IN RE WILL OF JOSE FLORES, DECEASED. SOTERO FLORES AND AGUEDA FLORES, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. GERARDO FLORES, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT.

On
October 13, 1919, the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga admitted to probate the will of one Jose Flores, formerly a
resident of the barrio of Santa Rita, in the municipality of Macabebe,
Province of Pampanga, who had died on May 6, 1919, at the advanced age
of about 89 years. Rafael Flores, a brother of the deceased, was named
in the will as executor and by him the petition which resulted in the
probate of the will was presented. But Romulo Macalino succeeded later
to the office of administrator.

It appears that in life Jose
Flores had been three times married, and he left children surviving him
from each of said marriages. By his first wife, Angela Payuyu, he had
had three children named respectively Catalina, Apolonia and Eleuterio
Flores. The last named died before his father, leaving three children,
to wit, Virginia, Donata and Manuel Flores. By his second wife, Jose
Flores had two children, both of whom are still living, namely, Sotero
and Agueda Flores. By his third wife, he also had two children named
Gerardo and Elcredo (or Alfredo), but the last named died before the
testator.

In the course of the settlement of the estate
various questions have arisen with reference to the nature of the
property to be divided and the respective interests of the different
sets of children therein, but for the purposes of this appeal attention
will be directed only to the contention over the claims of the two
surviving children of the second marriage, Sotero Flores and Agueda
Flores, who figure in this proceeding as appellants.

It
appears that the deceased lived about twenty-four years with his second
wife, and the property with which we are here concerned was acquired
during said marriage. In so far as appears from this record the
conjugal partnership between Jose Flores and his second wife, Maria
Agustin, has never been formally liquidated, and in conformity with
well-established precedents it is proper to have said partnership
liquidated by the testator’s executor or administrator, that is, in the
present proceeding. In view of this situation the two children of the
second marriage, now appellants, insisted in the lower court that all
of the property acquired by the testator during his second marriage
pertained to the conjugal partnership that had existed between him and
his second wife, and they maintained that said partnership should be
liquidated and that the half pertaining to their mother should be
segregated before any general distribution of the estate should occur.
This general idea seems to have been admitted in a qualified way by the
court below in its decision of February 4,1925, and reiterated in its
order of March 11, 1925, denying a motion for reconsideration; but
error is assigned to its pronouncement with respect to the lands
included in a Torrens certificate of title (Exhibit D-1). This feature
of the appeal is, we think, well grounded.

From the Exhibit
D, which is a certified copy of the decision in a registration
proceeding, it appears that the lands covered by the certificate of
title (Exhibit D-1) had been purchased by Jose Flores on September 15,
1902, or in the lifetime of his second wife, Maria Agustin. After her
death Flores instituted proceedings to register said lands and procured
the Torrens certificate of title thereto in his sole name. This had the
effect, so the court seems to have supposed, of making these lands the
exclusive property of Flores and of extinguishing their character as
conjugal property of the prior marriage. To hold otherwise, said his
Honor, would have the effect of revising the decree of the land court
and impairing a title which that court had decreed to Flores.

This idea is clearly incorrect. The surviving husband is ex-officio
manager, or administrator, of the conjugal estate. He has the power to
alienate the property for the purpose of liquidating the estate and the
purchaser under him undoubtedly gets valid title (Nable Jose vs.
Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713). But as long as the husband retains the
property in whatever form, he holds it in the character of
administrator and is virtually a trustee for those interested in the
conjugal partnership. Nor does the obtaining of a Torrens title in any
wise change the situation. In section 70 of the Land Registration Act
(No. 496), it is, among other things, expressly declared that nothing
contained in this Act shall in any way be construed to relieve
registered land or the owners thereof from any rights incident to the
relation of husband and wife or to change or affect in any other way
any other rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to
unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act.
It is needless to say that there is no express provision anywhere in
the Act which has the effect of extinguishing the responsibility of the
husband with respect to the conjugal estate or which would enable him,
by taking a Torrens title, to escape from his responsibility as
administrator and liquidator. Furthermore, in Severino vs.
Severino (44 Phil., 343), it is clearly shown that the registration of
property in the name of one who holds in a trust character does not
extinguish the trust or destroy the rights of the beneficiary. His
Honor was therefore in error in this case in supposing that the Torrens
certificate of title (Exhibit D-1), covering lands which had been
acquired during the second marriage had changed in any way the
character of the property as ganancial property of the spouses in said
marriage. The first assignment of error is therefore well taken in so
far as it relates to the ruling of the court with respect to the
character of said property. Property acquired during marriage pertains
to the conjugal partnership regardless of the form in which the title
is then or thereafterwards taken.

With respect to the second
contention of the appellants, it appears that their attorney was
desirous of presenting proof with respect to the dates upon which the
deceased had contracted the various debts admitted by the committee on
claims as valid charges against his estate; and it is said that the
appellants were prepared to show, that these debts had all been
contracted during his third marriage and hence could not constitute a
proper charge against the conjugal property pertaining to the second
marriage. That the appellants have a right to submit proof for the
purpose suggested is a fact that cannot be questioned, but as we gather
from the appealed orders the intention of the court was to reserve this
point until the final project of liquidation and partition of the whole
estate of Jose Flores should be presented. While something would
probably have been gained in the way of clarifying the situation by
entering into this question at an earlier stage of the proceedings, the
court cannot be put in error in having merely postponed entering into
this contention until a later stage of the proceedings.

For
the reasons stated the order appealed from will be modified by
declaring that the lands covered by Torrens certificate of title
Exhibit D-1, like the other properties mentioned in Nos. 1-8,
inclusive, of the decision of February 4, 1925, pertain to the conjugal
partnership of Jose Flores with his second wife, Maria Agustin. In
other respects the orders appealed from are affirmed. So ordered,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamer, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.