CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., PETITIONER, VS. VICTORIANO D. CASTILLO AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

In this appeal by petitioner Caltex
(Philippines) Inc. from a decision of respondent Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, the award granted the employee, respondent Victoriano
D. Castillo, in view of the ailments “admittedly work-connected” with
his employment at the ethylizing plant of petitioner, due to exposure to tetraethyl
lead, is sought to be set aside
on due process grounds, it being alleged that the finding as to the cause of
such ailments “is not supported by any evidence on record” and that
an additional compensation for alleged disability was likewise without such
support and, what was worse, granted without such claim having been presented.

In the decision of respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
which is sought to be reversed, the antecedents of the case were set forth,
thus:  “It appears that claimant Victoriano D. Castillo was first taken in by the respondent
in 1954 to
work in the Pumping and Shipping Section of its Refinery in Batangas
with a daily wage of P13.17.  He worked as TEL Blending
Operator in this section, after undergoing the required training and had
remained in this particular job up to July 1956, when he was transferred to
another section because of his complaint of body weakness and dizzi­ness.  In this section, he was assigned to act as
pump operator with the principal duty of opening intake and outlet valves of
the respondent’s storage tanks and noting their gauge readings until 1958, when
his designation was changed to that of mechanic at P14.67 a day.”^[1]

Then came the finding as to the ailment from which respondent
Castillo was found to be suffering. 
“On January 14, 1956, while still performing the job of a TEL
Blending Operator (blending ethyl fluid, a
poisonous substance, with gasoline), claimant was for the first time
found to be suffering from Thrombo-phlebitis.  In 1960 Castillo’s varicose veins had become
hemorrhagic and in 1961, his Thrombo-phlebitis,
together with his dermatitis, had so asserted to the point of disabling
him.  When examined on June 14, 1961, by Dr. Prospero Ma. Oreta (doctor to whom claimant was referred by the
respondent’s physician for expert advice and treatment), Castillo was found to
be suf­fering from ‘Thrombo-phlebitis, obronic, lags, bilateral, Allergic Dermatitis, leg,
right.’  His thrombo-phlebitis
was operated on in the early part of 1962.”^[2]  What trans­pired next follows:  “On account of the above-described
ailments, Castillo was not able to report for work from January 5, 1962, to September 3, 1962, and from October 29, 1962 to November 21, 1962. 
But because his ailments had considerably impaired his capacity to meet
efficiently the duties attached to his job (mechanic) he was prevailed upon on March 7, 1964 by the respondent to
retire under its retirement plan.  During
the first period of his disability, however, respondent paid him the amount of
P460.95.  The amount of P1,351.50 spent by Castillo for the hospital (P554.60) and for
medicines (P796.90) came from his own pocket.”^[3]

The decision of respondent Commission likewise noted:  “It further appears that on September 25, 1963, a decision in this
case was rendered by the aforesaid officer holding respondent liable for
compensation for the work-connected ailments (thrombo-phlebitis,
varicose veins, and dermatitis) of the claimant.  Respondent filed on October 17, 1963, a petition for
review of said decision on the grounds we have at the outset stated.  Apparently convinced by the soundness of one
of the grounds (re: computation of compensation under Section 14 of the Act)
interposed therein by the respondent, the Hearing Officer in an order dated December
12, 1963, modified the computation of the compensation provided for in said
decision by reckoning claimant’s weekly compensation at P35.00 (the maximum
allowed by Law) and not at P39.51, as previously computed, but ordered, in the
same breath, the elevation of the entire records to us pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 23, Rules of the WCC.”^[4]

Thus, respondent Commission in effect upheld its hear­ing officer
in San Pablo City.  After
being employed by petitioner for some time, respondent Castillo
“noticed there was something wrong with
his right foot.  He consulted the
company doctor and complained also of dizziness and pains on the chest and
back.  Dr. Leviste,
the company physician, advised him to go to Dr. Prospero Maria Oreta of the St. Luke’s Hospital who diagnosed the
claimant’s ailments as thrombo-phlebitis, chronic, legs bil.; varicose ulcer, leg right, edema, acute leg right;
allergic dermatitis, leg right.”^[5]  There
was a summary of what was testified to by the
Doctor:  “Dr. Prospero Oreta, being presented as an expert witness, testified that
the claimant’s allergic dermatitis of the right leg is probably due to contact
with tetraethyl lead.  He
further stated the other possibilities that there may be some other cause or
causes for the ailment, but the history given by the claimant shows that he got
this from his work because exposure to the tetraethyl lead is dangerous if it
is prolonged and continuous.  One
exposure is not enough but if it is
done again and again, it could lead to skin eruptions and other conditions. 
Claimant here works for 8 hours, sometimes, 4 hours at the minimum and sometimes more than 8 hours depending upon the
exigencies of the work.”^[6]  From
which it was concluded:  “The safety
instructions for tetraethyl lead blending operations pre­sented by the claimant
and the respondent as Exhibit “B” and Exhibit
“1”, respectively, clearly shows the danger of being contaminated by the tetraethyl lead.”^[7]

