G.R. No. 24014. October 16, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GREGORIO LARA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
STREET, J.:
First Instance of the Province of Abra, finding the appellant, Gregorio
Lara, guilty of the offence of homicide, committed upon the person of
one Cayetano Querido, and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for
fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
Gregorio Lara, the appellant, is a resident of the municipality of La
Paz, in the Province of Abra, and at the time of the homicide which is
the subject of this prosecution, was about 32 years of age and married;
while the deceased, Cayetano Querido, age not stated, was a resident of
the same municipality. At about 8 o’clock on the night of September 25,
1924, the deceased, accompanied by four other persons, planted himself
at the crossing immediately in front of the appellant’s house and began
to entertain his companions by speaking insulting words of and to the
appellant. These expressions were to the effect that a concubine to
whom the appellant was supposed to be devoted had been, or was about to
be, enticed away by some other person. Among the words attributed to
Querido on this occasion are the following: “Wake up, Ramon, they are
eating your chow” (meaning in local slang that some one else was
enjoying Lara’s concubine). Another expression, having about the same
significance, was: “They are burning your clothes”; and again, yet more
broadly: “Gregorio Lara, they are enticing your concubine, and
nevertheless you permit it.” These expressions were greeted with loud
guffaws from Querido’s companions. Another statement made by Querido on
this occasion was to the effect that he had been anxious to run up
against Lara for some time but that Lara was not now coming out of
nights. It is further stated that, upon addressing to Lara the
offensive expressions which we have quoted concerning his concubine,
the deceased placed the palms of his two hands in such a position as to
form the tube of a trumpet, for the purpose of changing the pitch of
his voice.
Now, it happened that upon the same night an
employee of the Bureau of Lands, named Rufino Roque, had occasion to
stop in La Paz upon an official errand and, being acquainted with
Gregorio Lara, he stopped at the latter’s house as a guest for the
night. Being an employee of the Bureau of Lands, Roque carried a
revolver, and upon retiring to bed he suspended the weapon, with its
holster, from a peg on a beam in the house. The fact that the revolver
had been placed in this position was noted by Lara; and after his
patience had become exhausted towards Querido and his companions he
took the revolver down, and as it was unloaded, placed two cartridges
in the cylinder, at the same time starting for the street. Upon seeing
this movement on the part of Lara, Querido and his companions
scattered. Querido went in an easterly direction along one of the
streets, accompanied by Artemio Casel, a high-school student of the age
of 16 years. The two went along together for a little way, perhaps a
hundred meters, when Querido stopped and hid behind the corner of a
fence in front of the house of Nicolas Velasco. At the same time
Querido said to Casel, “Move away a little as I am going to smash him.”
Artemio, therefore, instead of hiding in the same place with Querido,
turned to the other side and hid himself also behind a fence, in order
to see what Querido was going to do to Lara.
Lara,
meanwhile, had emerged from his house with pistol in hand, and reaching
the centre of the street, he found that his entertainers had all
disappeared. Seeing this, he discharged his pistol into the air, as a
sort of warning against a repetition of the incident; and instead of
going immediately indoors again, he turned into the street and went in
an easterly direction, being desirous, so he says, of ascertaining from
his neighbors the identity of the members of the party. The direction
pursued took him over the same course that had been followed by Querido
and Casel; and after he had passed the spot where the two were hiding,
Querido jumped out from behind and threw his arms around Lara in an
effort to pinion his hands and get possession of the pistol. Lara at
once attempted to free himself from his assailant and succeeded in
breaking Querido’s hold. At the same time he turned so as to confront
Querido, and the struggle for the possession of the revolver was
continued. In the course of this struggle, perhaps immediately after
Lara turned, the revolver was discharged. The bullet passed into
Querido’s abdomen on the left side, passed entirely through the body,
and emerged in the right gluteal region. The shot did not immediately
disable Querido, who continued his efforts to get possession of the
pistol. This he was unable to do, but being a man of strength, he
succeeded in throwing one of his arms around Lara’s neck, in which
position he held him as in a vice while he called to Mariano Dolor,
whose house was only a few paces away, to come to his assistance.
