CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 2565, which she
commenced on May 28, 1962,
to secure declar­ation of nullity of two contracts executed on January 24, 1934 and for recovery of
certain properties.

The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:

Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don
Felipe Calderon and with whom she had one living child, Concepcion
Calderon, contract­ed a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo
Rodriguez, a widower with four children by a previous marriage, named Geronimo,
Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed
Rodriguez.  There was no issue in this
second marriage.

Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion
Felix was the registered owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of Babañgad, municipality of Bulacan,
Bulacan province, with a total area of 557,711 square
meters covered by OCT Nos. 605 and 807. 
Under date of January 24, 1934,
Concepcion Felix appeared to have executed a deed of
sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid properties to her daughter, Concepcion Calderon, for the sum of P2,500.00, which the
latter in turn appeared to have transferred to her mother and stepfather by
means of a document dated January 27,
1934.  Both deeds, notarized
by Notary Public Jose D. Mendoza, were registered in the office of the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan on January 29, 1934, as a consequence of which, the original
titles were cancelled and TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were issued in the names of
the spouses Do­mingo Rodriguez and Concepcion Felix.

On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by
the widow, Concepcion Felix, his children Geronimo, Esmeragdo and Mauricio and grandchildren Oscar, Juan and
Ana, surnamed Ro­driguez, children of a son, Jose, who had predeceased him.

On March 16, 1953,
the above-named widow, children and grandchildren of the deceased entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of his (Domingo’s) estate, consisting of one-half
of the properties al­legedly belonging to the conjugal partnership.  Among the properties listed as conjugal were
the two parcels of land in Bulacan, Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property,
were divided among the heirs in this manner:

“WHEREAS, the parties have furthermore agreed that the
fishpond covered by TCT Nos. 13815, 13816 and 24109 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, containing an area of
557,971 sq. m., which is likewise the conjugal property of the deceased and his
surviving spouse; 1/2 of the same or 278,985.5 sq. m. belongs to said Concepcion Felix Vda. de Ro­driguez,
as her share in the conjugal property; and 3/4 of the remaining half or
209,239.125 sq. m. are transferred in full ownership to Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo Rodriguez and Mauricio Rodriguez, share alike,
while the other 1/4 or 69,746.375 sq. m. of the said remaining half goes in
equal shares to Oscar Rodriguez, Juan Rodriguez and Ana Rodriguez.”

As a result of this partition, TCT Nos.
13815 and 13816 were can­celled and TCT Nos. T-11431 and T-14432 were issued in
the names of the said heirs of the deceased.

On March 23, 1953,
in a power of attorney executed by the children and grandchildren of Domingo
Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix Vda.
de Rodriguez was named their attorney-in-fact, authorized to manage their
shares in the fishponds (Exh. 4).

On July 2, 1954,
the heirs ended their co-ownership by execut­ing a deed of partition, dividing
and segregating their respective shares in the properties, pursuant to a
consolidation and subdivision plan (PCS-3702), in accordance with which, Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez obtained TCT No. T-12910, for the portion pertain­ing to her (Exh. L), while TCT No. T-12911 was issued to the other
heirs, for their shares.  This latter
title was subsequently replaced by TCT No. 16660 (Exh.
M).

On October 12, 1954,
the Rodriguez children executed another document granting unto the widow
lifetime usufruct over one-third of the fishpond which they received as
hereditary share in the es­tate of Domingo Rodriguez, which grant was accepted
by Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez.

Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow ap­peared
to have leased from the Rodriguez children and grandchil­dren the fishpond
(covered by TCT No. 16660) for a period of 5 years commencing August 16, 1962,
for an annual rental of P7, 161.37 (Exh. 5).

At about this time, it seemed that the relationship between the
widow and her stepchildren had turned for the worse.  Thus, when she failed to deliver to them the
balance of the earnings of the fishponds, in the amount of P3;000.00, her
stepchildren endorsed the matter to their lawyer who, on May 16, 1962, sent a letter of demand to the
widow for payment thereof.  On May 28, 1962, Concepcion
Felix Vda. de Rodriguez filed the present action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila naming as defendants, Geronimo Rodriguez,
Esmeragdo Rodriguez, Oscar Rodriguez, Concepcion Bautista vda. de
Rodriguez, as guardian of the minors Juan and Ana Rodriguez, and Antonio Diaz
de Rivera and Renato Diaz de Rivera, as guardians of
the minors Marfa Ana, Mercedes, Mar­garita, Mauricio, Jr. and Domingo (Children
of Mauricio Rodriguez who had also died).

