CONSTANCIO P. RUSTIA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PETRONA RAMOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Plaintiff
alleges that he and the defendant are both citizens and residents of
the Philippine Islands. That on June 12, 1924, he married the defendant
in the State of Illinois, U. S. A. That the plaintiff then believed
that the defendant was single and unmarried and free to marry him, as
she fraudulently represented herself to be, when in truth and in fact
she was a married woman, and obtained plaintiff’s consent by means of
fraud. That soon after his marriage to the defendant, plaintiff
ascertained that she was a married woman, having previously contracted
marriage with another man in the Philippine Islands, and that for such
reason the plaintiff from the date of his marriage to the defendant on
June 12, 1924, has never lived with her, and has refused to live with
her, because she was married before the justice of the peace of Pasay,
Province of Rizal, on September 5, 1914, to one Basilio Francisco, who
was then a resident of the Philippine Islands, and who is now living,
and that the marriage between the defendant and Francisco has never
been annulled or dissolved. Plaintiff prays for a decree annulling his
marriage contract.

For answer the defendant admits all of
the material allegations of the complaint, “that plaintiff and
defendant were married as set forth in plaintiff’s complaint; the said
marriage having been contracted by both parties freely and
voluntarily,” and as a special defense “alleges that the prior marriage
alleged in the complaint was null and void and of no effect, by reason
of the fact that it was celebrated without the territorial jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace who solemnized the same; and by reason of
the further fact that in the celebration of the alleged prior marriage,
the requirements of the law in the premises were not complied with in
that the contracting parties were not required to declare in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage that they took each
other as husband and wife,” and prays that the complaint be dismissed.

Upon such issues the lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appeals, contending:

“1. The lower court erred in holding that defendant was previously married.

“2. The lower court erred in holding that the alleged prior marriage
was in force at the time plaintiff and defendant were married.

“3. The lower court erred in annulling the marriage contracted by and
between plaintiff and defendant in the Roman Catholic Church of Santa
Clara, at Chicago, Illinois.”

JOHNS, J.:

In the final analysis, the real question before this court is whether
or not the defendant was married to Basilio Francisco before the
justice of the peace of Pasay on September 5, 1914.

What is
known in the record as Exhibit B is a marriage certificate dated
September 5, 1914, signed “Cosme Bustamante, justice of the peace,” and
by Basilio Francisco and the defendant, and is duly witnessed by
Bonifacio Castellon and Emilia Alcantara, and it is printed in both
English and Spanish, in which the names and ages of the contracting
parties are given, the names of the respective fathers and mothers,
their residence, birth place, nationality, and occupation, and in which
the justice of the peace certifies to the truth of the foregoing
statements, and that Basilio Francisco and the defendant, in the
municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, “were with their mutual
consent lawfully joined together in matrimony by me in the presence of
Emilia Alcantara, of Sta. Mesa, 894 Int. 16, and Bonifacio Castellon,
of Sta. Mesa, 894 Int. 16, attesting witnesses. And I do further
certify that the parties to this marriage are personally known to me
(or were satisfactorily identified by the oath of Bonifacio Castellon
known to me), and that upon due inquiry by me made, there appeared to
be no lawful impediment to the marriage.”

As stated, this
certificate was signed by the justice of the peace, and by both
contracting parties, and in the presence of the witnesses, who signed
their respective names as such. It also appears that in large printed
letters in both English and Spanish, this certificate was headed or
entitled “Marriage Certificate,” and that after the ceremony
was performed, a true and correct copy of it was delivered to the
defendant, who had it in her personal possession until the following
day when she delivered it to her aunt. It also appears that at the time
the defendant was 23 years of age, and that she was a teacher in one of
the normal schools of the Philippine Islands, was well educated, and
could read and write in both English and Spanish.

The
justice of the peace before whom the marriage took place testified that
at the time and place named in the certificate, all of the parties
appeared before him at his office in Pasay, and that he there duly
performed the marriage ceremony in question.

The defendant
contends that she was never married to Basilio Francisco, and that all
she did or agreed to do was to enter into a contract of marriage at
some future date, and that she thought and understood that she was
signing a contract of that nature and for that purpose. This contention
flatly contradicts her personal signature on the marriage certificate
and all of the recitals therein made, and the verbal testimony of the
justice of the peace, who, as far as the record shows, is an impartial
witness.

This marriage certificate is dated September 5,
1914, is in writing and has all of the formalities of a marriage
certificate, and after the ceremony was performed, a copy of it was
delivered to the defendant who, as a matured educated person, must have
known its nature, contents and legal effect.

The trial court
who saw and heard the witnesses testify in a well written opinion found
as a fact that the marriage of September 5, 1914, was valid, and in
legal effect that the defendant knew that it was a marriage ceremony,
and that the certificate delivered to her was a marriage certificate.

Relying upon a legal presumption, the attorneys for the appellant
contend that “the lower court erred in holding that the alleged prior
marriage was in force at the time plaintiff and defendant were
married,” and cite Son Cui vs. Guepangco (22 Phil., 216); Ruling Case Law, vol. 18, p. 417; 40 Oklahoma, 101; 135 Pac, 1143^[1]; and Chancey vs.
Whinnery (147 Pac, 1036), and it must be conceded that both Ruling Case
Law and the Oklahoma decisions apparently support appellant’s
contention.

In the United States every state has its own
divorce law. In some, divorces are granted on a number of different
grounds, and in others, the grounds are very limited, and it is very
doubtful whether any state in the United States has a divorce law like
the one in the Philippine Islands. For such reasons, any authority from
the United States is not in point.

The decision in Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra,
is founded upon a very different state of facts. There, the main
question was to determine “whether or not said three plaintiffs are the
legitimate children of Tan Tungco; for if legitimate, their interests
would be greater than they otherwise would.” Here, the question
involved is between parties to the second marriage, and which it is
sought to annul upon the ground of fraud.

It is a matter of
record that the husband in the former marriage was personally present
in the trial of this case in the lower court. Hence, the only question
here is whether or not after a period of ten years, there is a legal
presumption that the parties to the first marriage were divorced at the
time of the second marriage.

It is true that the second
marriage took place in Chicago, Illinois, in the United States, but it
also appears that at the time of the second marriage, both the
plaintiff and the defendant were actual residents of the Philippine
Islands, and that neither of them ever had any other residence, and
that at least during the trial of the case in the lower court, the
former husband was a resident of the Philippine Islands.

Under the law in the Philippines, adultery is the only ground upon
which a divorce can be obtained, and even then, it can only be obtained
one year after a conviction for that crime. Hence, we have this
situation. Adultery is a crime, and a divorce can only be obtained here
upon the ground of adultery. A defendant is presumed to be innocent
until he is proven guilty, and to sustain a conviction, the evidence
must show that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This legal
presumption is much stronger than any presumption “that the former
marriage has been legally dissolved.” That is to say, that the legal
presumption that a person would commit the crime of adultery, for which
he must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is a condition
precedent to obtaining a divorce here, and it is much stronger and more
forcible than the legal presumption that a “former marriage has been
legally dissolved.” Hence, under the law in the Philippine Islands and
upon the facts shown in the record, the burden of proof was upon the
defendant to show that her marriage of September 5, 1914, was legally
dissolved at the time of her marriage with the plaintiff. Upon that
question, she has relied upon the legal presumption above stated, and
there is no evidence whatever in the record tending to show that her
former marriage was legally dissolved.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Ostrand, Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm and Villamor, JJ., concur in the result.

Romualdez, J., concurs from the stand point of the civil law.