Meanwhile, Rufino Roque had heard the first pistol shot and was aroused
by it from the borders of sleep. Roque’s first thought was of his
revolver, and, upon looking up, he saw that it was missing from its
holster. He immediately slipped on his clothes and hastened out into
the street. Hearing the second shot, he went in the direction of the
sound and arrived at the scene of trouble before any other person. His
first effort of course was directed towards the recovery of the pistol,
and his movements towards this end were apparently interpreted by
Querido as of an unfriendly nature. At any rate Querido at once threw
his unoccupied arm around the neck of Roque and held him prisoner in
the same manner as he was already holding Lara. At this moment Mariano
Dolor came upon the scene, where he found Querido holding both Lara and
Roque firmly with his arms around their respective necks, while he
appeared to be supporting himself by leaning upon their shoulders.
Mariano Dolor says that Querido called to him twice that he had been
shot by Lara, and he asked Dolor to take possession of the pistol,
which Dolor did. Querido then freed his prisoners, and all went
together to the municipal building, for the purposes of the official
investigation. On the way thither Querido, weakened by the wound he had
received, needed assistance, and Lara assisted others in supporting him
as he walked.
The wound, produced in the manner above
stated, caused the death of Querido within about three days. In this
interval he signed two written statements concerning the homicide. The
first of these statements was made before the justice of the peace
immediately after the arrival of the principals at the municipal
building; and the document would hardly be admissible as a dying
declaration, since it does not appear that the declarant then really
thought that death was certain. His words on this point were these:
“Perhaps I am going to die very soon, justice.” However, the statement
was introduced in evidence, apparently without objection, and on
examination it will be found to contain nothing prejudicial to the
appellant aside from the fact (which is admitted) that Lara did the
shooting. The declarant added: “We were able to take from the hands of
Lara the revolver which a friend had lent him.” In a later statement,
signed by Querido in the presence of E. Parado and Feliciano Fariñas,
after he had given up hopes of life, he stated in substance that Lara
entertained rancor towards him because he (Lara) suspected that the
declarant had induced his concubine to seek another man. There is
nothing in either of these statements that throws any light upon the
immediate circumstances of the shooting, additional to what is revealed
by the testimony of the living witnesses. The failure of the declarant
to state any fact unfavorable to the accused with respect to the
conditions under which the shot was fired strongly confirms the
contention of the appellant that it occurred while the two combatants
were struggling over the pistol.
It appears that a few days
after the homicide the appellant himself was subjected to an
examination by Lieutenant Garcia, and on that occasion he stated that
he discharged the revolver as soon as he succeeded in breaking loose
from the person who had seized him. From this it has been argued that
the danger had then passed and that the firing of the pistol at this
juncture was not justifiable. We are of the opinion, however, that the
struggle for the possession of the revolver was continuous and that the
deceased was still engaged in his attempt to get the revolver when the
shot was fired.
Upon the foregoing state of facts, we are of
the opinion that a case of self-defense is completely made out, under
subsection 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, and that the appellant is
entitled to an acquittal. There was no provocation whatever on the part
of the appellant and the provocation given by the deceased was of a
nature to provoke wrath in the mind of any spirited person. Again,
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, in this,
that while the appellant was passing along the street during the
nighttime the deceased sprang upon him from ambush and began a
struggle, primarily for the possession of the revolver and with the
criminal design of beating the appellant up. That this assault was
characterized by alevosia is manifest.
It only
remains to inquire whether there was reasonable necessity for the means
employed by the appellant to repel the attack. In this connection it is
necessary to bear in mind the following circumstances, namely, the
darkness of the night, the element of surprise involved in the assault,
and the revealed intention of the deceased to beat the appellant up.
Under these conditions the appellant might well have reasoned that if
the struggle continued upon equal terms his assailant would undoubtedly
in a moment get possession of the revolver. If this should happen there
was great and real danger that in the excitement of the moment the
deceased would have shot the appellant,—a thing which he could have
done with impunity. The appellant, therefore, on the peril of his life,
could not permit the deceased to get possession of the weapon, and the
only means of preventing it was the firing of the pistol for the
purpose of defense. When the deceased sprang from behind on the
appellant in the dark, when the latter was known to have a pistol in
his hand, the deceased acted at his peril, for it was but reasonable to
suppose that in the moment of surprise and struggle the appellant would
use the pistol against his assailant, if it should be within his power
to do so.
It will be remembered that the struggle for the
possession of the pistol continued for some time after the deadly shot
was fired. While the appellant was under cross-examination his
attention was called to this fact, and he was asked why he continued to
fight for the retention of the pistol when, as he then knew, there was
no other cartridge in the cylinder. He replied, very reasonably, we
think, that he knew that if the deceased should get the weapon in his
hands he could easily kill the appellant by using it as a cudgel.
