NICANOR B. PAGKALINAWAN, SUPERVISING AGENT, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, EAST VISAYAN DISTRICT OFFICE, CEBU CITY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS P…

This decision deals with
the specific question of whether a court of first instance of one district in a
replevin proceeding may ignore a search warrant
issued by another court of first instance. 
In brief, this petition presents this situation:  Respondent Judge, the Hon. Amador E. Gomez, acting
on a complaint for replevin filed by the other
respondent Norberto L. Dayrit directed peti­tioner, Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the National Bureau of Investigation to turn over
to the Sheriff of Cebu city an automobile which was
seized under a search warrant issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the Hon. Guillermo Santos presiding, as a subject of the offense of theft or
as stolen property.  Did respondent Judge
act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?

What happened next after
such seizure in accordance with the search warrant issued on February
4, 1964, at Manila was set forth in the petition.  Thus: 
“That on February 7, 1964, respondent Norberto L. Dayrit
filed a complaint for Replevin in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. R-8284 and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Honorable Judge
Amador E. Gomez, against the herein petitioner, Nicanor
B. Pagkalinawan, Supervising Agent, National Bureau
of Invest­igation, Cebu City, [and two members of
the] Manila Police Department for the recovery of possession of the
aforementioned car alleging that it is wrongfully detained by the herein
petitioner * * *; that on February 8, 1964, the respondent Judge acting on said
complaint issued an order directing the Sheriff of Cebu
City or any proper officer of the court, to take the aforementioned car into
his custody and said order was implemented by the Clerk of Court by issuing on
the same date a writ of replevin; * * * that on same
date, February 8, 1964 the petitioner after said writ of replevin
was served on him manifested that he could not possibly comply with said order
to deliver the aforementioned car to the sheriff because he was holding the
same in ‘custodia legis‘
for the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II, the court that issued the
search warrant under which the said car was seized and held in custody; * * *
that on February 12, 1964, the respondent Judge, acting on the ‘urgent motion
to require defendant Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan,
Supervising Agent, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu
City, to explain why he persists in refusing to deliver the car in question to
the sheriff’, which motion was vigorously opposed during the hearing by the
petitioner, issued an order directing the petitioner * * * ‘to immediately
comply with the order of the court and to turn over to the sheriff the car in
question upon receipt of a copy of this order’, with the warning that,
otherwise, ‘this court visits on [him] the full harshness of its coercive
power’ and under this circumstance the petitioner on the same date, February
12, 1964, was compelled to part with the custody of the said car to the
Provincial Sheriff of Cebu who took over the
possession of the same and who in turn immediately gave it or turned it over to
respond­ent Norberto L. Dayrit; * * * that the
delivery of the car to the Provincial Sheriff who in turn delivered it to the
respondent Norberto L. Dayrit by virtue of the said
order of the respondent Judge, would place the petitioner in imminent danger of
being declared in Contempt of the Manila Court of First Instance that issued
the search warrant because he cannot now comply with the recent order of the
said court dated February 10, 1964 regarding the proper disposition of said
car; * * * that petitioner on February 14, 1964 filed an ‘urgent motion for
reconsideration of the order dated February 12, 1964 and setting aside the writ
of replevin dated February 8, 1964,’ but respondent
Judge after hearing on said motion on February 15, 1964, denied the same in its
order dated February 20, 1964; * * *.”^[1]

It was then alleged by petitioner that the aforesaid orders
issued by the respondent Judge compelling him to deliver such car to the
Sheriff so that it could be turned over to the other respondent, after it was
explained that it was being held in custodia legis for the Manila Court of First
Instance, having been properly seized in pursuance of a search warrant issued
by it, were made without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion; that said orders moreover would likewise “nullify the
purpose and defeat the force and validity of the search warrant issued by the
Court of First Instance, a competent court of equal category;” and
“would then cause confusion in the enforcement and implementation of
lawful orders issued by other courts thereby causing embarrassment in the
proper administration of justice; * * *.”^[2]

The prayer was for
respondent Judge being declared as having
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
thus proceeding in the replevin action and that
pending the final hearing and determination of this petition, an order
of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued directing the respondent Judge to
order the return of said car to petitioner, desisting and refraining until
further orders of this Court from acting on the matter.

On March
18, 1964, this Court
issued a resolution ordering
respondents to file an answer to the petition and likewise issued a preliminary
mandatory injunction without bond as prayed for.

In the answer of
respondent Dayrit, there was in effect an admission
of the facts as alleged by
petitioner.  Respond­ent Dayrit would however impugn the actuations of petitioner,
who, it was alleged “instead of protecting the rights of the citizens of
this country used the powers of his office in arrogating unto himself the
interpretation of the law which only the courts are vested thereof and the
alleged contempt charge which petitioner asserts under this parag­raph is not
only nugatory and illegal but entirely imaginary for the reason that the [search warrant]
mentioned in the [Petition] is based
on fraud and deceit * * *.”^[3] The special defenses appearing in the answer
further stressed not only the fact of the car that was seized under the search
warrant as different from that referred to in the case pending in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, but also the fact of respondent being the true and
lawful owner thereof.^[4] There was thus a denial of the allegations
that respondent Judge in issuing the orders complained of, acted in excess of
his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discre­tion, for the truth of the
matter, according to respondent, was that “the car in question is not
subject of a criminal case before a Court of First Instance of Manila, more specifically
before Hon. Judge Guillermo Santos,” who issued the search warrant, or in
any other court, respondent Dayrit further stating
that he was not an accused “in any case where said car is allegedly stolen property.  * *
*.”^[5]

