G.R. No. L-20303. September 27, 1967
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK (NOW REPUBLIC BANK), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROSENDO T. RESUELLO, BENJAMIN JARA, FLORENCIO ALLASAS, DOMINGO B. JOLA, DIOSDADO S. MEN…
CASTRO, J.:
The vital issue in this case is whether the dismissal of the
eight (8) respondent employees by the petitioner Republic Bank (hereinafter
referred to as the Bank) constituted an unfair labor practice within the
meaning ands intendment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875). The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) found
it did and its decision is now on appeal before us. The Bank maintains that the discharge was for
cause.
The Bank had in its employ the respondents Rosendo
T. Resuello, Benjamin Jara,
Florencio Allasas, Domingo
B. Jola, Diosdado S. Mendiola, Teodoro de la Cruz, Narciso Macaraeg and Mauro A. Rovillos. On July 12,
1958 it discharged Jola and a few days after (July
18, 1958), the rest of respondents, for having written and published “a
patently ribelous letter * * * tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and employees of this bank,
but also of your employer, the bank itself.”
The letter referred to was a letter–charge which the respondents
had written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees. The letter, dated July 9, 1958 is hereunder
reproduced in full:
“Mr.
Ramon Racelis
President, Republic Savings Bank
M a n i l a
“Dear Mr. President:
“We, the undersigned, on behalf of all our members and
employees of the Republic Savings Bank, who have in our hearts only the most
honest and sincere motive to conserve and protect the interest of the
institution and its 200,000 depositors, do hereby, demand the much needed
resignation of His Excellency, Mr. Ramon Racelis as
President and Member of the Board of Directors of the Bank.
“Mr. President, you have already, in so many occasions, placed the
Bank on the verge of danger, that now we deem it right and justifiable for you
to leave this Bank and let other more capable presidents continue the work you
have not well accomplished.
“In the above instance, we are presenting charges which in our
humble contention properly justifies incapacity on your part to continue and
assume the position as top executive of the huge institution:
“(1) That you Mr. President, have tolerated
and practiced immorality in this Bank.
We have been expecting you to do something about this malpractice which
is very disgraceful and affects the morale of the hundreds of your employees. But so far, Mr. President, you have just let
this thing passed through. As a matter
of fact, you have even promoted these women like Misses Pacita
Mato and Edita Castro. These
women are of questionable characters, Mr. President, and should have had no place in the Bank
as managers or even as mere employees.
We know Mr. President, because it is an open secret in the Bank, that
you have illicit relations with one of them – Miss Edita
Castro. As top officer and as father of
the employees of the Bank, you have shown this bad example to your
employees. Mr. President, we are really
ashamed of you.
“(2) That you have
allowed the practice of nepotism in this Bank. You have employed relatives of yours like Honorio Ravida; Bienvenido Ravida; Antonio Racelis; Jesus Antonio; and Argentina Racelis. Not only that Mr. President. You have also given those nieces and nephews
of yours good positions at the expense of the more capable employees. Mr. President, if we have to mention all of
them, one page will not be enough.
“(3) With regards
to promotion, you have given more preferences to your close relatives. When the
Banks advocated the sending of pensionados to States,
you have only limited your choice among your nieces, nephews, and quirida, namely Miss Argentina Racelis,
Mr. Jesus Antonio, Miss Edita Castro, and her
brother-in-law, Mr. Pedro Garcia, Jr. In
doing this, Mr. President, you have only lowered the reputation and standing of
the Republic Savings Bank. There is really
no sense in sending high school and B.S.E. graduates to States to study
advanced banking. Because of this silly
decision, it took one pensionado six months and cost
the Bank a total of P10,000.00 just to study Christmas savings. That subject is very simple; one need not go
to States to study savings; that you know full well, Mr. President. The reason why you sent Miss Castro to States
was because you were also there. Are we
not right?
“(4) That you Mr.