The action to declare null and void the deeds of transfer of
plain­tiff’s properties to the conjugal partnership was based on the alleged
employment or exercise by plaintiff’s deceased husband of force and pressure on
her; that the conveyances of the properties – from plain­tiff to her daughter
and then to the conjugal partnership of plaintiff and her husband – are both
without consideration; that plaintiff par­ticipated in the extrajudicial
settlement of estate (of the deceased Domingo Rodriguez) and in other
subsequent deeds or instruments involving the properties in dispute, on the
false assumption that the said properties had become conjugal by reason of the
execution of the deeds of transfer in 1934; that laboring under the same false
assumption, plaintiff delivered to defendants, as income of the prop­erties
from 1953 to 1961, the total amount of P56,976.58.  As alternative cause of action, she contended
that she would claim for her share, as surviving widow, of 1/5 of the
properties in controversy, should such properties be adjudicated as belonging
to the conjugal partnership.  Thus,
plaintiff prayed that the deeds of transfer men­tioned in the complaint be
declared fictitious and simulated; that the “Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate” be also declared null and void; that TCT No. 16660 of the Registry
of Deeds of Bulacan be cancelled and another one be
issued in the name of plaintiff, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Felix; that defendants be ordered to pay to plain­tiff
the sum of P56,976.58, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing
of the complaint, and for appropriate relief in connection with her alternative
cause of action.

In their separate answers, defendants not only denied the ma­terial
allegations of the complaint, but also set up as affirmative de­fenses lack of
cause of action, prescription, estoppel and laches.  As
counterclaim, they asked for payment by the plaintiff of the un­paid balance of
the earnings of the land up to August
15, 1962 in the sum of P 3,000.00 
for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

On October 5, 1963,
judgment was rendered for the defendants. 
In upholding the validity of the contracts, the court found that al­though
the two documents, Exhibits A and B, were executed for the purpose of
converting plaintiff’s separate properties into conjugal assets of the marriage
with Domingo Rodriguez, the consent of the parties thereto was voluntary,
contrary to the allegations of plain­tiff and her witness.  The court also ruled that having taken part
in the questioned transactions, plaintiff was not the proper party to plead
lack of consideration to avoid the transfers; that contracts without consideration
are not inexistent, but are only voidable, following
the ruling in the case of Concepcion vs.
Sta. Ana (87 Phil. 787); that there was ratification or confirmation by the
plaintiff of the transfer of her property, by her execution (with the other
heirs) of the extrajudicial settlement of estate; that being a volun­tary party
to the contracts, Exhibits A and B, plaintiff cannot re­cover the properties
she gave thereunder. 
Plaintiff’s alternative cause of action was also rejected on the ground
that action for res­cission of the deed of extrajudicial settlement should have
been filed within 4 years from its execution (on March 16, 1953).

From the decision of the Court of First Instance, plaintiff duly
appealed to this Court, insisting that the conveyances in issue were obtained
through duress, and were inexistent, being simulated and without consideration.

We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing
that the contracts of transfer from Concepcion Felix
to her daughter, and from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed
through violence or intimidation.  The
charge is predicat­ed solely upon the improbable and biased testimony of
appellant’s daughter, Concepcion C. Martelino, whom the trial court refused to believe,
considering that her version of violence and harass­ment was contradicted by Bartolome Gualberto, who had
lived with the Rodriguez spouses from 1917 to 1953, and by the improbability of
Rodriguez threatening his stepdaughter in front of the Notary Public who
ratified her signature.  Furthermore, as
pointed out by the appealed decision, the charge of duress should be treated
with caution considering that Rodriguez had already died when the suit was
brought, for duress, like fraud, is not to be lightly laid at the door of men
already dead.  (cf. Prevost
vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S] 481, 498; Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507).

What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or
defect of consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years
after it has ceased;^[1]
and the present action was insti­tuted only in 1962, twenty-eight (28) years
after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred, and no less than nine (9)
years after the supposed culprit died (1953). 
On top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent transactions
with appellees that con­firmed the contracts that she
now tries to set aside.  Therefore, this
cause of action is clearly barred.

