G.R. No. 24114. August 16, 1967
PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, ELPIDIO TIBUR…
CASTRO, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) and the University of the Philippines (U.P.), against Eulogio
Mencias, presiding judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Elpidio Tiburcio, and several others, most of them surnamed Tiburcio.
The petition stemmed from
five orders issued by the respondent
judge in civil case 5572 pending before the said court[1] where the private respondents herein, as complainants,
asked for the annulment of Original Certificates of Title 730 and 735 in the
name of the Tuasons, and of Transfer Certificates of
Title 16263, 9462 and 1356 in
the names of the Varsity Hills, Inc., the U.P. and the PHHC, respectively,
aside from damages, on the ground that these titles are fictitious and were
issued in violation of Act 496.
The
Tiburcios, in their reamended complaint,[2] alleged that they, as heirs of the late Eladio Tiburcio, are the owners
of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City and containing
an area of about 430 hectares; that their ownership is evidenced by a Spanish
title in the name of Eladio Tiburcio
issued by the Spanish government of the municipality of Marikina
on March 25, 1877; that they (and their predecessors-in-interest)
have been in open, peaceful, public, continuous and exclusive possession of the said land from prior to
1877 up to the present, have introduced improvements thereon, cultivated it,
and reaped the products thereof; that sometime in 1955 the U.P., the PHHC and the Varsity Hills,
Inc. intruded upon the land, the first by building houses on the east portion
thereof, the second by bulldozing the rice paddies and cutting down mango
trees, and the third by subdividing portions thereof into subdivision lots;
that because of this trespass upon their land, they made the necessary inquiries
and discovered that the U.P. and the Varsity Hills, Inc. are holding in their
names TCTs 9462 and 16263 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, both derived from OCT 730, and that the PHHC also holds in its name TCT
1356 of the same cadastre, derived
from OCT 735; and that both OCTs 730 and 735 appear to be registered in the name of the Tuasons,
from whom the U.P., the Varsity Hills, Inc. and the PHHC claim to have acquired
the land covered by their respective TCTs. They further alleged, per
paragraphs 13 to 16 of their re-amended complaint, that the land they own was
fraudulently included within the technical boundaries set out in OCT 730 by means of detachable sheets of paper incorporated to the
said title “some of which anterior pages appear to have been allegedly cancelled before the issuance of the regular form of
said O.C.T. 730, are not in the form prescribed by Act 496″, which
“pasted papers supposedly
containing the technical
descriptions could not be read with sense
and the locations, position and
areas of the properties pretendingly covered thereby are
unknown”, in violation of sections 41, 42 and 112 of Act 496; that in OCT 730, the “area of the property
entered in the said regular form is only in the total area of three and a half
hectares (3.542 has.)”, and “could not possibly cover” the areas
respectively covered by TCT 9462
(449 hectares) and TCT 16263 (100 hectares); that
OCT 735 shows that it is “irregular through and through” in that,
among other things, “Only points 335 and 393 is (sic) entered in the regular form which points are
floating, the same not being tied to any known fixed point”; that “A
big space on the face of the form and at the back thereof, reserved for
technical description is vacant, obviously to give the perpetrators
the discretion of entering whatever technical
descriptions covering points 1 to 334 they may desire,
and change the location and position of the alleged property supposedly covered
thereby by changing the sheets of detachable papers and changing the original
bearing and distances of point 1 in relation to the tie point”; that
“the alleged technical descriptions of points 113 to 217 or 104 points could
not be found and therefore the alleged parcel 2 of the
supposed O.C.T. 735
is an incomplete title and could not possibly cover any property even if we consider the illegally
pasted detachable
sheets of paper as anterior page”; that OCT 735 could not “possibly
cover” the land embraced within TCT 1356; that OCTs
730 and 735 are null and void,
because the records of the General Land Registration Office (now the Land
Registration Commission) do not show any data relative to the issuance of the
supposed decrees 15584 and 17431, by virtue of which the said OCTs were issued; and that the said decrees were not
reconstructed pursuant to R.A.
1151, and the period within which reconstitution has to be done has long
expired.
The PHHC, on October 2, 1959, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment; (2) there is another action pending between the same parties and/or
parties representing the same interests, for the same cause of action; (3) the
cause of action has prescribed and/or is barred by laches;
(4) the amended complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action; (5) there is misjoinder
of defendants; and (6) the court
has no jurisdiction to try the case. The
U.P. also filed a motion to dismiss,
based substantially on grounds (1) to (6) aforestated,
and on the additional ground (7) that venue is improperly laid. The Tuasons and the
Varsity Hills, Inc. also filed motions to the same effect, based on grounds
(1), (3), (4), (6) and (7) aforesaid.
