G.R. No. 22456. September 27, 1967
FRANCISCO SALUNGA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., & MIGUEL NOEL; NATIONAL BREWERY & ALLIED INDUSTRIES LABOR UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (N…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by petitioner
Francisco Salunga from a resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations, sitting en banc, dismissing unfair labor
practice charges against the National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor
Union of the Philippines (PAFLU) – hereinafter referred to as the Union – John de Castillo, Cipriano
Cid, San Miguel Brewery, Inc. – hereinafter
referred to as the Company – and Miguel Noel.
Petitioner had, since
1948, been an employee of the Company, which, on October 2, 1959, entered with the Union, of which respondent John de Castillo is the
president, into a collective bargaining agreement, effective up to June 30,
1962. Section 3 thereof reads:
“The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those workers covered by this
agreement who either are members of the UNION
on the date of the signing of this agreement, or may join the UNION during the effectivity
of this agreement, that they shall not voluntarily resign from the UNION
earlier than thirty 30) days before the expiry date of this agreement as
provided in Article
XIII hereof; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any
employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as
herein-before stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or
non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or worker.”
(Exh. 4-A-Union.)
Petitioner was a member of the Union since 1953.
For reasons later to be stated, on August 18, 1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union, which accepted it on August
26, 1961, and
transmitted it to the Company on August 29, 1961, with a request for the immediate implementation
of said section 3. The Company having
informed him that his aforementioned resignation would result in the
termination of his employment, in view of said section, petition wrote to the Union, on August 31, 1961, a letter withdrawing or revoking his
resignation and advising the Union continue deducting hit monthly union
dues. He, moreover furnished a copy of communication to the Company. The latter, in turn, notified the Union of the receipt of said copy and that
“in view thereof, we shall not take any act on this case and shall
consider Mr. Francisco Salunga still a member of your
union and continue deducting his union dues.
On September 8, 1961, the Union told the Company that petitioner’s
membership could not be reinstated and insisted his separation from the
service, conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. One Company replied, on September 12, 1961,
stating:
“x x x We
asked Mr. Salunga if he realized that by resigning
from the Union he would in effect be forfeiting his
position in the company. When he
answered in the negative, we showed him a copy of our Collective Bargaining
Agreement and called his attention to Sec. 3, Art. 11 thereof. He then told us that he did not realize that
he would be losing his job if he were to resign from the Union. We did not at any time ask or urge him to withdraw his
resignation; neither are we now asking or insisting that you readmit him into
your membership. We thought that informing him of the consequences of his
resignation from, the Union, was the only humane thing to do under the circumstances.
“Nevertheless, if notwithstanding our foregoing clarification
you still consider him as having actually resigned from your organization, and
you insist that we dismiss him from the service in accordance with Sec. 3,
Article II of our agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so.” (Exh. L).
In a letter to the
Company, dated September 20, 1961, the Union reiterated its request for
implementation of suit section 3, for which reason, on September
22, 1961, the Company notified petitioner that, in view of said letter and the aforementioned section,
“we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause. You are, therefore, hereby notified of your
dismissal from the service effective as of the close of business hours, September
30, 1961.”
Meanwhile, petitioner had
sought the intervention of PAFLU’s National President, respondent Cipriano
Cid, to which the Union was affiliated, for a review of the latter’s
action. The PAFLU gave due course to petitioner’s request for review and asked the Company, on September 29, 1961, to defer his dismissal, for at least two (2) weeks, so
that its (PAFLU’s)
Executive Board could act on his
appeal. On October 6, 1961,
respondent Cid advised petitioner that the PAFLU had found no ground to review the action taken by the Union and that, on the expiration of the 15-day grace granted to him by the Company, the
decision thereof to terminate his services would take effect.
Thereupon, or on October
11, 1961, petitioner
notified the PAFLU that he was appealing to its
supreme authority – the PAFLU National Convention – and requested that
action on his case be deferred until such time as the
Convention shall have acted on his appeal. A
letter of the same date and
tenor sent, also, by the petitioner to the Union.
Furthermore, he asked the Company to maintain the status quo, in the meantime.
This notwithstanding, at
the close of the business hours, on
October 15, 1961, petitioner was discharged from the employment of the
Company, through its assistant-secretary and vice-president, herein
respondent Miguel Noel.
