G.R. No. L-21275. July 31, 1967
ZAMBOANGA GENERAL UTILITIES, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES; THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND GOODRICH INTERNATIONAL RUBBER COMPA…
ANGELES, J.:
We are asked in this appeal to reverse the order of the Court of
First Instance of Basilan City dismissing for lack
of jurisdiction the petition for certiorari in Special Civil Case No. 63 of
said court.
The facts are not disputed.
A protest was filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau
of Lands at Zamboanga
City by the Zamboanga
General Utilities, Inc. against the Goodrich International Rubber Company,
Inc., for the forcible occupation over, and encroachment into, a portion of
public land which had already been applied for, occupied and improved by the
former. After hearing, at which both
parties were represented, the Director of Lands, on June 27, 1958, rendered a
decision awarding the whole of Lot No. 1, SWO-40126, and one hundred forty-four
(144) hectares of Lot No. 2, SW0-40126, the contested lot, to the Zamboanga General Utilities, Inc., and to the Goodrich
International Rubber Company, Inc., three hundred eighty (380) hectares of said
Lot 2. Feeling aggrieved, Zamboanga Utilities appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on the basic contention that it was entitled
to the whole area of Lot No. 2. On February 26, 1959, the Secretary
rendered a decision
“concurring in the result” of the decision of the Director of Lands,
and denied the appeal. Motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the Zamboanga
Utilities filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari with this Court on March
22, 1960, but this was dismissed “without prejudice to filing
an action, if any, in the Court of First Instance.”
Accordingly, on June 22, 1960, Zamboanga
Utilities filed with the Court of First Instance of Basilan
City a petition for “CERTIORARI” against the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Lands, and
Goodrich International Rubber Co., Inc.
On July 28, 1960,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Lands,
through their respective counsels filed separate answers. On July
29, 1960, the Goodrich also filed, through counsel, its answer with
counterclaim.
On September 26, 1960,
the petitioner filed a petition for preliminary injunction, praying that the
Director of Lands be enjoined from proceeding with the sale at public auction
of a portion of public land including the contested area. On October
11, 1960, counsel for Goodrich filed opposition to the petition,
and after due hearing, the court granted the petition for the issuance of the
preliminary injunctive writ, upon petitioner’s filing a bond. On November
8, 1960, counsel for respondent Goodrich filed a motion for the
dissolution of the writ on the ground that the averments in the petition are
not sufficient to warrant its issuance.
Despite opposition from the petitioner, and upon filing of a counterbond by movant Goodrich,
the preliminary injunction was ordered dissolved.
On January 14, 1963, or about four months after the respondents
had filed their answers, a joint motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari
was filed by the respondents on the ground that the court “has no
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari the decisions and acts of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Lands performed
outside the City of Basilan, pursuant to section
44(h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948″.
The motion was granted, and the petition was dismissed on March 11, 1963, the lower court
citing as authority the case of Samar Mining Co. vs. Amado, G. R. No. L-17109, decided on June 30, 1961.
From the order of dismissal, the petitioner elevated the case to Us for review.
In support of the
contention that the order of dismissal was erroneous, the petitioner-appellant
stresses on the untimeliness of the motion to
dismiss, stating that venue had been waived since the motion was filed long
after the respondents had filed responsive pleadings, that is, their answers to
the petition for certiorari. Respondents-appellees, on the other hand, insist that the basis for the
motion to dismiss was not improper venue but “lack of jurisdiction based
on Section 44(h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948”, which cannot be waived and
may be interposed at any time of the proceedings. In other words, that the lower court has no
authority to hear and determine the case.
The question of whether
or not the Court of First Instance of Basilan has the
power to “hear and determine the case”, and to review the decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands –
which would seem to be the main question posed herein – was raised and passed upon
in Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary,
etc., et al., G. R. No. L-21066, April 30, 1965. This
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, there said:
“The doctrine invoked in support of the theory of
non-jurisdiction (Castaño vs. Lobingier,
7 Phil. 91; Acosta vs. Alvendia, L-14598, Oct. 31,
1960; Samar Mining vs. Amado,
L-17109, June 30, 1961) are inapplicable, in that those cases involved
petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or
officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts
involved. Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the
respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into
the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial
review should be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality
where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts
of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where
the questioned decisions are being enforced.
“It is easy to see that if the contested ruling of the court below
is sustained the same would result not only in hardship to litigants of limited
means, practically amounting to denial of access to the courts, but would also
unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are already
overburdened. Actually, since Ortua vs. Singson, 59 Phil. 440,
the power of provincial courts of first instance to review administrative
decisions of national officials has been consistently recognized.”
In
line with the principle laid down in this case, we hereby sustain the
jurisdiction of the lower court over the petition for certiorari.
Of course, as stated in
the above-quoted pronouncement, the rule is different in petitions for injunction
which seek to control the actions of courts and officers. Jurisdiction or authority of Courts of First
Instance to control or restrain acts by means of the writ of injunction is
limited to acts which are being committed or about to be committed within the
territorial boundaries of their respective provinces and districts (Acosta vs. Alvendia, supra; See also Alhambra Cigar, etc., et
al. vs. National Administration of Regional Office No. 2, etc., et al., L-20491,
August 31, 1966.) While there was in the case at bar a petition for writ of
preliminary injunction filed sometime after the main petition had been
instituted, the respondent officials, particularly the Director of Lands against whom the writ was directed,
had failed to challenge the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ. Only the respondent Goodrich objected to its
issuance, but without raising the question of jurisdiction as a ground for its
opposition. At any rate, since the writ
had been dissolved upon motion and filing of counterbond
by Goodrich, the main petition remains as one for mere “CERTIORARI”, and the jurisdiction of the court in
issuing the preliminary injunctive writ is no longer a question for determination.
WHEREFORE, the order complained of is hereby set aside
with costs against the Goodrich International Rubber Company, Inc. Let the records of this case be remanded to
the court below for further proceedings.
Reyes, JBL, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro, J., on leave, did
not take part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official
leave of absence.