The respondent judge, in an order issued on June 1, 1961,
denied all the motions to dismiss with respect to
the questions of venue and jurisdiction, holding in abeyance the resolution
of the other grounds. The PHHC and the
U.P. thereafter filed their answers to the reamended
complaint (the former with a counterclaim for damages), denying the material
allegations thereof, alleging special and affirmative defenses (the U.P.
reiterating the grounds stated in its motion to dismiss), and praying for the
dismissal of the said reamended complaint. To these pleadings, the private respondents
filed a reply and an answer, reiterating the prayers in their reamended complaint.
The respondent judge,
acting on a motion filed by the private respondents on March
21, 1963, issued his
order of March 30, 1963, enjoining the PHHC from driving away the private respondents and their
children from the land subject-matter of the civil case, from building roads
and houses thereon, and from selling portions thereof. The PHHC’s motion
for reconsideration was denied by the respondent judge in his order of June 5, 1963.
The U.P., on July 1, 1965, filed an urgent motion, praying that
the respondent court resolve the matters it held in abeyance in the order of
June 1, 1961, and calling the attention of the respondent judge to the
decision of this Court in Galvez, et al. vs. Tuason, et al., G.R. L-15644, February 29, 1964. This urgent motion was denied by the court in
its order of July 20, 1965.
The PHHC, on July 27,
1965, filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the reamended complaint, praying for the dismissal thereof and
the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on March 30, 1963, citing Galvez, et al. vs. Tuason, et
al., supra. This
supplemental motion to dismiss was denied by the respondent judge in his order
of September 28,
1965.
From the orders of June 1, 1961, March 30, 1963, June 5, 1963, July 20, 1965 and
September 28, 1965, five (5) orders
all told, the petitioners have come to this Court, on the present recourse,
contending that these orders were issued by the respondent court without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that they have no
other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect their
interests from further jeopardy and prejudice resulting from the said orders.
They pray (1) that the said orders be annulled and set aside; (2) that the
complaint, as to them, be dismissed; (3) that pending this proceeding, this
Court issue the writs of preliminary injunction prayed for.
On February 9, 1965
we issued the first writ which enjoined the respondent judge from proceeding in
CC 5572. We issued the second writ on
July 24, 1967, restraining the private respondents from causing to be made any
further survey or survey plan with respect to any portion of the land covered by TCT 9462, from advertising or
offering for sale through newspapers,
circulars or by word of mouth any portion of the U.P. Diliman
campus covered by the said title, from executing any contract to sell or
contract of sale with respect to any portion of the land covered by the said
title, from entering or trespassing upon any portion of the said campus, and
from destroying, defacing, or injuring the stone posts and fences under
construction along the southwestern boundary of the said campus.
We reserved action,
however, on the prayer of the U.P. in its petition for
injunction that the private respondents be commanded to withdraw their
application for approval of survey plan SWO-40888 from the Bureau of Lands, to
cancel any existing subdivision plans respecting any portion of the U.P. Diliman campus demarcated in the survey plans
SWO-40815 and 40888 of the private respondents, to terminate and cancel any
contracts to sell entered into or executed by them in favor of third parties
respecting any portion of the
said campus covered by the aforesaid survey plans, and to rescind any contracts
of sale already executed or consummated by them with respect to any portion of
the said campus covered by the aforestated survey
plans.
In our Resolution of July 24, 1967, we also denied the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by the
private respondents on July 22, 1966, as well as their urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of an order
to restrain the U.P. from fencing the property claimed by them in their
complaint and from committing further acts of dispossession and all other acts
that hinder their normal ingress to and egress
from their dwellings.
The present petition necessarily poses the vital issue of whether the respondent
court acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the orders complained of, and, more particularly, in
denying the petitioners’ motions to dismiss the complaint, especially in view
of the import of the decision of this Court
in Galvez and Tiburcio
vs. Tuason, et al., U.P. and PHHC, supra, which decision was
brought to the attention of the
respondent court but, for reasons known only to the said court, was ignored by
it.
Although the private respondents in their reamended
complaint explicitly pray for the annulment
of OCTs 730 and 735 and TCTs
9462, 1356 and 16263, what in
fact is sought by the private respondents, in so far as the petitioners are concerned, is
the recovery of the land covered by TCTs 9462 and 1356.
This is not the first time that the validity of Transfer Certificates
of Title 9462 and 1356 in the
names of the U.P. and the PHHC has been
judicially challenged, nor is this the first time that the Tiburcios have come forward to make such
challenge. For, as a matter of fact, the validity, efficacy and
indefeasibility of these two TCTs have, in no uncertain
terms, been twice before affirmed by this Court.
