NARCISO D. SALCEDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUAN R. LIWAG, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition seeking to prohibit respondents from carrying out
their order disauthorizing petitioner from prosecuting three criminal
cases filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Jolo, province of
Sulu, against Lt. Romeo M. Reciña, et al., all members of the
Philippine Constabulary stationed in said province, and praying that,
pending determination of this case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued against respondents. This Court granted the writ prayed for.

The facts as may be gathered from the petition are: On October 10,
1961, petitioner, in his capacity as 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Sulu, investigated an incident involving Sgt. Andres A. Lopez of the
Philippine Constabulary who was allegedly arrested while performing
guard duty and in the process was handcuffed and manhandled to
unconsciousness. Having found enough merit to warrant prosecution,
petitioner, with the approval of his chief, Fiscal Martin A. Paulete,
filed on November 29, 1961 before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Jolo, province of Sulu, three informations against Lt. Reciña, et al.,
to wit: one for assault upon an agent or a person in authority, another
for less serious physical injuries, and the third for arbitrary
detention.

On September 14, 1962, the first time the cases were called for
trial, the Justice of the Peace Court, over the objection of
petitioner, granted as many postponements as the accused had desired,
contrary to our Rules of Court, as follows: the first postponement was
to October 22 to 24, 1962; then to November 26, 1962; and many other
postponements that were granted later on.

On October 2, 1962, accused Reciña wrote a letter to Chief
Prosecutor Agapito Conchu requesting that petitioner be replaced by
another fiscal considering the over enthusiasm and unusual interest he
has taken in the prosecution of the cases against him. Acceding to the
request, Chief Prosecutor Conchu wired 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Jose L. Coscolluela, Jr. instructing him to take over the cases handled
by petitioner because the latter was needed in Manila. Obligingly
Fiscal Coscolluela tried to comply with the instruction but failed so
he wired Chief Prosecutor Conchu informing him that petitioner refused
to yield the prosecution of the cases until he is legally disqualified
by the court. On November 12, 1962, petitioner received another
telegram from Secretary Liwag again instructing him to turn over the
cases to Fiscal Coscolluela. This time petitioner sent a radio message
to Secretary Liwag explaining his stand on the matter. He stated that
there is sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution of Reciña and since
the motive behind his disqualification is to have the case quashed he
requested that the order be recalled. He added that if the same would
be pressed he will take up the matter with the Supreme Court.

On February 5, 1963, after the accused had secured numerous
postponements of the trial which petitioner considers unwarranted
because the prosecution was at all times prepared and ready to present
its evidence, petitioner was required by Fiscal Paulete to turn over
the cases once more to Fiscal Coscolluela in order that the latter may
handle the same, but considering such request as an undue interference
with the performance of his official duty since he is not disqualified
by law to act thereon, he declined the request and insisted on his
right to prosecute the cases. This request was again reiterated by
Fiscal Paulete on February 7, 1963, but petitioner again declined it
for the same reason. And on February 8, 1963, Fiscal Paulete, in view
of the order he received from Secretary Liwag, again tried to take over
the cases from petitioner even if the same were already under trial,
but again petitioner refused to yield claiming that he had a right to
prosecute the cases inasmuch as he suffers from no legal
disqualification as already ruled by the justice of the peace court.
This refusal of petitioner prompted Fiscal Paulete to appear at the
trial of the cases which was then in progress during which a discussion
ensued between the two prosecutors. It was on this occasion when the
court decided to postpone the trial once more in order that the
incident may be determined once and for all by the authorities
concerned. The court said: “This Court will not interfere as to who
among the fiscals will appear to prosecute these cases. It is within
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal to decide who will handle these
cases. So we will postpone these cases.” Whereupon, petitioner
interposed the present petition for prohibition.

