taken
into consideration, and because when the increase was approved by the Senate and
the House of Representatives there were members of the Senate whose term of
office was longer than that of some other Members of the Senate and of the
Members of the House of Representatives it is the term of the Senators which was
the longest that should first expire before the increase should take effect.
That is how I understood then that portion of Section 14, Article VI of the
Constitution, and I sincerely believe that that was also how most if not all of
my colleagues understood it.

The question precisely was raised
whether under that constitutional proviso, as above-quoted, the Members of the
House of Representatives who are elected during the elections subsequent to the
approval of the increase by the Congress of the Philippines could receive the
increased compensation inasmuch as the term of those Members of the House that
had approved the increase had already expired. I remember that it was the
understanding of the Members of the National Assembly that those Members of the
House of Representatives who would be elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase could not immediately receive the increased compensation as approved
during the preceding Congress; and neither could the eight Senators who would be
elected along with those Representatives in the same elections. To allow those
newly elected Representatives and Senators to receive the increased compensation
would give rise to a situation whereby the Members of the House of
Representatives and eight Senators would be receiving a
compensation higher than that received by at least sixteen Members of the
Senate, including the President of the Senate, as the case might happen. That
would be inconsistent with the basic idea adopted by the Members of the National
Assembly that the compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives
and those of the Senate should be the same; and it is only logical that when we
say that the compensation of the Members of the House and of the Members of the
Senate is the same, that compensation should be the same not only in amount but
also at the same time within their respective terms of office.

It was envisaged by the Members
of the National Assembly that the salary increase, under the constitutional
proviso now in question, would become effective after the lapse of two years, or
four years, as the case may be, after the commencement of the term of office of
those Members of the House of Representatives that are elected in the elections
subsequent to the approval of the increase. In the case of the lapse of four
years, which we have just stated, it would mean that it would be the Members of
the House of Representatives who would be elected in the second elections
subsequent to the approval of the increase who would receive the increased
compensation.

As I have stated, it was the
sense of the Members of the Second National Assembly that approved the
constitutional amendment in 1940 that the increase in the compensation for
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate would take effect only
until after the expiration of the full term of the senators who were Members of
the Senate that approved the increase. It is my recollection that the main idea
of the Members of the National Assembly in adopting the proviso in question was
to maintain the equality of the compensation of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate at all times.

Three situations were anticipated
to happen by the amending Assemblymen under the constitutional proviso in
question:

1. This is the first situation.
Let us take the case of the First Congress of the
Philippines which was elected in November,
1941 already under the Constitution as amended in 1940. This Congress was
composed of a House of Representatives whose members were elected for a term of
4 years, to expire on December 29, 1945; and of a Senate composed of eight
senators with a term of 6 years to expire on December 29, 1947; eight senators
with a term of 4 years to expire on December 29, 1945, and eight senators with a
term of 2 years to expire on December 29, 1943.

If a law increasing the
compensation of Members of Congress was passed during the sessions in 1942,
supposing that there was no war, the increase would take effect on
December 30, 1947 , after the expiration of the term
of the eight senators who were elected in the elections in November, 1941 who
served for a term of six years. The term of the eight senators who were elected
in 1941 and who would have served for only two years would have expired on
December 29, 1943 ; and the term of the eight
senators who would have served for four years would have expired on
December 29,
1945 .
The term (4 years) of the Representatives who were elected in November, 1941
would also have expired on December 29,
1945 . But in November, 1943 elections
for eight senators who would serve for a regular term of 6 years would have
taken place; and likewise elections for a full House of Representatives and for
another set of senators to serve for a full term of six years would have taken
place in November, 1945. If the war did not upset the national affairs a new
Congress would have convened in January, 1946, already composed of a House of
Representatives and a Senate whose members would all have been elected for a
term of six years each.

So, on December 30, 1947 when the
increase in the compensation would take effect, the increased compensation would
be uniformly enjoyed by all members of Congress (Senators and Representatives
alike) – those Senators who were elected in the 1943, 1945 and 1947 elections,
and by the Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in the 1945
elections. Under that situation, the Members of the House of Representatives who
were elected in 1945 would have waited for two years before they could receive
the increased compensation that was approved in the 1942 sessions of Congress.
And this is so, because it is on December 29, 1947, when the six-year term of
the eight Senators who were Members of the Senate that approved the increased
compensation in 1942 (along with the then existing House of Representatives) had
expired.

2. Now let us take the second
situation. Let us take the case of a Congress that is normally constituted. When
I say “normally constituted” I mean a Congress composed of a House of
Representatives whose members had been elected for a term of four years, and a
Senate that is composed of Members who had each been elected for a term of six
years, although at different elections, as provided in the Constitution.