President, tolerated and still tolerating grave dishonesty in this Bank as evidenced
by the following irregularities and anomalies:
“(a) In one of
our branches, around P200,000.00 was mulcted and embezzled by a certain Maximo Donado by doctoring the
ledgers and records of that particular office. To the present, the amount is
still increasing and some more are being dug up from the records everyday ever
since its discovery in February 1957. In
this case you dismissed Mr. M. Dorado, immediately. But this was all that you did. If you have toe go back to the history of the
case, you will find out that your beloved niece and nephews are also involved
having been managers of that particular office. Another nephew, the Vice
President-Operations, then Vice President Personnel, was also involved for
valid reasons that he did not even shift this particular employee to other
branches or departments since the beginning when it has been the policy of the
Bank to reshuffle its personnel. If you
want to know why your good nephew did not transfer this employee, we will tell
you. ‘Your good nephew has eaten too many baskets of delicious alimango.’ Mr. President, if there is someone to be blamed
in this particular case, it is your good nephews and nieces for their gross
negligence.
“(b) Aside
from the one mentioned above, we have also Mr. Rodolfo Francisco, who in April
1955, maliciously withdraw (sic) P970.00 in two withdrawal slips from the
account of one depositor in one of our provincial offices, inserting his name
as co-depositor in the savings account ledger.
“(c) In January
1958 Mr. Jose de los Santos expended an unapproved
representation expense in the amount of P300.00 in one of our provincial
offices.
“(d) Mr. Federico
A. Dabu, the ex-cashier and now Personnel Manager,
incurred a shortage in the amount of P1,240.00 in the course of the audit on
August 3, 1954.
“(e) Mr. Jose S.
Guevara Vice-President on Personnel have (sic) been accepting bribe
moneys. One of these amounts to
P4,000.00, which was delivered by a messenger sometime during the last quarter
of 1957.
“Mr. President, the anomalies are only a partial list of the
irregularities which so far you have not acted upon. This type of people should have been fired
out from the Bank; yet, on the contrary, you promoted them to higher and
responsible positions, thus, resulting in the demoralization of the more
capable employees.
“Mr. President, we hope that you have still a littler sense of
decency and propriety left. So, for goodsake and for the welfare of the Bank, DO RESIGNS NOW as
President and as Member of the Board of Directors of the Republic Savings Bank.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd.) Rosendo T. Resuello
President, RSB Supervisors’ Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Benjamin Jara
Vice-President RSB Supervisors’ Unions (FFW)
(Sgd.) Florencio Allasas
Treasurer, RS Supervisors’ Union, FFW)
(Sgd.)
Domingo B. Jala
Chairman, Executive Committee, RSB
Employees Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Diosdado S. Mendiola
Vice-President, RSB Employees Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Teodoro de la Cruz
Member,
Executive Committee, RSB Employees’ Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Angelino Quiambao
President, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Narciso Macaraeg
Vice-President,
RSB Security Guard Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Alfredo Bautista
Treasurer, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Pacifico A. Argao
PRO, RSB Employees Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Toribio B. Garcia
Secretary, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW)
(Sgd.) Mauro A. Rovillos
Member, Executive Committee, RSB
Supervisors’ Union (FFW)”
Copies of this letter were admittedly given to the chairman of
the board of directors of the Bank, and the Governor of Central Bank.
At the instance of the respondents, prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR on September 15 1958,
alleging that, the Bank’s conduct violated section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial
Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to
dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee
for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony
under this Act”
The Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending
that respondents were discharged not for union activities but for having
written and published a libelous letter against the bank president. The court denied the motion on the basis of
its decision in another case[1]
in which it ruled that section 4(a) (5) applies to cases in which an employee
is dismissed or discriminated against for having filed “any charges
against his employer.” Whereupon the case was heard.
In 1960, however, this Court overruled the decision of the CIR in
the Royal Interocean case and held that
the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee,
must be related to his right to self-organizations in order to give rise to
unfair labor practice on the part off the employer,” because “under
subsection 5 of section 4(a) the employee’s (1) having filed charges or (2)
having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by
‘under this Act’ appearing after the last item.”[2]
The Bank therefore renewed its motion to dismiss, but the court held the motion
in abeyance and proceeded with the hearing.
On July 4, 1962 the court rendered a decision finding the Bank
guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering it to reinstate the respondents,
with full back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. This decision was affirmed by the court en
banc on August 9, 1962.
