G.R. No. L-20597. November 29, 1963
LU CHOY FA, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Ong Chui Man, Ong Yu Ling and Ong Chui Cheung filed with the Philippine
Consulate General in Hongkong a sworn application for non-immigrant
passport visa to the Philippines (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, A-3). On
November 15th, the Consul General issued in favor of the applicants
temporary visitors visa No. 171 (Exhibit D).
In accordance with immigration rules and regulations, Ong Tai,
petitioner’s husband and father, respectively, filed a cash bond of
P22,000 in behalf of the petitioners to guarantee their faithful
compliance with the terms and conditions of their admission as
temporary visitors (Exhibit E).
On November 18, 1961, the petitioners arrived and were admitted to
the Philippines as temporary visitors for a period of two months ending
on January 18, 1962. Upon petitioners’ repeated requests, the
respondent extended the period of their temporary stay to February
18th, then to March 15th, again to March 30th, and finally to April 15,
1962.
On December 27, 1961, the court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
XIX) entered a decree holding that Ong Tai, the petitioner’s husband
and father, respectively, has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines and thus
granted his petition (Annex A, petition). From such decree the
Government has appealed (G.R. No. L-19418).
On April 12, 1962, the petitioners tendered to the respondent a
check for P840 covering extension fees allegedly due from them for the
period of April 15, 1962 to December 27, 1963, to enable them to stay
in the Philippines while Ong Tai is awaiting the expiration of two
years from the date of promulgation of the decree granting his
application for admission as a citizen of the Philippines. The
respondent refused to accept payment of the fees because he had
declined to extend the period of their temporary stay after April 15,
1962.
Hence, the instant proceeding was filed in the court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch XIX) by the petitioners to prevent
their arrest, confinement, and deportation and the confiscation of
their cash bond of P22,000 filed in their behalf by Ong Tai (Case No.
50127). As prayed for, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent from arresting, confining and
deporting the petitioners and confiscating said cash bond filed for
them.
After hearing, during which both parties introduced only documentary
evidence in support of their respective claims and defenses, on October
22, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment, holding that, since they
were admitted into the Philippines as temporary visitors for a definite
period of time which had already expired, the petitioners are duty
bound to return to their country of origin; and that there is nothing
to justify the extension of the petitioners’ period of temporary stay
beyond the limit authorized by the respondent.
Upon the foregoing reasons, the trial court denied the petitioners’
prayer for relief and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction
which it had theretofore issued.
On November 7, 1962, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. On November 12, 1962, the lower court denied said
motion; but, upon further motion of the petitioners, it reinstated the
writ of preliminary injunction therefore issued.
The petitioners appealed to this Court.
The appeal is without merit.
We have ruled in a series of decisions (the latest being Kua Suy, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, October 31, 1963) that a
temporary visitor acquires no right to remain in the Philippines beyond
the authorized period, and that upon its expiration the duty of the
Immigration Commissioner to expel them becomes inescapable.
We have also ruled that the fact that the visitor’s husband has been
declared by the Court of First Instance to be qualified for
naturalization does not automatically vest citizenship upon him; that
the change of nationality does not occur until the lapse of the
probationary period and the fulfillment of the conditions prescribed by
law. This being so, a mere naturalization decree can not vest upon the
applicant’s consort and next of kin the right to remain in this country
beyond the time set in the entry visa and by any valid extensions
thereof (Kua Suy, et al., vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).
It follows that no erorr was committed by the court below in holding
that the authorities’ refusal to extend their term of stay terminated
these visitor’s right to remain here. In truth, if the preliminary
induction had not been issued ex parte, and if the
Commissioner had been only given a hearing before the restraining order
was issued, appellants’ lack of on justification for remaining in the
Islands would have become speedily apparent, and their exclusion could
have proceeded without unnecessary delay.
The duty of consorts to live together is irrelevant to the issue in
the case, that concerns only the right of a sovereign state to
determine what aliens can remain within its territory and under what
conditions they can stay therein.
Appellants finally invoke an alleged Cabinet resolution of 29
February 1956, to allow the members of the immediate family of
applicants for naturalization to remain until naturalization is
completed. No evidence of any such policy has been furnished; the text
of the resolution is merely to—
“indorse the request of the above named Chinese” (Go
Siok Hue, Go Soo Lim, and Baby Go) “as well as those of other aliens
similarly situated, to the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs for determination of the question involved, giving them
at the same time, power to act in the matter.”
As may be seen, no universal rule was laid down or contemplated; the
plain import of the preceding resolution was that the two Secretaries
(of Justice and of Foreign Affairs) should act on each individual
request in accordance with law. There being no showing that in the case
of these particular appellants the two Secretaries have granted any
extension beyond April 15, 1962, the Immigration Commissioner’s right
and duty to exclude these aliens from the Islands becomes indubitable.
Moreover, if the purpose of these appellants had been from the
beginning to take up residence until the husband Ong Tai should have
become naturalized, on the theory that the Cabinet resolution of
February 29, 1956 authorized them to do so, then they should have so
stated in their application for entry, instead of solemnly representing
that they would be only temporary visitors. Under the circumstances,
their application for a temporary visitor’s visa appears to be a fraud,
perpetrated on the Immigration authorities of the Republic, that denies
the holders thereof any right to favorable treatment.
We reiterate the following observations made in our decision in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil., 1020; 55 Off. Gaz. 6551, on pp. 6552-6553:
“* * *. It is clear that if an alien gains admission
to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby
secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently,
without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. * * *.
Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage
aliens to enter the Islands on false pretenses; every alien, so
permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to
permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby
compel our government to spend time, money and effort in examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up
permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to
prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came,
contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The dangers
inherent in such a ruling are self-evident.”
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.