At petitioner’s behest, on or about December 7, 1961, a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial
Relations commenced, therefore, the present proceedings, for unfair labor
practice, against the Union, its president, respondent John de Castillo,
respondent Cipriano Cid, as PAFLU president, the
Company, and its aforementioned Vice-President, Miguel Noel. In due course, thereafter, the trial Judge
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which
reads:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
and Miguel Noel and National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of
the Philippines (PAFLU), John de Castillo, and Cipriano
Cid, are hereby declared guilty of unfair
labor practices as charged, and ordered to cease and desist from further
committing such unfair labor practice acts complained off; and as affirmative reliefs:
“(a) The National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union
of the Philippines (PAFLU), John de Castillo and Cipriano
Cid, their officers and agents, are hereby directed to readmit and to continue
the membership of Francisco Salunga in the membership rolls of the union after paying
all union dues, with all the rights and privileges being enjoyed by bonafide members;
“(b). The San Miguel Brewery, Inc., and Miguel Noel, their
officers and agents are hereby directed to immediately reinstate Francisco Salunga to his former or substantially equivalent position
with one-half back wages, without prejudice, however, to his seniority and/or
other rights and privileges; and
“(c) Respondents Union and Company, their respective officers
and agents, are likewise directed to post two copies of this decision in conspicuous places in their respective
offices or plants for a period of one month,
furnishing this Court with certificate of compliance after the expiration of
said period.”
On motion for
reconsideration of the respondents, this decision was reversed by the Court of
Industrial Relations sitting en banc – with two (2) judges
concurring in the result and the trial judge dissenting – which dismissed the
case. Hence, this appeal by the
petitioner.
The appeal is well taken,
for, although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had
accepted the resignation, the former had, soon later – upon learning that his
withdrawal from the Union would
result in his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision
above referred to – revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the Union
refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. The Union had not only acted arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to continue his
membership trial Judge found said refusal of the Union officers to be due to
his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by
them. As set forth in the decision of
the trial Judge:
“x x x
Prior to August, 1961, he had been criticizing and objecting to what he
believed were illegal or irregular disbursements of union funds, i.e., allowing
Florencio Tirad, a
union official, to receive six months advanced salaries when Tirad went to the United States, which objection he openly
manifested in a meeting of the board of directors and stewards, but instead of
receiving favorable response, he (Salunga) was
twitted and felt insulted by the laughter of those present after Mr. Torio of the Glass Factory remarked that he would be the
next man to be sent to America; second, granting Ricardo Garcia, union
secretary, two months advance salaries when
preparing for the bar examinations, which objection he broached to union
officer Efren Meneses;
third, the union’s additional monthly expense for the salary of a counsel when
the PAFLU, their mother union, is well staffed with a number of lawyers who could attend and handle their cases and
other legal matters, and to which mother union the NABAILUP has been paying a
monthly assessment of more than
P1,000.00; and fourth, giving salary to Charles Mitschek who was dismissed by the
company but denying the same privilege to other similarly situated
member-employees. Salunga
was later removed by the union from his position as steward without his
knowledge. It also appears that the
power of attorney executed in his favor by co-worker Alejandro Miranda for the
collection of Miranda’s indebtedness of P60.00 to him (the latter has certain
amount in possession of the Union) was not honored by the union.
xx xx xx
“The record is clear
that feeling dejected by the inaction of the union officials on his grievances and objections to what he
believed were illegal disbursements of union funds, coupled with the
fact that he was later removed from his position as a union steward without his
knowledge, as well as the fact that the union did not honor the power of
attorney executed in his favor by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the
collection of Miranda’s indebtedness of
P60.00 to him, he submitted his
letter of resignation from the
union on August 18, 1961. It mutt be
stated here that no evidence was adduced by the respondent union to
overcome complainant’s testimonies about his objections to the disbursements of
union funds but only tried to elicit from him on cross examination, that the funds
of the union are only disbursed upon authority of the Executive Board of the union. x x x.”