In Tiburcio, et al. vs. PHHC and U.P., L-13479, decided on
October 31, 1959, involving the same parties or parties representing the same
interests, the same subject-matter, and the same cause of action, this Court
held that since the land involved therein had been registered in the name of
the predecessor-in-interest of the U.P. and the PHHC since 1914 under the Torrens system, the claim of the Tiburcios
that the original titles lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law
for their validity cannot now be countenanced for, by law, a decree of
registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the ground of
fraud, provided that no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property;
that upon the expiration of the period of one year within which a review of the
decree may be had, the decree as well as the title issued pursuant thereto
become incontrovertible; and that the action of the Tiburcios
is barred by laches.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo, made
the following pronouncements:
“It appears, however, that the land in question has been
placed under the operation of the Torrens system since
1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of defendants’ predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955 defendant People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the
original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiffs’
property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its
favor, while defendant University of the Philippines likewise acquired from
the same owner another portion of land which embraces the remainder of the
property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor.
It is,
therefore, clear that the land in question has been registered in the
name of defendants’ predecessor-in-interest since 1914 under the Torrens system and
that notwithstanding what they now claim that the original title lacked the
essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they have never
taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the
present action. In other words, they
allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what they now claim
to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in
the name of defendants’ predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our
law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within
one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the property (Section 38,
Act No. 496; Apurado v. Apurado,
26 Phil. 581; Salmon v. Bacanda, 40 O.G., 13th Supp. 1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48
Phil., 836).
“On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration
of the one-year period within which to review the decree of registration, the decree
as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof become incontrovertible
(Section 38, Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting
to one year the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a
limit to the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an
action may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside the decree,
the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee
the indefeasibility of the title would be defeated (Cabanos v. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520).
“Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges
that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual
possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the land in
question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for such averment is sufficient
to establish a cause of action against defendants. This contention overlooks the fact that the
land in question is covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that defendant People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation bought the portion of
the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955 for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356
was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property said defendant knew of any
defect in the title appearing on
its face in the form of any lien
or incumbrance.
The same thing is true with regard to defendant University
of the Philippines. It likewise
acquired the portion of the property in question sometime in 1955 from its predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9462 was issued in its
favor. There is also nothing in the
complaint to show that when it acquired the property it knew of any defect in
the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrance. Said defendants are, therefore, presumed to
be purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to
protection under the law.
“The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled
principle: ‘A person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens
on the property which are noted
on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of
the primary objects of the Torrens system’ (William H. Anderson v. Garcia, 64 Phil., 306;
Castillo v. Sian, G.R. No. L-11291, April 30, 1959; Paraiso v. Camon, G.R. No. L-13919, September 18, 1959).
“Assuming arguendo, that
plaintiffs’ action for reconveyance had not yet
prescribed as contended, their right however to bring the instant action may
be considered barred by laches for not having taken
the action seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens
system. It appears that the property in
question was originally registered on May
3, 1914 and it was only on October
11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the
present action. In the recent case of Domingo
v. Mayon Realty Corporation, G.R. No. L-2701, September 30, 1957, this Court said: ‘Like Ciriaco
Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein
could have
raised the issue of the validity of the Certificate of Title issued to Valle
Cruz since 1928, when the foreclosure sale in her favor was confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years
afterwards, and their action (if any) now should be held barred by their own laches and negligence.'”
More than four years
later, in Maximo Galvez
and Elpidio Tiburcio vs. Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., U.P. and PHHC, L-15644, February 29, 1964, involving one of the parties herein (Elpidio Tiburcio), the same subject-matter, and the same cause of
action, this Court emphatically declared that the question of ownership of the
lands covered by TCTs 9462 and 1356 is a matter “settled definitely and
conclusively by the courts, and must be deemed well beyond the reach of
review.” We quote from the exposition made by Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, thus:
“On October 16, 1958, appellants, as heirs of the late Eladio Tiburcio, commenced the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
for the annulment of the technical descriptions appearing in the alleged
anterior page of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, but, in reality, for
the recovery of a parcel of land with an area of more than 400 hectares and
damages against Mariano Severo, Maria Teresa, Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio
Asuncion, Augusto Huberto,
all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz, and/or their
respective heirs, the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
the UP and the PHHC. Their complaint
alleged, in substance, that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of
a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an
area of about 430 hectares, cultivating and enjoying its fruits; that when the
PHHC and the UP began exercising rights of dominion over the property, they
investigated the records of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and discovered that their property
was included within the technical boundaries set out in Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 in the name of the defendants Tuasons
by means of detachable sheets of paper incorporated to the certificate of
title; that by virtue of a deed of donation executed by the Tuasons
in favor of themselves, said certificate was cancelled and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 2680 was issued in their (Tuasons) names; that, subsequently, the latter sold to appellees UP and PHHC the property covered by T.C.T. No.