Appellant’s main stand in attacking the conveyances in ques­tion
is that they are simulated or fictitious, and inexistent for lack of
consideration.  We shall examine each
purported defect separately.

The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of
simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really de­sired or
intended to produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties.  Thus, where a person, in
order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a
transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest him­self of his
title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a
sham.  But appellant contends that the
sale by her to her daughter, and the subsequent sale by the latter to appel­lant
and her husband, the late Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting
the property from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby
vesting a half interest in Rodriguez, and evading the pro­hibition against
donations from one spouse to another during coverture
(Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334).  If this
is true, then the appel­lant and her daughter must have intended the two
conveyances to be real and effective; for appellant could not intend to keep
the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time vest half of them in her
husband.  The two contracts of sale then
could not have been simulated, but were real and intended to be fully
operative, being the means to achieve the result desired.

Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these
contracts the law against donations between spouses make them simulated ones.

Ferrara, in his
classic book, “La Simulacion de los Negocios Juridicos”
(Sp. trans. 1926), pp. 95, 105, clearly explains the dif­ference between
simulated transactions and transactions in fraudem
legis: 

“Otra figura
que debe distinguirse de la simulacion es el fraus legis. 
Tambien aqui se da una gran
confusion que persiste aun en la jurisprudencia, apegada tenazmente a antiguo errores.  Se debe a Bahr el haber defendido con vigor la antitesis teorica que existe entre
negocio fingido y negocio fraudulento, y haber atacado la doctrina comun que hada una
mescolanza con los dos conceptos.

“Se confunde – dice (2) –, el negocio in fraudem legis con el negocio simulado, aunque la naturaleza de ambos sea totalmente
diversa.  El ne­gocio fraudulente no es, en absoluto, un negocio aparente.  Es perfectamente serio:  se quiere real­mente.   Es mas, se quiere tal como se ha realizado,
con todas las consecuencias que corresponden a la forma juridica elegida.  Muchas veces, estas
consecuencias son incomodas
pars una u otra de las partes, aunque
serian mucho mas incomodas las consecuencias
que llevaria consigo el acto prohibido.

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

“El resultedo de las
precedentes investigaciones
es el siguiente:  el negocio simulado quiere producir una apariencia;
el negocio fraudulento, una realidad; los
negocios simulados son ficticios, no queridos; los negocios in fraudem son serios, reales, y realizados en tal forma por las
partes pare conseguir un resultado prohibido:  la simulacion nunca es un medio
pars eludir la ley, sino para ocultar
su violacion.  La transgresion del
contenido verbal e inmediato
de la norma se encubre bajo el manto de un negocio licito, lo cual no altera el caracter del contra
legem agere.  Tan verdad es, que si
se ha redactedo una contraescritura que documenta y declares la verdadera
naturaleza del
ne­gocio realizado, no queda mas que
aplicar pure y simple­mente
la prohibibion.

Tambien el fraude
quiere perjudicar la ley, pero emplea
pare ello medios diversos y sigue distintos caminos.  No oculta el acto exterior, sino que lo deja claro
y visible, tratando de huir
sesgadamente de la aplicacion
de la ley merced
a una artistica y sabia com­binacidn de varios medios juridicos
no reprobados.”

Appellant invokes our decision in Vazquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil. 490, but to no purpose.  The mortgage and foreclosure sale involved in
that case were typical simulations, merely apparent but not really intended to
produce legal effects, as proved by the Court’s finding that the alleged
creditor and buyer at the foreclosure sale “Porta
himself ostensibly acknowledged by his inertia in allowing the doc­tor (alleged
mortgagor debtor) to exercise dominical power thereon without any protest on
his part.” (cas cit. p. 495).  Not only this, but the mortgagor’s wife, when
her husband died, “found among his papers Portals cancellation of the
mortgage in his favor and the draft of the complaint for
foreclosure.”  Plainly, the
precedent cited is here inapplicable.

Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from
the latter to the spouses Rodriguez void ab initio or inexistent for lack of consideration?   We do not find them to be so.  In the first transaction, the price of P2
,500.00 is recited in the deed it­self (Exh. A); in
the second (Exh. B), the consideration set forth is
P3,000.00.  Now, Article 1274 of the
Civil Code of 1889 (in force when the deeds were executed) provided that —

“In onerous contracts the causa is
understood to be, for each contracting party, the prestation
or promise of a thing or service by the other.”  (Emphasis supplied.)

Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a
definite price in money, such undertakings constituted in themselves actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the
fishponds.  That the prices were not paid
(assuming ad arquendo that Concep­cion Martelino’s testimony
to this effect is true) does not make the sales inexistent for want of causa.  As
ruled in Enriquez de la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37
Phil. 982, “the consideration (causa) need
not pass from one (party) to the other at the time the contract is entered
into.  x x x The consideration need not be paid at the time of the
promise.  The one promise is a
consideration for the other.” ‘

What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the
fact that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal prohibition
against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334, paragraph 1, of
the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. 
That illegal purpose tainted the contracts, for as held by the Spanish
Tri­bunal Supremo in its decision of 2 April 1941,

“ha de ser reputedo
ineficaz, por exigencias ineludibles del caracter social y moral del Derecho,
todo contrato que persiga un fin ilicito o inmoral, sea cualquiera el medio empleado por los
contratantes para lograr esa finalidad,
no justificada por un interes digno de ser socialmente protegido.”

The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil Code, for as
declared by the same Spanish Court
in its de­cision of 14 December 1940
–

“toda vez que lo que
caracteriza fundamentalmente
la ilicitud de la causa es la lesion de un interns general juridico
o moral,”

a ruling reiterated in the decision of 2 April 1941 when the Court ruled:

“El concepto
de la causa ilicita, tal como la desenvuelve
y aplicca con gran amplitud y flexibilidad ia doctrine mo­derna  permite cobijar, no solo las convenciones ilicitas por razon de su
objeto o de su motivo x x x
sino tambien multiples convenciones que no encerrando en sf ningun elemento de directa antijuricidad son ilicitas por el matiz inmoral que
reviste la operacion en su conjunto . . . “

Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by
illegal subject matter or illegal causa, Articles
1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in
pari delicto non
oritur actio,
denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se.  And appellant is clearly as guilty as her
husband in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the
Code, already cited.  Wherefore, her
present action to reivindicate the conveyed prop­erties
was correctly repulsed by the Court below.

“ART. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit
consideration is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor, the following rules shall
be observed:

1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what
he may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the
undertaking of the other party;

x                    x                    x.”

That Article 1306 applies to cases where
the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration of the purpose
of the contract was expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla,
48 Phil. 449-450.^[2]

Finally, it cannot be denied that plaintiff-appellant had knowl­edge
of the nullity of the contract for the transfer of her properties in 1934,
because she was even a party thereto. 
And yet, her pre­sent action was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of
friendly relations between her and defendants-appellees.  Appel­lant’s inaction to enforce her right,
for 28 years, cannot be justified by the lame excuse that she assumed that the
transfer was valid.  Knowledge of the
effect of that transaction would have been obtained by the exercise of
diligence.  Ignorance which is the effect
of in­excusable negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches.  (Go Chi Gun,
etc., et al. vs. Co Cho, et al., G. R. No. L-5208, Feb. 28, 1955).  Even assuming for the sake of argument that
appel­lant held her peace, during the lifetime of her husband, out of leg­itimate
fear for her life, there is no justification for her failure to bring the
proper action after his death in 1953. 
Instead, she entered into a series of agreements with herein appellees, the children of her husband by a prior marriage,
of partition, usufruct and lease of their share in the fishponds, transactions
that necessarily assumed that Rodriguez had acquired one-half of the litigated
fishponds.  In the circumstances,
appellant’s cause has become a stale demand and her conduct placed her in estoppel to question the validity of the trans­fer of her
properties.  (Manila,et
al. vs. Galvan, et al., G. R. No. L-23507, May 24, 1967; Perez vs. Herranz,
7 Phil. 695-696).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
affirmed.  Costs against appellant Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, Bengzon,
JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official
leave, did not take part.

^[1]
Article 1301 of the Civil Code of 1889, in force when the assailed contracts
were executed (1934).

^[2]
See also Liguez vs. Court of Appeals, 102
Phil. 581-582; Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695.