We make the Third Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines as an example. This Congress
covered the period of four years from January, 1954 to December, 1957,
inclusive. During the first two years (or two regular sessions) this Congress
was composed of the House of Representatives whose members were elected in the
elections of November, 1953 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1957;
and twenty-four senators: eight who were elected in November, 1953 whose term
would expire on December 29, 1959; eight who were elected in November, 1951 and
whose term would expire on December 29, 1957; and eight who were elected in
November, 1949 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1955.

If a law increasing the salary is
passed, say in the first regular session of the Third Congress in May, 1954,
then the increase provided for in this law would take effect on December 30, 1959 . Why? Because that law was
approved by the House of Representatives (the term of whose members ended on
December 29, 1957 ) and by a Senate at least eight
of whose members were elected in November, 1953 and whose term of office would
expire on December 29,
1959 .
That means that the members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
the elections of November, 1957 (many of whom may be members of the Third
Congress who voted for the law in May, 1954) would have to wait for two years
before they could receive the increased compensation. In other words, beginning
December 30, 1959 , the Members of the House of
Representatives and all the Members of the Senate (those elected in the 1955,
1957 and 1959 elections) would all be uniformly getting the increased salary.

3. Let us take the third
situation. We still use the Third Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines as an example. Let us suppose
that the law increasing the compensation was passed in the third regular session
of the Third Congress in May, 1956. This time the Third Congress is composed of
the same members of the House of Representatives who were elected in November,
1953, but the Senate has a different composition. The Senate would already be
composed of eight new Senators who were elected during the elections of
November, 1955 and whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1961 , the remaining eight Senators
elected in 1953 and eight Senators who were elected in 1951. If the law
increasing the compensation is passed during the regular session of 1956 this
law would be approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate that had
eight new members whose term would expire on December 29, 1961 . Since the term of these new
eight Senators would expire on December 29,
1961 , then the increased compensation
would take effect on December 30,
1961 .

In November, 1957 there were
elections and a new House of Representatives was then elected, and the term of
office of the members of the new House would expire on December 29, 1961 . Likewise, a new set of eight
Senators were elected whose term would expire on December 29, 1953 . Those
Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in November, 1957,
among whom perhaps were Representatives who voted for the increase during the
1956 sessions, would not enjoy the increased compensation because their term
would expire on December 29, 1961 – the very same date of the termination of the
term of the eight Senators who were elected in 1955 and who were Members of the
Senate that approved the increase during the session of 1956. In this case the
increased compensation would be received by the Members of the House of
Representatives who were elected in the elections of November, 1961, along with
the Senators who were elected in November, 1961 and the
remaining Senators who were elected in 1959 and 1957. They would all be
receiving the same compensation and at the same time while they are in office
during the term for which they were elected.

As far as the House of
Representatives is concerned, the situation as portrayed in this third case is
the same situation as that which was contemplated by the framers of the original
Constitution of 1935 when it was provided in the Constitution as adopted that
the increase in salary should not take effect “until after the expiration of the
full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase.” In the example we have given, the increase in
salaries of the Members of the House of Representatives which was approved by
the Members of the House in the third regular session of the Third Congress did
not take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of
the House who were elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The case now before Us is similar to Case No. 3 that we have portrayed above.
Republic Act 4134 was approved during the regular session of the Fifth Congress
of the Republic of the Philippines in May, 1964 and signed into law
by the President on June 20, 1964 . As I have stated earlier, the
increase provided in this law was approved by the House of Representatives whose
members were elected in November, 1961, and whose term of office expired on
December 29, 1965; and by the Senate composed of eight Senators who were elected
in November, 1963 whose term would expire on December 29, 1969, eight Senators
who were elected in November, 1961 whose term would expire on December 29, 1967,
and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959 whose term had expired on
December 29, 1965. Inasmuch as the increase would take effect at the expiration
of the term of the Senators who were elected in November, 1963 – which is on
December 29,
1969 –
the Members of the present House of Representatives cannot receive this
increased compensation during their present term of office. It will be the
Members of the House of Representatives who will be elected in November, 1969,
along with the Senators elected in 1965, 1967 and 1969, who will receive this
increased compensation. They will then all be receiving the same compensation
during the time that they are in office.

I have endeavored to make a
discourse of facts as I know them, because I sincerely believe that the
interpretation embodied in the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, of the pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14 of
our Constitution is in consonance with the facts and circumstances as I remember
them, and as I know them. As I have stated at the early part of this concurring
opinion, it is not my purpose to impose on anyone my recollection of what
transpired, or of what had been discussed about, or of what had been agreed
upon, by the Members of the Second National Assembly during the deliberations
which brought about the 1940 amendments to our Constitution. My perception and
my memory are as frail as those of any other human being, and I may have
incurred myself in error. It just happened that the facts and the circumstances
that I have herein narrated, as I remember them, have engendered in my mind an
opinion, nay a conviction, which dovetails with the opinion of my illustrious
colleague that has penned the opinion for the majority of the Court in this
case.