NICANOR B. PAGKALINAWAN, SUPERVISING AGENT, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, EAST VISAYAN DISTRICT OFFICE, CEBU CITY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS P…

Pagkalinawan versus Gomez

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction, brought by Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the National Bureau of Investigation stationed in Cebu City, against Judge Amador E. Gomez of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and against Norberto L. Dayrit, the plaintiff in a replevin suit below. Pagkalinawan had seized an automobile in Manila under a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and was holding it in the custody of that court, when Judge Gomez, acting on Dayrit's complaint for replevin, ordered him to surrender the car to the Sheriff of Cebu City. The case matters because it fixes a rule of judicial comity between courts of coordinate jurisdiction: a court of first instance may not, through replevin or any other independent remedy, take from the custody of another court of first instance property that the latter has seized under its own search warrant. Only the issuing court may order the release of the property.

Procedural History

On the fourth of February, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Guillermo Santos presiding, issued a search warrant under which the automobile was seized as the subject of theft or as stolen property. On the seventh of February, 1964, Dayrit filed a complaint for replevin in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, presided over by Judge Gomez. The next day, the eighth of February, Judge Gomez issued an order directing the Sheriff of Cebu City to take the car into custody, and a writ of replevin was issued. When the writ was served, Pagkalinawan manifested that he could not comply because he was holding the car in the custody of the law for the Manila court. On the twelfth of February, 1964, on Dayrit's urgent motion, Judge Gomez ordered Pagkalinawan to turn over the car immediately, warning that otherwise the court would visit on him the full harshness of its coercive power. Pagkalinawan complied under protest, and the sheriff delivered the car to Dayrit. His motion for reconsideration was denied on the twentieth of February, 1964.

Pagkalinawan then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that Judge Gomez be declared to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that the car be returned to him pending the outcome. On the eighteenth of March, 1964, the Supreme Court ordered the respondents to answer and issued a preliminary mandatory injunction without bond as prayed for. The case was decided on the eighteenth of December, 1967.

Facts

Acting under a search warrant issued on the fourth of February, 1964 by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, seized an automobile as the subject of the offense of theft or as stolen property. From that moment the car was in the custody of the Manila court that had ordered its seizure.

Three days later, Norberto L. Dayrit filed a complaint for replevin in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, claiming that the car was wrongfully detained by Pagkalinawan. Judge Amador E. Gomez took cognizance of the complaint, ordered the sheriff to take the car into custody, and caused a writ of replevin to issue. Pagkalinawan refused to comply, explaining that he held the car in the custody of the law for the Manila court, which had issued the search warrant. Unmoved, Judge Gomez on the twelfth of February, 1964 ordered him to turn the car over at once, under threat of the court's coercive power.

Fearing contempt of the Manila court, which had in the meantime issued its own order on the proper disposition of the car, Pagkalinawan parted with its custody. The sheriff took possession and immediately delivered the car to Dayrit. Pagkalinawan's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not a court of first instance of one district, acting in a replevin proceeding, may require a public officer to surrender property that another court of first instance of coordinate jurisdiction has seized and holds under a search warrant it issued.
• Whether or not Judge Gomez acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ordering the turnover of the car and in disregarding the search warrant of the Manila court.
• Whether or not certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to prevent one branch of a court of first instance from interfering with the lawful orders of a co-equal and coordinate branch.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, as it then stood, governs the issuance of the order of replevin, and the Court acknowledged that its literal language appeared to authorize the order Judge Gomez issued:

Section 3 of Rule 60, formerly Section 3 of Rule 62, requires a Judge of the Court of First Instance, upon the filing of an affidavit that the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, that it is wrongfully detained by defendant alleging that it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized in an execution or attachment against the property of the plaintiff and a bond with him or with his clerk, shall issue an order describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the Sheriff or any proper officer of the Court forthwith to take such property into his custody.

The Court read this provision against the higher principle of comity among coordinate courts, holding that the rule cannot be applied where the property is already in the custody of another court under a search warrant.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the moment a court of first instance is informed, through the filing of an appropriate pleading, that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer to take into custody the property subject of the replevin action if that property has theretofore come into the custody of another public officer by virtue of the search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued the search warrant may order its release. The Court conceded that the literal language of the Rules of Court yielded a contrary impression, and that this demonstrated the good faith of Judge Gomez, but held that the rule of comity must prevail.

On the second issue, the Court held that any other view would be subversive of a doctrine steadfastly adhered to, whose main purpose is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. It drew support from its recent ruling in Tuason and Company versus Judge Torres, where it held that only the particular branch of the Court of First Instance that rendered a judgment can annul its own decision, and that any other branch attempting to do so either exceeds its jurisdiction or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It likewise invoked Cabigao versus del Rosario, where it was settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought, and Philippine National Bank versus Javellana, which reiterated that doctrine. The Court added that while this proceeding does not deal with the annulment of a judgment, the principle calls for application, otherwise a court of first instance would be allowed to pass on the validity of a search warrant issued by another court of first instance. It also found persuasive the doctrine in Molo versus Yatco, that the court which ordered the seizure is the only one authorized by law to return the property to its owner, and that the remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant may be sought in the court that issued it, not in the sala of another judge, and not through replevin.

On the third issue, the Court held that certiorari and prohibition were proper, since in either case, where a branch attempts to nullify or disregard the lawful act of a co-equal and coordinate branch, those remedies lie to prevent it from proceeding.

Doctrine

A court of first instance may not, in a replevin proceeding or through any other independent or plenary remedy, take property out of the custody of another court of first instance of coordinate jurisdiction that has seized it under a search warrant. The property is in the custody of the law, and only the court that issued the search warrant may order its release. The validity of a search warrant may be questioned only in the court that issued it, not in the sala of another judge.

The rule rests on judicial comity: no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought. A branch that attempts to annul the judgment of a co-equal branch, even one in the same judicial district, either exceeds its jurisdiction or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and certiorari and prohibition lie to prevent it. The literal language of Section 3 of Rule 60 on replevin must yield to this principle whenever the property is already in the custody of another court under a search warrant.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the writ prayed for, made the mandatory preliminary injunction permanent, and ordered the car returned to the custody of the petitioner, with costs against respondent Dayrit.

Remember This

Memorize the line: only the court of first instance that issued the search warrant may order the release of the property seized under it, and no coordinate court may take that property through replevin. Examiners use this case on the hierarchy and comity of coordinate courts, on custody of the law, and on certiorari and prohibition as the remedy against a branch that disregards the lawful order of a co-equal branch.