LY GIOK HA ALIAS WY GIOK HA, ET AL., PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. EMILIO L. GALANG, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeal by the respondent, Immigration Commissioner, from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila (Hon. Juan O.
Reyes, presiding), rendered in Civil Case No. 29318 thereof, holding
that petitioner, a woman citizen of the Republic of the China, is
entitled to admission as a naturalized Filipino citizen after her
marriage to one Restituto Lucasta, a citizen of this Republic.

The present case is, in fact, a sequel to a previous appeal to this
Court (G. R. No. L-10760), decided on May 17, 1960, wherein it was
decided to remand the case to the court of origin, for the reason that—

“neither in the administrative proceedings nor in
the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue
whether Ly Giok Ha may ‘be lawfully naturalized’^[1]
and * * * in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein
should be given an oppo rtunity to introduce evidence, if they have any,
on said issue.” (Decision, L-10760, p. 7).

The following statement of facts in the appellant Commissioner’s brief is accepted by the appellee as substantially correct:

“From the evidence submitted by the petitioners at
the rehearing of this case on October 15, 1962, it appears that Ly Giok
Ha arrived in the Philippines as a temporary visitor on May 14, 1955
(pp. 11, 27, t.s.n., Octo. 15, 1962); that on March 8, 1956, she
married Restituto Lacasta, a Filipino Citizen with whom she begot three
minor children (p. 4, t.s.n., id.; Annex “C”, p. 9, rec.); that she is
not opposed to organized government and is not affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government (p. 8, t.s.n., id.); that she does not defend or
teach the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of man’s ideas (p. 8,
t.s.n., id.); that she is not a polygamist or a believer in the
practice of polygamy (p. 8, id.); that she has never been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude (id); that she is not suffering
from any incurable contagious disease or mental illness (id); and that
she mingles socially with the Filipinos and embraces their customs,
traditions and ideas (p. 10, t.s.n., id.).

On
cross-examination, she failed to establish that: (1) she has been
residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least ten
(10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id); (2) she has a lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n. id.); and (3) she can
speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id).

After the rehearing, the lower
court rendered a decision on December 6, 1962, holding that petitioner
Ly Giok Ha alias Wy Giok Ha, is not entitled to become a Filipino
citizen by reason of marriage to Restituto Lacasta, a Filipino, because
she does not possess all the qualifications required by law of an
applicant for naturalization (p. 181, rec.).

On January 15,
1963, petitioner Ly Giok Ha filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision rendered by the lower court on December 6, 1962 (p. 185,
rec.), which motion was favorably acted upon and accordingly, the lower
court modified its decision of December 6, 1962, and declared that the
herein petitioner Ly Giok Ha, has acquired Philippine citizenship by
reason of her marriage to a Filipino (pp. 195, 201, record). From this
decision the Government has appealed to this Honorable Court (notice of
appeal, p. 203).”

The case before the Court involves the interpretation of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, providing that:

“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words
emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization law requires that
an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the
qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being
disqualified under any of the eight (“a” to “h”) subheadings of section
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by
marriage , both the appellee and the court below (in its second
decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the
woman be not disqualified under section 4.

At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin
(1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively
settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et
al. vs. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, December 23, 1959, to the effect
that:

“The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does
not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She
must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino
citizen by naturalization.”

Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has
firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman
married to a citizen should be one who “might herself be lawfully naturalized“,
means not only a woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in
section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 of C. A. 473(San Tuan vs. Galang, L-18775, Nov.
30, 1963; Sun Pek Young vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, Dec.
27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy vs. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria vs.
Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee vs. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965; Brito vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, June
30, 1965).

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications
prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4,are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a
Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be
that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the
policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only—

“(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude”,

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses,
not previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby
disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a
person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of
section 2 that an applicant for citizenship “must be of good moral
character”.

Similarly, the citizen’s wife might be a convinced believer in
racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the
right to vote exclusively by certain “herrenvolk”, and thus disbelieve
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would
not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not “opposed to
organized government”, nor affiliated to groups “upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments”, nor “defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas”. Et sic
de caeteris.

The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking
into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in
the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.

As to the argument that the phrase “might herself be lawfully
naturalized” was derived from the U. S. Revised Statutes (section 1994)
and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given
to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lo San
Tuang vs. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee vs.
Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965. In the latter case, this Court ruled:

“This Court, however, believes that such reason has
ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions
have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No.
3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress
chose to retain the said provision—that to be deemed a Philippine
citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one “who might herself be
lawfully naturalized,”—the reference is no longer to the class or
race to which the Woman belongs, for class or race has become
immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for
naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman “might herself be lawfully
naturalized” would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms
of statutory construction.

The rule laid down by this Court
in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line
with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who
are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on
the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the
Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.”

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the petitioner-appellee
Ly Giok Ha declared not entitled to claim Filipino citizenship by her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. Costs against appellees.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.