DOMINADOR GOMEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO CONCEPCION, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RICARDO SUMMERS, SHERIFF OF MANILA, AND GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, CITY FISCAL, RESPONDENTS.

This
is a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Dr. Dominador Gomez, a
practicing physician in the City of Manila. The case is rather unique
and is, as far as we have been able to ascertain, without a precedent
in the annals of jurisprudence. It appears from the record that some
time in the year 1924, the following information was filed in criminal
case No. 27550 of the Court of First Instance of Manila:

“The
undersigned accuses Dominador Gomez, Olimpio Sison and Flaviano Torres
of a violation of section 2 of Act 2381 of the Philippine Legislature,
committed as follows:

“That on or about and including the
period between the first of February and the 26th of April, 1924, in
house No. 600 on Calle T. Pinpin of the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused,
Dominador Gomez, conspiring and confederating with his coaccused
Olimpio Sison and Flaviano Torres and with the assistance of the
latter, maintained, controlled and offered to the public a place for
injecting morphine, cocaine and other prohibited drugs, and the three
defendants did then and there and in furtherance of the aforesaid
conspiracy wilfully, unlawfully and criminally inject morphine, cocaine
and other prohibited drugs in the bodies of Go Ti, Go Tico and So Chian
and several other persons.

“Contrary to law.”

After due trial, the court below rendered a lengthy decision in which,
after stating the facts and showing that the accused treated several
hundred patients a day with morphine or opium injections, his honor,
the trial judge, says:

“It is therefore indubitable that the accused, for the purposes of the law, has not used the prohibited drugs as a medicine
to cure, which is the only manner of using them which is authorized by
law, because the treatment by slow suppression followed by him in
attempting to cure his patients of the opium habit is, as he could have
known, ineffective and produces opposite results. And as it cannot be
alleged that he has used said drug as medicine he has
violated the Internal Revenue Law and the Opium Law, and by reason of
such illegal use, whether he has done it willingly or unwillingly, he
has converted his office into a real den or resort where prohibited drugs and opium are used in violation of the law. (Sec. 2, Act No. 2381.)

“But
if all this is indubitable, the same cannot be said when with a serene
and impartial criterion the guilt of the accused is examined. For more
than one reason the court entertains a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. There may have existed in the case before the court an error of
fact on the part of the accused in believing that with his professional
ability he could follow and practice a treatment knowingly ineffective;
but there is doubt as to whether it can be attributed to bad faith.
According to the evidence, the accused has always acted openly and
confidently, and without attempting to conceal anything since he opened
his office to the public. He communicated this fact to the police
department of this city, not only when he moved his office to another
street and reopened it within a few days after it had been closed. Not
only this, but upon being informed that some members of the police
watched his office, he voluntarily and without excitement or a petition
on the part of anybody, invited the policemen to enter the premises
themselves in order that they might witness everything that was done
there for the length of time they desired. And what is more, he not
only permitted them to see and examine everything and take notes
thereof, but he also gave them all the information they asked from him.
Are these the acts of a person who knowingly violates the law?

“Partly,
perhaps, the police department may have contributed unintentionally to
instill into the accused the belief, erroneous, of course, that he was
acting lawfully, inasmuch as he was not prevented from keeping his
office open and treating therein those who came to him affected by the
opium vice. This does not mean that we want to blame the police
department on account of the inaction shown in this case up to the
moment of the filing of the complaint. The court is far from having
such an intention and idea. We only note the fact because it
constitutes to a certain extent a justification for the accused. After
all the fact of the case having been handled slowly has its natural
explanation. It was a case which was entirely new in this country and
of such a nature and importance that in order to proceed with firmness
and safety much observation and study was required and both things
demanded circumspection and time. The legal case which has been the
motive for the filing of the complaint is based on a series of facts
and circumstances which did not reveal to the naked eye the legal
violation therein involved, as usually happens with ordinary cases. The
violation of the law in the instant case is discovered only through a
long and minute juridical analysis of all the points, physical as well
as legal. This is undoubtedly the explanation of the inactive conduct
of the authorities, which conduct may have perhaps created in the mind
of the accused the conviction that he was acting in accordance with the
law.