The decision of respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission
ordered petitioner:

“(a) To pay respondent Victoriano
Castillo the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR PESOS and 05/100 (P834.05), as
compensation from January 5, 1962
to September 3, 1962 and from October 29, 1962 to November 21, 1962.  This amount is the balance remaining after
deducting from the total compensa­tion of P1,295.00,
the amount of P460.95 which represents the wages paid to the claimant from January 5, 1962 to September 3, 1962.

“(b) To pay him
likewise the amount of ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,710.00), as
compensation from March 7, 1964
to February 15, 1965 (48 6/7
weeks for P35.00 a week); and a weekly compensation of P35.00 beginning
February 16, 1965, provided that the grand total of the compensations received
and to be resolved does not exceed the amount of P4,000.00;

“(c) To reimburse
him the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY ONE PESOS and 50/100 (P1,351.50) the hospital and medical expenses he personally
paid for;

“(d) To provide him
with such medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies which the nature
of his ailments may require until such time as the same would appear cured; * *
*.”^[8]

Petitioner was likewise required to pay respondent Castillo’s
legal counsel in the amount of Two hundred twenty-five pesos (P225.00) and
respondent Commission the sum of Thirty-six pesos (P36.00) as partial decision
fee and cost of the review, as well
as the sum of one peso (P1.00) for every hundred pesos (P100.00) of
compensation.

On the facts as above found, which this Court is not free to
disregard, the first due process question raised, namely, the absence of
evidence in support thereof, must fail. 
The scope of the appellate function exercised by this Court in appeals
from decisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission was set forth with clarity
in Basaysay v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission.^[9] According to the
then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, “It
is well settled that in appeals by certiorari, such as the one we have
before us, the findings of fact made in the decision appealed from will not be
reviewed by this Court, unless there has been a grave abuse of discretion in making said findings,
by reason of the total absence of
competent evidence – which, to our mind, is, also, substantial – in support of
the finding contested in the case at bar which admittedly exists, petitioner’s
contention being merely that said evidence (Dr. Lorenzo’s testimony) should not have
been given credence.  The task of
ascertaining the credibility and weight of conflicting evidence,
is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certio­rari.  Consequently, petitioner’s contention is
untenable.”

Since the brief for petitioner would in effect require this Court
to disregard the appraisal made by respondent Commission of the testimony of
Dr. Oreta, to whom respondent Castillo “was
referred by [petitioner’s] physician for expert advise and treatment”, the words of the Chief Justice Concepcion in the above case, if heeded, would show that
such an assertion cannot possibly find acceptance with this Court.

Moreover, the allegation that the finding that the ailments from
which respondent Castillo suffered were “admittedly work-connected”
could be characterized “as wholly unsupported by any evidence” of
record ignores the statutory provision that the presumption in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary is
that the claim comes within the
provisions of this Act.^[10]

In the latest decision on the subject,^[11]
this Court, thru Justice Bengzon, stated that under
the above pro­vision “once the claimant has established that the illness, upon which the claim is premised,
supervened during the time of his employment, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the illness arose out of or at least was
aggravated by, his employment.”  The
Justiniano case refers to an earlier decision.^[12]  There, again in interpreting the above
presumption established by the law, Justice J.B.L. Reyes speaking for the Court
correctly noted “that the laborer at present is relieved from the burden
of proving causation once the injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
the employment.”  His opinion went
on to state:  “The disease having arisen in the
course of the employment, it is presumed
by law that it arose out of it; and the fact that the conditions of work are
only a contributory cause that
permitted the disease to take hold in the organism of the laborer does not make
the injury less compensable
(Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, p. 50).”