On the other hand, respondents aver that the events that happened
relative to the prosecution of the cases mentioned and the attempts to
relieve petitioner from handling their prosecution are as follows:

“That on November 29, 1961, two informations signed
by the petitioner were filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Jolo charging Lt. Romeo Reciña, Sgt. Torino and Pfc. Sanugal with less
serious physical injuries and arbitrary detention;

That these charges were dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court on February 6, 1962;

That
on October 2, 1962, Lt. Romeo Reciña, one of the accused addressed a
letter to the respondents complaining that petitioner Salcedo has shown
over enthusiasm and unusual interest in the prosecution of the case
against him;

That on October 16, 1961, the aggrieved party
Sgt. Andres Lopez, wrote a letter to the respondent Provincial Fiscal
asking that the case be handled by the military court;

That
on the same date, October 16, 1961, the PC Provincial Commander of
Sulu, Mamarinta B. Lao addressed a letter to the Provincial Fiscal of
Jolo requesting that the investigation of the Reciña case be stopped in
order to avoid duplication and to allow his command full control of the
investigation as they involved persons subject to military law;

That on October 18, 1962, the letter of complaint of Lt. Reciña was endorsed to petitioner for his comment;

That
on October 24, 1962, Atty. Asclepiades Valbuena sent a wire to
respondent Secretary of Justice requesting that either Fiscal Paulete
or Coscolluela be assigned to prosecute the case against Lt. Reciña;

That
on October 26, 1962, in an information filed by the petitioner, Lt.
Reciña, Sgt. Torino and Pfc. Sanugal were charged again before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Jolo with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority (Criminal Case No. 9582);

That on October
30, 1962, the respondents received telegrams from Gov. Abubakar and
Atty. Valbuena requesting the relief of the petitioner Fiscal Salcedo
from prosecuting the case against Lt. Reciña;

That on October
31, 1962, respondent Agapito Conchu, Chief of the Prosecution Divison,
sent a wire to Fiscal Coscolluela instructing him to take over the case
against Lt. Reciña;

That on November 12, 1962, Fiscal
Coscolluela wired .the respondent Chief Prosecutor Conchu informing
that petitioner Salcedo refused to yield the prosecution of the case of
Reciña until legally disqualified from handling the same;

That
on the same date November 12, 1962, another telegram was sent to Fiscal
Salcedo by respondent Secretary Liwag requesting him to turn over the
Reciña case to Fiscal Coscolluela immediately;

That on
November 17, 1962, Atty. Asclepiades Valbuena of Jolo sent a wire to
respondent Secretary of Justice reiterating request for the relief of
Fiscal Salcedo;

That on November 23, 1962, another wire was
sent to the petitioner Fiscal Salcedo advising him to transfer the
Reciña case to the Department;

That on January 11, 1963,
Congressman Ututalum sent a letter to respondent Secretary of Justice
requesting that the petitioner Salcedo be disqualified from prosecuting
the Reciña case;

That on January 31, 1963, another letter was
sent by Congressman Cesar Fortich to respondent Secretary of Juctice
requesting also for the relief of petitioner Salcedo from the
prosecution of the Reciña case;

That on February 4, 1963,
another telegram was sent to respondent Fiscal Paulete by respondent
Conchu ordering him to have Fiscal Coscolluela handle the Reciña case;

That
on February 6, 1963, another telegram was sent to respondent Paulete
confirming previous wire of respondent Secretary Liwag directing him to
have petitioner Salcedo turn over Reciña case to Fiscal Coscolluela;

That on February 7, 1963, another telegram was sent to respondent Paulete directing him to take over the Reciña case;

That
in view of the repeated refusal of petitioner to turnover the Reciña
case to respondent Paulete, on February 8, 1963, another telegram was
sent to Fiscal Paulete requesting that the postponement of the said
case be asked as the respondent Chief prosecuting Attorney Conchu would
arrive on February 12, 1963;

That pursuant to the Department
of Justice, Administrative Order No. 67 issued on February 9, 1963,
Chief Prosecuting Attorney Conchu went to Jolo to confer with
petitioner Salcedo;

That respondent Conchu told petitioner
Salcedo that it would be better if he would turn over the Reciña case
to respondent Provincial Fiscal Paulete and made it clear to him that
the Secretary of Justice has no intention of relieving him from
prosecuting this case as he would continue assisting the respondent
Paulete in the prosecution panel;

That petitioner Salcedo
finally agreed to turn over the Reciña case to respondent Paulete and
for him to assist the latter in the prosecution of the case and to
handle the cross-examination of the witnesses:

That in spite
of this agreement petitioner still refused to turn over the case to
respondent Paulete and on March 21, 1963 he filed this petition with
this Honorable Court;”

Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) the power of control and
supervision of the Secretary of Justice over a public prosecutor does
not authorize him to interfere with the power and discretion of the
latter in the prosecution of a case pending trial before the court; (2)
the power and discretion of a public prosecutor to investigate and
prosecute a case emanate from Section 1687 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act 1799, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, and not from the power of
control of the Secretary of Justice; (3) the Secretary of Justice
cannot disqualify a public prosecutor from prosecuting a case because
this power belongs to the proper court; and (4) the matter of
disqualification of a public prosecutor must be determined in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 115, in relation to Section 1, Rule
126, of the Rules of Court.

