DELFIN MAYORMENTE, PETITIONER, VS. ROBACO CORPORATION AND/OR ITS MANAGER, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Delfin
Mayormente, a pauper litigant to set aside an order
of the respondent judge Emiliano C. Tabigne of the Court of Industrial Relation (CIR)
transferring the hearing of case 182-V-Cebu before him from Cebu City
to Butuan City.

The petitioner filed in Cebu City
case 182-V against the respondent Robaco
Corporation.  After the reception of his
evidence, the respondent judge set the hearing in Butuan City,
the place of business of the company.  
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but
the respondent judge denied his motion.  
The petition charges that, in so doing, the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion.

The respondents justify the disputed order on the basis of
section 1 of Commonwealth Act 103 which gives the CIR juris­diction “over
the entire Philippines
to consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions, matters,
controversies, or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employees or
laborers… and regulate the relations between them . . . .”  They also claim that the petition is
premature because the peti­tioner did not first elevate the matter to the CIR in
banc before bringing it up to
this Court.

We shall first dwell on the technical objection raised.   The respondents invoke Broce
v. Court of Industrial Relations^[1]
in which this Court said:

“Section 1 of said Commonwealth Act
No. 103 ex­pressly provides that if any of the parties ag­grieved by a decision
or ruling of any of the judges, requests for a reconsideration of said
decision, it must be presented to the judges who shall sit together, and that
the concur­rence of at least three of the five judges shall be necessary for
the pronouncement of a decision, order, or award.   This provision has always been followed in
cases of appeals to this Court by certiorari. . . . The provision does not
authorize an appeal from any decision made by a judge but only from decisions of the court . . . .”

The fallacy of the respondents’ argument is that it assumes that
the present case is an appeal
by certiorari, which it is not.  As stated at the outset, this is an ori­ginal petition for certiorari.  The distinction between an appeal by certiorari
and a special civil action of certiorari is basic. 
The first is governed by Commonwealth Act 103 in connection with Rule 43 and is a mode of appeal whereby mat­ters of law
may be reviewed.  The second is a special civil action governed by Rule 65 by which questions of jurisdiction
may be determined.

In the case of appeal by certiorari it is plausible to argue that a
motion for reconsideration before the CIR in banc is necessary
because the statute^[2]
authorizes an appeal only “from a decision, order, award
of the Court of Industrial Relations.” 
A motion for reconsideration is thus in effect an appeal to the CIR in
banc as there can be no appealable decision of
that court until it shall have acted as a body on the motion for
reconsideration.^[3]

On the other hand, no such requirement can be read into the statute with respect to a special civil action of certio­rari
for, as each judge participates in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction,^[4]
so may his acts be kept within bounds by
a resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.  As section 1 of Rule 65 indicates, certiorari
is available not only against a tribunal or board but also against any “of­ficer exercising judicial functions
who has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion.”  The
only condition is that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordi­nary course of law open to the petitioner.

That the use of the
remedy in this case is particularly appropriate is beyond question, as relief from the injurious effects of the disputed interlocutory order
would have to await the rendition of a decision.  By the time judgment shall have been rendered
it will be useless for the petitioner to contend that the hearings should
continue in Cebu City.  While,
therefore, the proceedings in a given case should normally not be allowed to go
of on procedural points, especially when in­terlocutory orders are in issue,
the urgency and the peculiar environmental
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar and the obvious inadequacy of appeal as a remedy make resort to certiorari
fully justified.

And now
to the merits of the petition.  In justifying the transfer of
venue to Butuan City, the respondent judge states in his order of
October 20, 1965:

“The Court cannot agree on this proposition because the Court of Industrial Relations has
the power to conduct hearings anywhere in the Philippines
in order to receive the evidence of the par­ties, specially
in the place of business operations of the employer firm in order to evaluate
the circumstances leading to the lay-off of an employee.  It is the policy of the law creating this
Court in the interest of justice that It
my go to any place in the Philippines in order to hear the parties and receive their evidence
so that in the resolution of the issue
or issues which gave rise to the proceeding may be properly appreciated and
considered (sic).  In the exercise
of its ample power this Court found that the request of counsel for the
respondents to transfer the
place for the reception of their evi­dence in its place of business is, to our opinion, in consonance with
justice and fair play.  The Court
believes that there is no abuse of its discretion because it afforded
complainant the benefit of the hearing and the reception of his evidence in his
place of residence;
and if the Court will refuse to concede
the same right to the other party, it is, to the mind of the Court, not
in consonance with reason, fair play and the social justice po­licy of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended.”