More specifically in so far as the assertion of the jurisdiction
of respondent Judge on the suit for replevin
affecting the validity of the search warrant issued, it was alleged in the
answer “That respondent Dayrit denies the
allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the [petition] with respect to the
fact that the [orders] of co-respondent Judge Amador E. Gomez would nullity and
defeat the force and vali­dity of the [search warrant] for [its] issuance * * *
cannot prevent respondent Judge Amador E. Gomez to issue an order of replevin as provided
by Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court; * * *.”^[6]

Petitioner is entitled
to the remedy prayed for; the writ must be granted.  It would be to ignore a principle to which
this Court has been firmly committed if under the cir­cumstances disclosed,
respondent Judge would be sustained.  The
moment a court of first instance has been informed through the filing of an
appropriate pleading that a search
warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot, even if
the literal language of the Rules of Court^[7] yield a contrary impression which in
this case demonstrated the good faith of respondent Judge for acting as he did, require a sheriff or any
proper officer of the Court to take the pro­perty subject of the replevin action if theretofore it came into the custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant.  Only the court of first instance that issued
such a search warrant may order its release. 
Any other view would be
subversive of a doctrine that
has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure
stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that
may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to
interfere with each other’s lawful orders.

Only the other day, in Tuason & Co.
v. Hon. Guillermo E. Torres,^[8]
this Court reaffirmed such a principle, when speaking through Justice Bengzon, it held that only the particular branch of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City “can annul its own decision * * *.”
The opinion continues:  “It is
settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of
First Instance belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the
judgment.” As aptly stated, any other branch “even if it be in the
same judicial district” that would attempt to do so “either exceeds
its jurisdiction”,^[9] or
“acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, *
* *.”^[10] As set forth in the above Tuason decision: 
“In either case, certiorari and prohibition would be proper to
prevent the attempting branch of the court from proceeding to nullify a
final decision rendered by a co-equal
and co-ordinate branch.” In this case then, certiorari is likewise an
appropriate remedy when respondent Judge disregarded a search warrant issued by
another court of first instance.

In Cabigao v. del Rosario,^[11]
which was a petition to restrain respondent Judge from interfering with
execution of a judgment rendered by another court of first instance, this Court,
speaking through Justice Ostrand stated:  “Firstly, it is settled by an
overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
juris­diction having equal power to grant the relief sought by in­junction.”

In Philippine National Bank v. Javellana,^[12]
which was a petition for certiorari, seeking to set aside a writ of preliminary
injunction issued by respondent Judge enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from
proceeding with the sale of a property attached to satisfy a judgment by
another court of first instance, the above doctrine was reiterated, followed
with the affirmation that such “ruling in the Cabigao
case is decisive on the issue before us.”

While the instant
proceeding does not deal with the annulment of a judgment previously issued, the principle therein announced
calls for application here.  Otherwise a
court of first instance would be allowed to pass on the validity of a search warrant, issued by another
court of first instance.  This is to
preclude an undesirable situation from arising, one, which if, permitted, as above pointed out, would be fraught
with undesirable consequences as already indicated, for the bench, no less than
for the litigants.  To such an
eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction.

Moreover, while not authoritative, this case being one of first
impression, the doctrine announced in Molo v. Yatco,^[13]
which denied an original petition filed with this Court for mandamus is
persuasive.  There the petitioner
alleging that by virtue of a search warrant issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for an alleged violation of the
Usury Law, certain documents belonging to him were seized and thereafter kept
in the possession of the respond­ent Collector of Internal Revenue, sought
their return.  This Court did not oblige;
mandamus did not lie, as “the
one having the legal custody thereof is the Court of First Instance of Rizal which had ordered their seizure and which is the only
one authorized by law to return them to their owner.” It is worth noting
that while the then Justice Laurel dissented, his opinion being in effect that
the remedy should be granted, he admitted that “where property is seized
under color of judicial process and brought under the control of the court, [it was] placed beyond the reach of replevin or other independ­ent or plenary remedy, * *
*.”^[14]
Again, while the above ruling is not squarely on all fours, still the governing
principle does not seem to be in doubt. 
The remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant may be
sought in the Court of First Instance that issued it, not in the sala of another Judge, and as admitted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel, not
through replevin.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the
mandatory preliminary injunction issued made
permanent.  With costs against
respondent Dayrit.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro J., in the result.

^[1]
Pars. 3 to 8, Petition.

^[2] Pars. 9 to 11, Petition.

^[3] Par. 5, Answer.

^[4] Pars. 11, 17, Special Defenses, Answer.

^[5] Par. 7, Answer.

^[6] Par. 8, Answer.

^[7] Section 3 of Rule 60, formerly Section 3 of
Rule 62, requires a Judge of the Court of First Instance, upon the filing of an
affidavit that the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, that it is
wrongfully detained by defendant alleging that it has not been taken for a tax
assessment or fine pursuant to law
or seized in an execution or
attachment against the property of the plaintiff and a bond with him or with
his clerk, shall issue an order describing the personal property alleged to be
wrongfully detained and requiring the Sheriff or any proper officer of the
Court forthwith to take such property into his custody.

^[8] G.R. No. L-24717, Dec. 4, 1967.

^[9] Citing Cabigao v.
del Rosario (1922) 44 Phil. 182.

^[10] Citing Philippine National Bank v. Javellana, (1953) 92 Phil. 525.

^[11] 44 Phil. 182 (1922).

^[12] 92 Phil. 525 (1953).

^[13] 63 Phil. 644 (1936).

^[14] Ibid,
at p. 651.