Relying upon Royal Interocean
Lines v. CIR[3]
and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter
Paul v. CIR,[4]
the Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the
discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with their union activities as
the letter in fact admitted at the lettering that the writing of the
letter-charge was not a “union action” but merely their
“individual” act.
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admissions of the
respondents. Assuming that the latter
acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge, trey
were nonetheless protected for they were engaged it a concerted activity, in
the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection,[5]
interference width whim constitutes an unfair labor practice under section
4(a)(1). This is the view of some
members of this Court. For, as has been
aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act.
It is not necessary that union acclivity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated.[6]
Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism,
favoritism and other management practices, they were acting within an area
marked out by the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Even the reference to immorality was not irrelevant
as it was made to support the respondents’ other charge that the bank president
had failed to provide wholesome working conditions, let alone a good moral
example, for the employees by practicing discrimination and favoritism in the
appointment and promotion of certain employees on the basis of illicit
relations or blood relationship with them.
In many respects, the case at bar is similar to National Labor
Relations Board v. Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurances Co.[7] The
issue in that case was whether an insurance company was guilty of an unfair
labor practice in interfering with this right of concerted activity by
discharging two agents employed in a branch office. The cashier of that office had resigned. The
ten agents employed there held a meeting and agreed to join in a letter to the
home office objecting to the transfer to their branch office of a cashier from
another branch office to fill the position.
They discussed also the question whether to recommend the promotion of
the assistant cashier of their office as the proper alternative. They then chose one of their member to
compose a draft of the letter and submit it to them further discussion,
approval and signature. The agent
selected to write the letter and another were discharged for their activities
in this respect as being, so their notices stated completely unpleasant and far
beyond the periphery of their responsibility.
In holding the company liable for unfair labor practice, the Circuit
Court of Appeals said:
“A proper construction is that the
employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, or
collective bargaining be contemplated.
Here Davis and Johnson and other salesmen were properly concerned with
the identity and capability of the new cashier.
Conceding they had no authority to appoint a new cashier or even
recommend anyone for the appointment, they had a legitimate interest in acting
concertedly in making known their views to management without being discharged
for that interest. The moderate conduct
of Davis and Johnson and the others bore a reasonable relation to conditions of
their employment. It was therefore an
unfair labor practice for respondent to interfere with the exercise of the
right of Davis and Johnson and the other salesmen to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid or protection.”
Other members of this Court agree with the SIR that the Blanks
conduct violated section 4(a)(5) which makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to dismiss an employee for having filed charges under the Act.
Some other members of this Court believe, without necessarily
expressing approval of the way the respondents expressed their grievances, that
what the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance
committee. This was its duty, failing
which it committed an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(6). For collective bargaining does not end with
the execution of an agreement. It is a
continuous process. The duty to bargain
imposes on the parties during the term of their agreement the mutual obligation
“to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and to good faith * * * for
the purpose off adjusting any grievances or question arising under such
agreement[8]
and a violation of this obligation is, by section 4(a)(6) and (b)(3) an unfair
labor practice.[9]
As Professors Cox and Dunlop point out:
“Collective bargaining * * * formally
takes the fort of negotiations when major conditions of employment to be
written into an agreement are under consideration and of grievance committee
meetings and arbitration when questions arising in the administration of an
agreement are at stake.”[10]
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the
respondents to air their grievances.
Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an open mind and a sincere
desire to negotiate over grievance.[11]
The grievance committee,
created in the collective bargaining agreements would have been an appropriate
forum for such negotiation. Indeed, the
grievance procedure is a part of the contiguous process of collective
bargaining.[12]
It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly between labor and management
as a means of maintaining industries peace.
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline
for what it calls the respondents’ libel in giving undue publicity to their
letter-charge. To be sure, the right of
organization of employees is not unlimited,[13]
as the right of employer to discharge for cause[14]
is undenied.
