JUANA ORDOÑEZ ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. AQUILINO CALVO ET AL., DEFENDANTS. AQUILINO CALVO, APPELLANT,

In the present case the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on December 12, 1923, rendered the following judgment:

“The
defendants are jointly and severally sentenced to pay the plaintiffs,
the sum of three thousand seven hundred sixty-five pesos (P3,765), the
value of the products not received by the plaintiffs during the
agricultural years 1914-1915 and 1915-1916, with costs.”

From this judgment the defendant Calvo appealed to this court where the
case was docketed as G. R. No. 23251. On December 16, 1924, the appeal
was dismissed on motion of the appellees, and the case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance for execution.

Upon the return
of the case to the Court of First Instance, a writ of execution was
issued and demand made upon the defendant Calvo by the sheriff for the
satisfaction of the writ. Shortly thereafter, on April 18, 1925, the
following motion was presented by counsel for said defendant:

“Comes now the undersigned attorney for defendant Aquilino Calvo in the above entitled case and to the court shows:

“1.
That on the 15th instant defendant Aquilino Calvo received a demand
from the provincial sheriff for the deposit in his office, within ten
days from the date of said demand, which was made on the 13th instant,
of the amount of the judgment rendered by the court jointly and
severally against him and his codefendant Manuel de Bosch.

“2. That the disposing clause of said judgment is as follows:

(Here follows judgment as above quoted.)

“At
the trial of this case the attorneys for both parties entered into a
stipulation of facts to the effect that the documentary evidence of the
defendant Aquilino Calvo should be admitted without objection on the
part of the plaintiff, a part of which evidence is the personal bond
given by the other defendant Manuel de Bosch to have the sheriff
proceed with the attachment, said bond having been executed by two
sureties sufficiently solvent to answer for the acts of the sheriff.
Said documents are attached to the record as exhibits of the defendant
Aquilino Calvo.

“3. That in accordance with the spirit of
the judgment, it was strictly to be subject to the provisions of
section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that while the
sheriff may be considered as liable with the sureties, yet the latter
must be the first upon whom demand must be made for the fulfillment of
their obligation; for the bond given for the levying of the attachment
stands precisely as a security for all the ministerial acts of the
sheriff, and in case they should later prove to be insolvent, then the
fulfillment of the obligation of the sheriff may be demanded.

“4. That the provincial sheriff in accordance with the judgment and the
law must in the first place require the other defendant Manuel de Bosch
and his sureties to comply with the judgment and then the other
defendant Aquilino Calvo.

“5. That the demand of the
sheriff, in the date it was sent is to be considered, shall mature on
the 22d instant; and if the date of the receipt thereof is taken into
consideration, then it will mature on the 24th, an admonition having
been made in said demand that if said period should elapse without the
defendant Aquilino Calvo having deposited the required amount, the
provincial sheriff will proceed with the attachment of the property of
the defendant Aquilino Calvo.

“For all of the foregoing the
defendant Aquilino Calvo through his undersigned attorney respectfully
prays the Honorable Court to pass upon this motion, (a)
ordering the provincial sheriff to suspend every proceeding for the
attachment of the property of the defendant Aquilino Calvo, pending the
final resolution of this petition; (b) that it be decided that
demand must first be made upon the defendant Manuel de Bosch and his
sureties for compliance with the judgment.”

The motion was denied by the court below on the ground that the
decision having become final, the court was without jurisdiction to
modify the judgment or to interfere with its execution. From this order
the defendant Calvo again appealed to this court. On September 7, 1925,
the appellees filed a motion with this court praying that the appeal be
dismissed on the ground that its evident purpose was merely to secure
the modification of the original judgment which had already become
final and enforceable by execution. This motion was granted by a
“minute order” dated September 19, 1925, and the record ordered
remanded to the court below. The appellant has now filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the order of September 19th and insists that the
question raised by him in his motion of April 18, 1925, and which forms
the subject matter of this appeal, is of sufficient importance to merit
the special attention of the court and a more extended discussion.

If we understand the appellant correctly, his contention is that the
judgment to be executed though clear in its terms should nevertheless
in the light of the circumstances shown by the original record be given
a special interpretation and that the liability of the appellant should
be regarded as subsidiary to that of his codefendant instead of joint
and several as stated in the judgment.

From a legal
standpoint this contention seems absurd. It calls for what amounts to a
modification of a judgment which became final long ago and which
suffers from no ambiguity. That is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of
this court as well as that of the court below and there is no lack of
precedents for so holding. In the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (8 Phil., 569), this court held:

“After
judgment is rendered and the case returned to the lower court for
execution, the party liable under the judgment will not be permitted,
in opposition to the execution, to present for consideration new issues
of fact and law upon the question of his liability.”

Neither will an appeal lie from the refusal by the Court of First
Instance to interfere with a final judgment. (Gonzalez Quiros vs. Palanca Tan-Guinlay, 17 Phil., 357.)

Under the judgment here in question the defendants are jointly and
severally liable and execution may issue against either of them for the
full amount of the judgment. No other interpretation is possible.

We may say further, that the appellant evidently misinterprets section
451 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the property of a stranger to
the action is attached and he presents his claim thereto in the manner
and form prescribed by said section, the sheriff himself is liable in
damages and an action for such damages may be maintained against him
without joining the attaching creditor or the latter’s sureties as
defendants. (35 Cyc., 1646; Quesada vs. Artacho, 9 Phil., 104.)

From as much of the record as is now before us, it may be inferred that
the appellant’s liability derives from a wrongful attachment. If so,
there is probably an indemnity bond upon which the appellant may still
maintain an action for reimbursement if the judgment is paid by him.

The motion for reconsideration is denied and the record will be forthwith remanded to the court below. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.