2680. * * *.
“The PHHC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of sufficient
cause of action, while the UP filed a similar motion based on the same ground
and several others.
“On December 5, 1958, the
Court issued the appealed order (dismissing the complaint against the UP and
the PHHC for lack of sufficient cause of action, and on the further grounds
that, their cause of action, if any, is barred by prior judgment, and there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause).
“During the hearing held in connection with the motions to
dismiss, the UP presented as Exhibit 1 a certified true copy of the
Application filed by Marcelino Tiburcio
on January 27, 1955 with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal for the registration in
his name of the property covered by Spanish Testimonial Title No. 36154 dated March 25, 1877; as Exhibit 3 a copy of the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dated October 17, 1955, dismissing the aforesaid application for registration,
and as Exhibit 4 a copy of the Record on Appeal in Civil Case No. Q-2663 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal filed by Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own
behalf and that of the other heirs of the late Eladio
Tiburcio, against the PHHC and the UP for the reconveyance of the
property covered by the Spanish title already referred to. This action was appealed to US (G.R.
No. L-13479) and on December 14,
1958,[3] we affirmed the order of the trial
court dismissing the case.
“For its part, the PHHC presented as evidence the Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 issued
on July 6, 1914 in the name of
the Tuasons, its predecessors-in-interest, covering
the property claimed by appellants (Exhibit 1-PHHC); a certificate of the commissioner of Land Registration to
the effect that the document thereto attached is a duplicate copy of the
Decree No. 17431, on the basis
of which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued (Exhibit 2-PHHC); a copy of Decree No. 17431 showing that the property
claimed by appellants was included in the judgment rendered in favor of the Tuasons (Exhibit 2-A-PHHC); and a certificate showing the
technical description of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1356 issued in favor of the
PHHC (Exhibit 3-PHHC). The record,
therefore, indubitably discloses that MarceIino Tiburcio, and the other heirs of the late Eladio Tiburcio, had filed an application
for the registration of the lands allegedly covered by a title granted to the
latter in 1877 by the Spanish
government, to which the Tuasons interposed the
corresponding opposition; that after due hearing, said application was
dismissed and that the order of dismissal became final and executory. Again, the record further discloses that in
1957, Marcelino Tiburcio,
for himself and in behalf of the heirs of the deceased Eladio
Tiburcio, instituted Civil Case No. Q-2663 against
the PHHC and the UP for the reconveyance of the same
lands covered by the Spanish title already referred to, and that this case was
dismissed by the court in its order of December 11, 1957, which order of dismissal was affirmed by Us on December 14, 1958[4]
in G.R. No. L-13479.”
Our rulings in the two
previous cases now constitute the law of the case in so far as the Tiburcios
and the U.P. and the PHHC are concerned. By “law of the case” is meant that “whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling
legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case” so long as the
“facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court” (21 C.J.S. 330). And once the decision becomes final, it is
binding on all inferior courts and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R.15548, October 30, 1962).
In view of all the
foregoing, we hold that the respondent court did abuse its discretion in not
dismissing the complaint in CC 5572
in so far as the U.P. and the PHHC
are concerned, in the face of the obvious conclusion that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, laches,
and prescription. Such abuse was
compounded when the respondent judge persisted in maintaining his order
of June 1, 1961 by issuing the subsequent orders of July 20, 1965 and September 28, 1965, after he was apprised of the
decision of this Court in the Galvez case which
unmistakably upheld the U.P. and the PHHC as the owners of the land covered by TCTs 9462 and
1356.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and (1) the orders
of June 1, 1961, March 30, 1963, June
5, 1963, July 20, 1965 and September 28, 1965, are annulled and set
aside; (2) the writ of preliminary injunction issued per our Resolution of July
24, 1967 is made permanent; (3) the
respondent court is ordered to dismiss the reamended
complaint as against the petitioners U.P. and PHHC; and (4) all the private
respondents Elpidio Tiburcio,
et al., their agents, and any person or persons acting in their behalf, are
hereby ordered (a) to withdraw from the Bureau of Lands their application for
the approval of Survey Plan SWO-40888, and (b) to cancel any and all existing
subdivision plans and to desist from making any further subdivision plans
respecting any portion of the land covered by TCTs
9462 and 1356. Costs against the
private respondents.
Let copies of this decision be forthwith
forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Rizal province,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and the
Director of the Bureau of Lands,
for their information, guidance and/or compliance.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
“ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, et al. vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON Y DE LA PAZ
and/or his heirs, et al., VARSITY
HILLS, INC., The OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION.”
[2]
The complaint of August 29, 1959
was amended several times; the last amendment was made on June 21, 1961.
[3]
Should read “October 31,
1959.”
[4]
Should read “October 31, 1959.”