The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right
of employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering the countervailing right of self-organization.[15]
But the difficulty arises in determining whether in fact the discharges made
because of such a separable cause or because of some other activities engaged
in by employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.[16]
It is for the CIR, in the first instance, to make the determination,
“to weigh the employer’s expressed motive in determining the effect on
the employees of management’s otherwise equivocal act.”[17]
For the Act does not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and
unmistakable language each incident which constitutes an unfair labor
practice. Rather, it leaves to the court
the work of applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of
infinite combinations of event, which may be charged as violative
of its terms.[18]
As the Circuit Court of Appeals puts it:
“Determining the legality of a
dismissal necessarily involves an appraisal of the employer’s motives. In these cases motivations are seldom
expressly avowed, and avowals are not always candid. There thus must be a
measure of reliance on the administrative agency knowledgeable in
labor-management relations and on the Trial Examiner who receives the evidence
firsthand and is therefore in a unique position to determine the credibility of
the witnesses. Where Examiner and Board
are in agreement there is an increased presumption in favor of their
resolution of the issue.”[19]
What we have just essayed underscores at once the difference
between Royal Interocean and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa on the one hand and this case on the
other. In Royal Interocean, the employee’s letter to the home
office, for writing which she was dismissed, complained of the local manager’s
“inconsiderate and untactful attitude”[20]—
a grievance which, the court found “had nothing to do with or did not
arise from her union activities.” Nor did the court find evidence of
discriminatory discharge in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa as the letter,
which the employee wrote to the mother company in violation of the local
company’s rule, denounced “wastage of company funds.” In contrast,
the express finding of the court in this case was that the dismissal of the
respondents was made on account of the letter they had written, in which they
demanded the resignation of the bank president for a number of reason touching
labor-management relations — reasons which not even the Bank’s judgment that
the respondents had committed libel could excuse it for making summary
discharges[21]
in disregard of its duty to bargain collectively.
In final sum and substance, this court is in unanimity that the
Bank’s conduct, identified as an interference with the employee right of
self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of July 4,1962 and resolution of
August 9,1962 of the Court of Industrial Relations are affirmed, at
petitioner’s cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Angeles JJ., concur.
Bengzon,
J., no part.
Fernando, J., separate opinion.
[1]
Mariano v. Royal
Interocean
Lines, Case 527-ULP
[2] Royal
Interocean
Lines v. CIR, G.R. No. L-11745, Oct. 31, 1960.
[3]
Note 2, supra.
[4] G.R.
No. L-10130, Sept. 30, 1957.
[5]Section
3 of the Industrial Peace Act provides: “Employees’ Right to
Self–Organization. Employees shall have the rights
self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organization of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of
their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may form separate organization of their own.”
[6] Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 416 (1949).
[7]
167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948).
[8]
Industrial Peace Act, sec 13.
[9]
NLRB v. Highland Shoe, Inc., 119 F.2d
218 (1st Cir. 1941 NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 P.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941).
[10] The
Duty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1105 (1950).
[11] Cf.
id. at 1110.
[12]
United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); accord, United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
[13]
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945).
[14] E.g ., Philippine Educ.
Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, G.R. No. L-13773, April
29, 1960.
[15]
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941).
[16]
NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW 346 U.S.
464 (1953).
[17]
NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S.
226 (1949).
[18]
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra
note 13.
[19]
NLRB v. M & B Headwear Co., 349 F.2d
170 (4th Cir. 1965
[20]
See second Royal Interocean case, G.R.
No. L-12429, Feb. 27, 1961.
[21]
“Considering the actualities of the collective bargaining and grievance
procedures, we think the employer must realize that far-fetched and overstated
claims, easily dissuadable, are often made initially by one side in a labor
dispute (especially when it is inexperienced in labor relations). Such claims
may well evaporate on discussion and negotiation, and never become an integral
part of the union’s real purposes. We
think that the employer cannot seize upon this kind of claim — made by
ignorant workers in their initial demands — in order to justify retaliatory
measures against them. He must make some
effort to find out if the employees mean in fact to pursue these claims to
stick to demands which are not protected by sec. 7. Summary discharge seems especially premature
here.” NLRB v. Electronics Equip. Co., 194
F.2d 650 (2nd Cir. 1952).
Cf. Abaya
v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-25641, Dec. 17, 1966.