“Declaring, therefore, as it is hereby declared by the
court, that there was a violation of the Opium Law alleged in the
complaint, the accused, however, is fully absolved therefrom upon a
reasonable doubt of his guilt. It is ordered that the office of the
accused be immediately closed, be it where it may, and it is decreed
that all the drugs, utensils and other effects exhibited in this case
and all other things that are used or may have been used in the office
of the accused be confiscated with the costs. So ordered.”

As will be seen, his Honor held in substance that Doctor Gomez violated
the Opium Law but that he probably did not realize that he was doing
anything illegal; that he, consequently, did not act with criminal
intent and was therefore not guilty of the crime or crimes charged in
the information.

After his acquittal Doctor Gomez failed to
close his clinic and continued the practice of injecting prohibited
drugs into his Chinese patients. As a consequence, the respondent
fiscal on March 16, 1925, presented a motion to the Court of First
Instance asking that the part of the judgment in case No. 27550 which
ordered the closing of the Doctor’s clinic be executed and on the
following day the court granted the motion and ordered the respondent
sheriff to proceed at once to execute the part of the aforesaid
judgment which related to the closing of the clinic, prohibiting Doctor
Gomez, his agents, employees, or any other persons under his direction
from entering the same. Doctor Gomez thereupon brought the present
action in this court praying that the respondents herein be prohibited
and restrained from carrying into effect the order of execution
abovementioned on the ground that the clause of the judgment in case
No. 27550 upon which the order is based, is null and void ab initio.

That the closing of the clinic in question is in the nature of a
penalty and that the court was in error in imposing the penalty after
acquitting the defendant, the herein petitioner, is too obvious for
argument. The fact that it is not among the penalties prescribed by law
for the offense with which he was charged, does not alter the case; it
only makes the error more glaring. The real question here to be
determined is, therefore, whether the part of the judgment which
imposed the penalty is void ab initio or whether it is merely
voidable. If the latter, it cannot be attacked collaterally in an
action such as the present where the object is simply to restrain its
execution. As stated in Black on Judgments, paragraph 170:

“* * * A voidable
judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to be made
void when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the
proper steps to have its invalidity declared. It always contains some
defect which may become fatal. It carries within it the means of its
own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly annulled, it is attended
with all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The party
against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or an
obligation, but only by a proper application to have it vacated or
reversed. Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an
estoppel, or a source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken
against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a valid
sentence. If emanating from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be
sustained by the ordinary presumptions of regularity, and it is not
open to impeachment in any collateral action. * * *”

But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. “A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no
rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are
void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds
himself without title and without redress.” (Freeman on Judgments, sec.
117, citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill.., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)

It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void
judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a
judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere
nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)

Applying the principles stated to the present case, it is obvious that
in imposing upon the accused a penalty for an offense of which in the
same judgment he was acquitted, the court acted entirely without
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. In a criminal case there is in
reality only one issue, viz: whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty. If he is found guilty the court acquires jurisdiction to impose
a penalty; if he is found not guilty no court has the power to mete out
punishment; a finding of guilty must precede the punishment. In a trial
by jury no one will contend that the court has jurisdiction to impose a
penalty after the jury has returned a verdict of not guilty and the
same principles must necessarily apply where the facts are found by the
court; the judge must find the accused guilty before he can assume
jurisdiction to order the infliction of punishment.

The part
of the judgment in question ordering the closing of the petitioner’s
clinic being in excess of the jurisdiction of the court and null and
void, it cannot, of course, be executed. The petition is therefore
granted and the respondents are hereby prohibited from executing the
portion of the judgment in criminal case No. 27550 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila which provides for the closing of the
petitioner’s clinic or place of business. No costs will be allowed. So
ordered.

Johnson, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.