It appears that petitioner was the one assigned by his chief to
investigate the incident involving Sgt. Andres A. Lopez wherein he was
allegedly handcuffed and manhandled while performing guard duty as a
result of which, because of sufficient evidence he gathered, he filed
against Lt. Romeo M. Reciña and companions three informations before
the Justice of the Peace Court of Jolo, province of Sulu. Apparently
these informations were dismissed without the intervention of
petitioner, and so he later refilled them. Then a series of
postponements ensued at the instance of counsel of the accused and in
the process many attempts were made, not only on the part of the
accused, but even on the part of certain provincial and national
officials to have petitioner relieved from the prosecution on the
alleged ground that he has taken an unusual interest in the conviction
of Lt. Reciña because of a supposed rivalry over a woman. He refused
time and again to yield the prosecution of the cases even in defiance
of superior orders claiming that since he has investigated and, taken
action on the incident in question and the cases were already in the
process of trial before the Justice of the Peace Court of Jolo should
be given the power and authority to continue the prosecution to its
final termination unless it be proven that he is disqualified to act by
our Rules of Court (Section 13, Rule 115, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 126). Here he does not suffer from any disqualification as already
found by said justice of the peace when counsel for the accused made an
attempt to do so. And so he considers the orders of respondents
decreeing his relief unauthorized they being an undue encroachment on
the exercise by him of his official and quasi-judicial function
directly interwoven with cases which were entrusted to him to
prosecute. It is his contention that the power of control and
supervision that the Secretary of Justice exercise over a public
prosecutor merely extend to administrative matters and not to those
which pertain to the handling or prosecution of cases already pending
in court. In other words, he contends that once a fiscal has taken
action on a case by filing the necessary information he cannot be
relieved therefrom except for any ground that may constitute a legal
disqualification. To hold otherwise would be to subvert the judicial’
duties of a fiscal to the detriment of public interest.

There is merit in the contention that once a public prosecutor has
been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon
by filing the necessary information in court he is by law in duty bound
to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law
he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is
the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. This
is more so when the attempt to relieve him is motivated by reasons that
are not compatible with sound administration of justice. Apparently,
this is the case obtaining herein. The record shows that, as a result
of the investigation made by petitioner, the latter has filed three
informtions against Lt. Reciña and his companions before the Justice of
the Peace Court of Jolo which for reasons that do not appear clear were
dismissed provisionally but which were later refiled. Then a series of
postponements ensued coupled with persistent attempts to relieve him
from the prosecution. Why such persistent demands for his relief the
record is not bereft of reasons. One apparently is the desire to have
the cases quashed. Another is the desire to have the cases removed to
the military authorities. In fact, there has been an attempt on the
part of the provincial command of the Philippine Constabulary stationed
in Sulu to have the cases tried by a military court on the alleged
ground that if the cases are not quashed there would be duplication of
action against the accused. It likewise appears that several local and
national officials have made representations for the relief of
petitioner, among them Governor Abubakar of Sulu and Congressmen
Ututalum and Fortich. The fact that much political pressure has been
brought to bear upon respondents to secure the relief of petitioner
cannot but create the impression that the purpose of his relief is not
in line with the interest of justice. In this respect, we find
justified the attitude adopted by petitioner regarding his relief.

Of course, respondents contend that the Secretary of Justice merely
acted on the matter pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by law
over fiscals and public prosecutors invoking in his favor the portion
of the law which provides: “It (Department of Justice) shall also have
general supervision and control of the provincial sheriffs and all law
officers of the Government, the provincial and city fiscals or
attorneys and other prosecuting officers.” (Section 83, in relation to
Section 79 [C], Revised Administrative Code), But this power of control
and supervision can only extend to adminstrative matters and not when
it may conflict or encroach on the performance by the fiscal of his
duties in connection with the prosecution of a case investigated and
acted upon by him. To this extent he should be given wide latitude in
order that the best interest of justice may be accomplished. This is
the case of petitioner.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from carrying out their orders of relieving petitioner
from prosecuting the cases herein involved. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.