HONDA GIKEN KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA, ET AL. PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking judgment declaring
that the respondent judges (or either of them) have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of Civil Case No. Q-7864, and restraining them
permanently from enforcing the orders issued therein on March 23 and
April 7, both of the year 1964.

It appears that the petitioner, hereinafter referred to as Honda, is
the manufacturer of the Honda motorcycles and the owner, among others,
of the trademarks “HONDA”, “HM” and “HM with wings” used in the
manufacture and sale of said Honda motorcycles, and that said
trademarks have for many years been duly registered in Japan and other
countries.

Since the year 1959, respondent Alfred Hahn had been importing into
the Philippines the said Honda motorcycles bearing the trademarks just
mentioned. In this connection, Hahn’s answer to the petition under
consideration, while denying that he was a mere importer of the Honda
motorcycles, and alleging that since 1956 he had been classified and
licensed as producer and not a mere importer of motorcycles, admits
that Hahn had received authority from Honda “to introduce and create a
market for Honda motorcycles” in the Philippines. It appears, however,
that on December 13, 1962, Hahn filed with the Philippines Patent
Office a verified petition seeking the registration in his name
of the trademark “HM HONDA”, alleging under oath therein that “he
believes himself to be the lawful owner” of said trademark and that “no
other person, partnership, corporation or association, to the best of
his knowledge and belief, has the right to use said trademark in the
Philippines, either in the identical form or in such mere resemblance
thereto as might be calculated to deceive”.

Honda opposed said application alleging, inter alia, that it was
manufacturing and selling and since long prior to January 1955 had
manufactured and sold in the Philippines and elsewhere motorcycles
under the trademarks already mentioned before; that it had never
abandoned and, in fact, was still using said trademarks as trademarks
in commerce with the Philippines and elsewhere.

Respondent Hahn’s reply to the opposition contains no clear denial
of the facts alleged therein nor did it raise any question whatsoever
regarding the personality of the oppositor to appear before the Patent
Office.

The application for registration was set for hearing by the Patent
Office before petitioner Teofilo P. Velasco, one of its Hearing
Officers, on January 20, 1964, but the hearing was postponed to
February 6 of the same year on which date Honda presented its evidence.
The hearing was continued to February 12, 1964 to give Hahn’s counsel a
chance to examine the various documents presented by Honda. On that
date said counsel registered his opposition to the admission of some of
the exhibits on purely technical grounds, but all of them were admitted
by the Hearing Officer. Thereupon, counsel for Hahn for the first time
questioned the personality of Honda to appear before the Patent Office
and asked orally that its opposition be dismissed. After extensive
argument the oral motion to dismiss was denied.

On February 14, 1964, however, Hahn filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging therein that Honda’s capacity to appear before
the Patent Office was a prejudicial question and that since it is not
licensed to do business in the Philippines, the Patent Office could not
be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of said
oppositor. This motion notwithstanding, the Hearing Officer set
February 26, 1964 for the reception of Hahn’s evidence, but on thatate,
his counsel refused to present any evidence until his motion for
reconsideration had been resolved by the Director of Patents. In view
of this incident, on March 2, 1964 petitioner Director of Patents
issued the following order:

“As prayed for in his ‘Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Issuance of Formal Order or Resolution’ filed on February 13, 1964, the
Respondent-Applicant, through his counsel, is
hereby granted a period of TEN (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
order within which to submit the necessary authorities and arguments in
further support of his motion to dismiss the opposition. Copy of
the said authorities and arguments should be served by
Respondent-Applicant on counsel for the Opposer who, within a period of
TEN (10) days from receipt thereof, should file its written opposition
and supporting authorities. Thereafter, the motion to dismiss shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.

“IT IS SO ORDERED.”

However, instead of complying with the above order, Hahn commenced
Civil Case No. Q-7864 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
IX, Q.C., which was a petition for certiorari against all the herein
petitioners for the annulment of the order of the Patent Office denying
his motion to dismiss Honda’s opposition, mainly on the ground that, in
accordance with Sections 68 and 69 of Act 1459, as amended, and the
pertinent provisions of Act 3883, as amended, registration with the
Bureau of Commerce and a license from the Securities and Exchange
Commission is sine qua non to have capacity to become a party
“applicant or oppositor” to an inter partes proceeding in the
Philippines Patent Office. On March 7, 1964, the respondent Judge
Lourdes P. San Diego issued an order requiring the parties to maintain
the status quo pending resolution of the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was set for hearing on March 21 of the
same year.

On March 11, 1964, Honda appeared in Civil Case No. Q-7864 and
opposed the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari on
the ground firstly, that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief against the Philippine Patent
Office and secondly, on the ground that the petition did not allege
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the therein
respondents.

On March 20 of the same year, the Director of Patents and the other
respondents in said case also filed a motion to dismiss the petition
for certiorari together with an opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon similar grounds.

On March 23, 1964, the respondent judge Lourdes P. San Diego,
notwithstanding the oppositions and motions to dismiss referred to
above, issued an order granting the petition for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and pursuant thereto, on April 2, 1964, the
other respondent judge Damaso S. Tengco, then acting as vacation judge
presiding over Branch IX, issued the corresponding writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the Director of Patents and Hearing Officers
Teofilo P. Velasco ana Amando Marquez “from extending further
recognition to the capacity of respondents Honda and Daihatsu and/or
compelling petitioner to enter into a trial on the merits with said
respondents foreign corporation and/or accepting and giving due course
to any opposition filed by unlicensed and unregistered foreign
corporation, pending the final determination of this petition”.

Thereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was
filed for the annulment of the orders of March 23 and April 2, both of
the year 1964, issued by the respondent judges upon the ground that in
issuing them they acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.

Upon the facts set forth above, the petition under consideration
must be granted because the respondent judges—the one as permanent
presiding judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and the other as vacation judge presiding over said court—had no
jurisdiction to issue the orders complained of.

The rule is well settled—so well settled indeed that it requires
no citation of authorities to support it—that a writ of injunction or
of prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a court only by
another court superior in rank to the former.

The law in this jurisdiction vests upon Us the authority to review
final orders and decisions of the Public Service Commission. In Iloilo
Commercial etc. vs. Public Service Commission (56 Phil. 28), in denying
jurisdiction to the trial court to issue injunctive relief against the
Public Service Commission, We held:

“Any order made by the Commission may be reviewed on
the application of any person or public service affected thereby, by
certiorari in appropriate cases or by petition, to the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court is given jurisdiction to review any order of the
Commission and to modify or set it aside (Sec. 35). x x x In the
absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to the Court of First
Instance to grant injunctive relief against orders of the Public
Service Commission, it would appear that no court, other than the
Supreme Court, possesses such jurisdiction.”

On the other hand, under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court and
Section 33 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, appeals from orders and
decisions of the Director of the Patent Office must likewise be taken
to Us. It is, therefore, undeniable that the Philippines Patent Office
and the Public Service Commission are similarly situated and that both
are, to say the least, of the same rank or category as Courts of First
Instance. Consequently, no one of the latter has jurisdiction to issue
a writ of injunction against them.

Wherefore, the writs prayed for are granted and the
orders complained of are hereby set aside, with costs against the
respondents, except the respondent judges.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.