It should be noted that the Court of Industrial Relations en
banc did not reverse these findings of fact or even question the
accuracy thereof. What is more, the
officers of the Union have, in effect, confirmed the fact that their refusal to allow the
withdrawal of petitioner’s resignation
had been due to his aforementioned
criticisms. lndeed said officers tried to justify themselves by characterizing said
criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true,
not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of its
officers, and, indirectly, the
officers themselves, but, also, because, the constitution and by-laws of the
Union explicitly recognize the
right of its members to give their views on “all
transactions made by the Union.” As a consequence, the resolution appealed
from cannot be affirmed without, in effect, nullifying said right which, independently of the constitution and
by-laws of the Union, is part and parcel of the freedom of speech
guaranteed in the Constitution of our Republic, as a
condition sine qua non to the sound growth and development of labor organizations and democratic
institutions.
Although, generally, a
state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given
individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter if privilege,[1] the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement.[2] The reason is that
“x x x The
closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements of trade unions
to become affected with the public interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership
clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the public interest.”1
Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not
entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership,
and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or
a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus
refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.2 Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to
admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more
reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee
involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of
union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith
withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at
least, invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time,
and can not arbitrarily be denied readmission.
We cannot agree, however, with the finding of the trial Judge to
the effect that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practice. The Company was reluctant – if not
unwillingly to discharge the petitioner.
When the Union first informed the Company of
petitioner’s resignation and urged implementation of section 3 of the bargaining contract, the Company advised petitioner of the
provisions thereof, thereby intimating
that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the Company notified the Union
that it (the Company) would not take any action on the case and would
consider the petitioner “still a member” of the Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioner’s discharge, the Company
still demurred and explained it was not taking sides and that its stand was
prompted merely by “humane”
considerations, springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the
Union without realizing its effect upon his
employment. And, as the Union
reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it had no other alternative but to
terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with
“regret”.
Under these circumstances, the Company was not “unfair”
to the petitioner. On the contrary, it did not merely
show a commendable understanding of
and sympathy for his plight. It even
tried to help him, although to such extent
only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from interfering
in purely internal affairs of the Union. At the same time, the Company could not
safely inquire into the motives
of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to withdraw his
resignation. Inasmuch as the true
motives were not manifest, without such inquiry, and petitioner had concededly
tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature of the
decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the
company in regarding said decision unreasonable. Upon the other hand, the Company can not be
blamed for assuming the contrary, for petitioner had appealed to the National
Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that
the PAFLU had inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives
of the Union Officers.
In finding, this notwithstanding, that the Company is guilty of
unfair labor practice, the trial Judge seemed to have been unduly influenced by
the fact that the former had dismissed
the petitioner despite his announced intention to Appeal from the decision of
the Union and that of the Officers of the PAFLU to its “supreme
authority”, namely, the PAFLU’s “National
Convention”. In other words, said
Judge felt that the Company should have waited for the action of the national convention before issuing the
notice of dismissal.
There is no evidence, however, that petitioner had really brought this matter to said
“Convention”. Much less in
there any proof that the latter had sustained him and reversed the PAFLU
officers and the Union. Thus, the record does not show that
petitioner was prejudiced by the Company’s failure to maintain the status quo, after the
Union had been sustained by said officers. In fact, petitioner
did not even try to establish that he had submitted to the Company – as he has not introduced in the lower court – satisfactory proof that an appeal had really been taken by him to the aforementioned Convention. In short, it was error to hold the Company
guilty of unfair labor practice.
Just the same, having
been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of
the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the Union and to his
former or substantially equivalent position in the Company, without prejudice
to his seniority and/or right and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay
shall be borne exclusively by the Union.
In the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, the lower court
may, however, take such measures as it may deem best, including the power to
authorize the Company to make deductions, for petitioner’s benefit, from the
sums due to the Union, by way of check off or otherwise, with a view to
executing this decision, and, at the same time, effectuating the purposes of the
Industrial Peace Act.
With this modification, the
aforementioned decision of the trial Judge is hereby affirmed in all other respects, and the appealed resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc is reversed, with costs against respondents, except the
Company.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., on leave.
[1]
4 Am. Jur. 462; 31 Am. Jur. 426.
[2]
31 Am. Jur. 432.
1 Underscoring ours. Labor Law Cases and Materials, Archibal Cox, pp. 1009-1011. See,
also, Williams v. international
Brotherhood of Boiler-Makers, 27 Cal.
2d 586, 165 P 2d 903; James v. Marineship
Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P 2d
329.
2 See 31 Am. Jur.
432.