The records do not disclose the nature of petitioner’s action
before the CIR.  We can only surmise that
it is for separation pay on account of his “lay-off” from the
respondent company’s employment.^[5]
But whatever be the nature of his action, we cannot see why it was necessary
for the court to transfer the hearings to Butuan City
with all the expenses that the transfer would entail to the petitioner.

The respondent judge says that it is as much the right of the
company to have the hearing in its place of business as it is the right of the
petitioner to have his evidence received in his place of residence.  This is palpable error.  Republic Act 1171 expressly provides:

“SECTION 1.  Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to
the contrary notwithstanding, civil ac­tions on claims of employees, laborers
and other helps may be commenced and tried in the court of competent
jurisdiction where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied)

We think it plain
that once laid venue cannot be changed save of course with the consent of the
parties or for over­riding reasons.  It cannot
be changed on the ground that the CIR has jurisdiction over the whole country
just as the venue of an ordinary civil action cannot be changed from one
province to another on the reasoning that Courts of First Instance are courts
of general original jurisdiction.^[6]
Indeed section 1 Republic Act 1171 is no different from the rule governing or­dinary
civil actions.  Thus, section 2(b) of
Rule 4 provides:

“All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.”

The choice of venue is
thus given to a plaintiff employee.  The
choice would be rendered meaningless were we to hold that, while an
employee may initially choose
the venue of his action, he may
not be heard to complain later against the subsequent transfer of that
venue.  Nor can the choice be delimited
by the fact that the jurisdiction of the CIR covers the entire country.  Indeed, much of the difficulty apparent from
a reading of the challenged order is due to a confusion of the issue.  For the question here is not jurisdiction.  It is simply venue.

There is a more compelling reason for insisting in this case that
the choice of venue be preserved to the plaintiff employee.  It is that he is so poor he cannot even
defray the cost of these proceedings. 
“He who has less in life should have more in law,” is more
than just a credo of government.  It is a
principle enshrined in the Constitutional mandate to afford protection to
labor.

Had the respondent judge been guided by this principle he would
not have felt compelled, by what he deemed to be the demands of justice, to
accord to the respondent company the “right” to be heard in its place
of business.  Nor would he have felt
empowered to remove the cause from whence it was first laid.  For the discretion of which
the respondent judge speaks in his order is not an unfettered one, though this
may sound paradoxical.  The judge, writes Cardozo, even when
he is free, is still not wholly free. 
“He is not to innovate at pleasure. 
He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pur­suit of his own ideal
of beauty or of goodness.  He is to draw
his inspiration from consecrated principles. 
He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated
benevolence.  He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system,
and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity of order in the social life.’  Wide enough in all conscience is the field of
discretion that remains”^[7]
And we might add that the kind of justice which courts are called upon to
disperse is justice according to the precepts of law.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of October 20, 1965 is set aside, and the case is remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations for further proceedings in Cebu City,
with costs against the respondent Robaco Corporation.

Dizon, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J., are
on official leave.

^[1]
L-12367, Oct. 28, 1959.

^[2]
Commw.
Act 103, sec. 15.

^[3]
Manila Terminal Relief & Mutual Aid Ass’n v. Manila Ter­minal Co., 88 Phil. 395 (1951) (7-4 decision).

^[4]
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 103 provides: 
“The Judges shall act on such matters as the Presiding Judge may
designate and each of them shall have power to preside over the hearing of
cases assigned to him and to render decisions thereon.”

^[5]
In all likelihood the action is not for discriminatory discharge, otherwise
“ULP” (for cases filed under Rep. Act 875) and not the letter
“V” (for cases filed under Commw. Act 103)
would have been added to the case number.

^[6]
Judiciary Act of 1948, sec. 39.

^[7]
B. Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process 141 (1921).