TAN BOC, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

The
appellant arrived at the port of Manila on July 17, 1922, and applied
for permission to enter and reside in the Philippines as a minor child
of Tang Tieng, a Chinese merchant residing in the City of Manila. On
August 20, 1924, that is to say, two years and thirty-two days after
the arrival of the applicant, the board of special inquiry of the
Bureau of Customs held the proper investigation and resolved that the
applicant had no right to enter or to remain in the Philippines, not
having proven that he was a minor child of Tang Tieng, and must be
deported to the port of origin. The decision of the board was appealed
to the Insular Collector of Customs who affirmed it.

On
September 17, 1924, the applicant filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. After a hearing upon the petition, the lower court held that it
was not proven that the board had committed an abuse of discretion in
the exercise of its powers, and denied the relief prayed for. From this
judgment of the lower court this appeal was taken by the applicant.

On account of the appellant having been sick for the period of six
months since his arrival, the investigation was not carried out for the
determination of the question whether or not he had the right to enter
and remain in the Philippines, until August 20, 1924, more than two
years after his arrival. According to the evidence introduced by the
appellant at the investigation, his father by the name of Tang Tieng
returned to China on August 8, 1923, and there died on June 5, 1924.
The father of the applicant was a Chinese merchant resident of the City
of Manila when his son Tan Boc arrived, who was then a minor. Under
such circumstances, did the plaintiff have any right to enter and
remain in the Philippines? The Attorney-General maintains that upon the
death of the father of the applicant before the latter was able to
prove his right to enter the Philippines, said right ceased to exist,
it being founded only on the fact that he was a minor child of Tang
Tieng. He further says that had his father lived on the day when his
right to enter these Islands was inquired into, the appellant should
have been entitled to enter the Philippines, by virtue of the juridical
condition that should have been transmitted to him as a minor child of
a resident Chinese merchant. (Tan Lin Jo vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil., 78.)

The object of the law in granting a minor child of a resident Chinese
merchant the privilege to enter the Philippines is to give said minor
child the opportunity to enjoy the company and protection of his father
(Lo Po vs. McCoy, 8 Phil., 343), and according to the
jurisprudence of this court, the minor children of a resident Chinaman,
who having left the Philippines died in China, said children not having
resided in these Islands, cannot enter the Philippines after the death
of their father. (Lee Jua vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil.,
24.) But in the instant case the father of the applicant was a Chinese
merchant resident of the City of Manila when he arrived a minor.
According to the doctrine laid down in the case of Lo Po vs. McCoy, supra,
the applicant has the right to enter the Philippines. His right must be
determined as at the time of his arrival in these Islands. The fact
that his father returned to China where he died one year after the
arrival of his child, does not affect the question. If under the
circumstances of this case the applicant may be deprived of his right
because the board of special inquiry of the customhouse did not make
the investigation of the application but two years after his arrival,
another immigrant 20 years old, a child of a Chinese merchant and
resident of the Philippine Islands, might likewise be deprived of the
right to enter and remain here through a dilatory proceeding of the
board in charge of the investigation of his application. This would be
highly unjust. In the instant case, the fact of the board of special
inquiry having delayed the investigation up to two years after the
arrival of the applicant, and the denial of the application based on
facts which took place one year after the arrival of the applicant
constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the board of special
inquiry of the customhouse in the determination of the right of the
appellant.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is
ordered that the applicant be released, for in our opinion he has the
right to enter and remain in the Philippines as a minor child of a
Chinese merchant resident of the City of Manila at the time of his
arrival. No special pronouncement as to costs is made. So ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.