It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human
nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to
the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this
case, that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the
duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor
irresponsible in law for the consequences.
In United States vs.
Patala (2 Phil., 752, 757), the deceased assaulted the appellant with a
knife. In the course of the ensuing struggle the appellant wrested the
knife from his assailant and with it inflicted upon him a fatal wound.
In support of the conviction it was suggested that when the appellant
got possession of the knife, the danger from the assailant had so far
passed that the appellant was not justified in using the knife. But the
Supreme Court, in reversing the decision and acquitting the appellant,
speaking through Mr. Justice Mapa, said: ” * * * If through a fortunate
accident he came into possession of the knife, he could have lost
control of it through a similar accident and then found himself at the
mercy of his assailant. Therefore the act of the defendant rendering
his assailant powerless as well as he could under the critical
circumstances of the moment, and repelling his aggression, constitute,
in our opinion, a true case of self-defense, which exempts the
defendant from any criminal liability under paragraph 4 of article 8 of
the Penal Code.”
In United States vs. Molina (19
Phil., 227), the assailant carried a bolo. In the course of the
struggle this weapon came to the hands of the appellant and with it he
slew his assailant. The court held that the use of the weapon by the
appellant was justified, notwithstanding the fact that the deceased had
become disarmed by the loss of his bolo. “The court, again speaking
through Mr. Justice Mapa, said: “* * * Considering the decidedly
aggressive attitude of the deceased from the commencement of this
struggle until its termination, it cannot be said that there was a
cessation of the danger for the accused, even for a single instant. If,
through the various incidents of the struggle, or any favorable
accident whatever, the deceased had succeeded in recovering the bolo or
in possessing himself of the hatchet, as he attempted to do to the
last, the result of the combat would probably have been very different;
perhaps the accused, instead of being the slayer, would himself have
been killed. The accused certainly was not in duty bound to expose
himself to such a contingency, and while the struggle continued, and,
consequently, the danger to his person or to his life subsisted he had
a perfect and indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding his
adversary, if necessary, as from the circumstances of the case it was,
without any doubt whatever, and even to disable him completely so that
he could not continue the assault. In our opinion, the means employed
by the accused were rationally necessary to repel the assault, and as
the latter was in all respects unlawful and was not preceded by any
provocation of any kind on the part of the accused himself, we declare
the said accused to be exempt from criminal liability, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code.”
If these considerations correctly express the law in a case where the
assaulted party has slain the assailant with his own weapon, no less
must they be applicable to a case like the present, where the appellant
has acted in his own self-defense against an aggressor of superior
strength and for the purpose of preventing the aggressor from obtaining
possession of the only weapon which the party assailed could use. (U.
S. vs. Salazar and Villanueva, 15 Phil., 315.)
From
what has been said it follows that the judgment appealed from must be
reversed, and the appellant will be absolved from the information, with
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., took no part in this decision.
DISSENTING
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
I
believe that the extraordinary superiority of strength which the
foregoing decision seems to attribute to the deceased over the accused
was not proven by the evidence.
The evidence does not show,
in my opinion, that the deceased, after having been wounded, was
holding the accused and Rufino Roque by the neck in an aggressive
attitude. While the witness Mariano Dolor, at the beginning of his
testimony on this point, seems to convey the idea that the deceased
caught them by the neck, yet when during the trial he was asked to show
it to the court, undoubtedly for the reason that his testimony was not
quite clear on this detail, he said that “the deceased was leaning on the shoulders of Gregorio Lara and Rufino Roque”
(p. 10, st. n.). And in this sense the accused himself has in effect
testified (p. 58, idem), who said on this point the following:
“Q. After the second shot, did the deceased Cayetano Querido say anything?—A. Yes, sir, he told me, ‘I was shot, Lara.’
“Q. And what did you do?—A. I immediately held him in order to take him to the municipal building and there Rufino Roque also came afterwards and the two of us held the deceased in order to take him to the municipal building.” (Italics mine.)
If the deceased, before being wounded, and in spite of having been
attacked by the accused without risk to himself, did not succeed in
snatching from the latter the revolver, nor to hold him, much less
could he, after having been seriously wounded, have held not only the
accused but also Rufino Roque by his strength.
The deceased,
then, after having been wounded, did not hold the accused nor Rufino
Rqque, but having lost his strength, he had to support himself on them.
I believe that what was proven by the evidence is that the accused acted in self-defense but that the same is incomplete.