It would then be to reverse what is now settled doctrine
in conformity with the mandate of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and in
keeping with its basic
philosophy of holding an employer liable for injury or illness which thus afflicts an employee in the
course of employment to sustain petitioner. 
Moreover a more careful analysis of what was testified to would disclose the inaccuracy of the assertion
that there was no support for the finding made by the Commission.

The other due process
question raised, on its face, appears to call for a more serious consideration.  It is undeniable that Commissioner Baens
del Rosario did
not limit her award to
cover only the earlier period for which the claim was filed. 
Her decision of February 5, 1965, in addition to affirming whet was
granted by the hearing officer, increased
the compensation by ONE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,710.00), with the proviso
that the weekly amount of THIRTY FIVE PESOS (P35.00) be granted respondent
Castillo from February 16, 1965 as long as the limit of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) was not reached.  As to such additional compensation than the
contention that petitioner was not originally heard could plausibly be
raised.  It is understandable then why procedural due
process was invoked.

From Ang Tibay
v. Court,^[13]
to Philippine Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board,^[14]
it has been the constant holding that one must be heard.  A disregard of such a right has fatal consequences.  If
such indeed were the case, then petitioner must prevail.  Could it be truly said however that such a
right was in fact denied petitioner? 
Such an assertion, as above noted, could only have been made when the matter was before the hearing officer.  Then
came the above modification by Commissioner Baens del Rosario.  Petitioner could argue that such an amendment
could not have been anticipated.  While
no doubt true, it is not decisive.  In
its petition for reconsideration before res­pondent Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, petitioner did have the opportunity to make vocal its protest
against the grant of additional compensation. 
Moreover, it sought and was heard on oral argument before respondent
Workmen’s Compensation Commission where the opportunity to discuss such a
question was once again afforded it.

It cannot be truthfully said then that it was not heard at all.  As this Court had occasion to state once,
what is sought
to be safeguarded against is not “lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be
heard on the claim.”^[15]
The due process requirement therefore was not altogether disregarded.  One other thing.  Neither in
the motion for reconsideration filed before respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, nor in its
brief was there even the remotest hint that if it were thus heard, the
result would have been different.  Since
what due process contemplates is freedom
from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the substance
rather than the form being paramount, an allegation based solely on the lack of
opportunity to be heard without notice does not per se merit unconditional approval.

That counsel would exert his utmost to advance his client’s cause
is commendable.  It often happens that in
the zeal of advocacy, in his earnest desire to press his claim, the temptation
to employ strong language to show the weak­ness of the contrary view may be difficult to resist.  Nonetheless, counsel must make the
effort.  He should be aware that a
pleading unduly harsh in its characterization of what the other party did would be far from persuasive.  The
brief for petitioner has not avoided such a pitfall.  As Chief Justice Bengzon
noted, the use of “intemperate language * * * detracts from the force of
arguments * * *.”^[16]

Nor is this all. Proper respect must be accorded quasi judicial agencies like
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 
Along with the courts, they are collaborative instruments in the search
for justice.  To demean them is to cast
an undeserved reflection on the juristic process.  Belief in the rule of law is thereby
eroded.  No member of the legal
profession should contribute, even if
inad­vertently, to such a deplorable state of affairs.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Dizon, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J., on
official leave.

^[1]
Decision of Chairman Baens del
Rosario, Annex F, Brief for the Petitioner, p. XLV.

^[2]
Ibid, at pp. XLV-XLVI.

^[3]
Ibid, at p.
XLVI.

^[4]
Ibid, at pp. XLVI-XLVII.

^[5]
Brief for petitioner, Annex B, pp. XXXIV-XXXV.

^[6]
Ibid, at p. XXXV.

^[7]
Ibid, at p. XXXV.

^[8]
Decision of Chairman Baens del
Rosario, Annex F, Brief for
Petitioner, pp. LIII-LV.

^[9]
L-16438, November 29, 1961.

^[10]
Section 44, Act No. 3428 as amended by Republic Act No. 771.

^[11]
Justiniano v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, L-22774, November 21, 1966.

^[12]
Agustin v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-19957, September 20,1964.

^[13]
69 Phil. 635 (1939).

^[14]
L-24321, July 21, 1967.

^[15]
Fuentes v. Binamira, L-14965, August 31,
1961.

^[16]
Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections, L-25444, January 31, 1966.