REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE DEPORTATION BOARD, THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND THE CHIEF OF SECURITY OFFICER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION, ENGINEER ISLAN…

It appears that, after protracted hearings before the Deportation
Board, on charges properly filed, and after considering the testimony
of witnesses examined and cross-examined before it, in connection with
other evidence, the said Board found as a fact that Vicente Kho, an
alien residing in the Philippines, had willfully and fraudulently
evaded payment of taxes of more than one million pesos; and so, in its
report and recommendation to the President,’ it urged the deportation
of Vicente Kho as an undesirable alien; and in 1957, the President
issued a deportation order; but due apparently to a motion to
reconsider, it was not carried out.

However, when a new President was elected and took possession,
another deportation order was issued on August 22, 1962, and in
compliance therewith, Vicente Kho was taken into custody.

Wherefore, Kho filed in the Manila court of first instance, a petition for habeas corpus
to test the legality of his arrest. During the pendency thereof, he
asked for bail. Such petition having been granted over the objection of
the Solicitor-General, this special civil action was immediately filed
challenging the legality of the order granting bail. At the request of
said officer, we issued an injunction to prevent the deportee’s release
on bail.

The report and recommendation to the President submitted by the
Deportation Board of which the Chairman is now an honored member of
this Court^[1]
consists of eleven pages. It explains in detail how the Government
discovered the tax evasions committed by Vicente Kho, and his failure
to pay over one million pesos in taxes; the long series of
correspondence between him or his agent and the Collector of Internal
Revenue; the steps taken by the Bureau to conduct a reinvestigation at
Kho’s request: the Bureau’s decision that taxes of over one million had
not been paid although overdue; the placing of the matter before the
Fiscal for prosecution; and finally the Government’s decision to
proceed against him for deportation.

It seems that Kho again asked for reconsideration of the second
order of deportation of August 1962, and that upon reference to the
Board, it was denied partly on these grounds:

“This deportation case was begun in 1954; the
record would show how difficult it had been for the Government even at
the beginning even to arrest respondent; after a prolonged litigation,
the Board prepared its report on 14 June, 1957; since then, and
throughout the past administration, nothing was done to implement the
report that recommended respondent’s deportation, many things can be
suspected perhaps unjustly but that fact is a circumstance that can
indicate that respondent in all probability, managed to interfere in
the disposition of his case by the Executive then; finally, the present
Administration took over and the President issued the Deportation Order
dated 20 August, 1962; even at that, respondent was not immediately
arrested; finally he was on 3 September, 1962; but curiously enough,
prior to his arrest, his counsel had already filed motions and motions
for reconsideration; without respondent being produced in the meantime;
on 10 December, 1962, counsel for respondent appeared in the hearing
and argued his points; but an examination of the same would show that
they are repetitions of the points raised before the Old Board, said
arguments being in brief, that respondent had not had a final
assessment because he had protested and there was not final ruling in
his case, but the recommendation quite clearly disposes of this as
shown in pp. 168 et seq adding further to show respondents bad faith:

‘With
regards to the other main contention of Respondent that there is no
evidence to show that he had willfully refused to pay and/or
fraudulently intended to evade the payment of his income tax, this
Board finds, and so holds, that respondent had not only willfully
refused to nay the tax assessed, but had likewise, by his manifested
conduct, fraudulently intended to evade the payment of the same. From
the beginning, right after the seizure of the books of account from his
establishment, respondent had resorted to every means to avoid the
payment of the assessment.'”

In habeas corpus proceedings, to challenge a deportation order
issued by the President upon recommendation of the Board, the real
issue is whether or not due process has been observed. It is undeniable
that charges against Vicente Kho had been filed before the Board; that
hearings were held on said charges wherein he was afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and present
evidence to sustain his defense; that a written recommendation was made
urging his deportation for willful and unlawful evasion of taxes. The
recommendation is before us and upon a cursory reading thereof, we see
no reason for criticism in so far as observance of due process is
concerned.

It seems that the habeas corpus petition was filed upon the belief
of counsel and the allegation of petitioner that the President would
reconsider or suspend the order of deportation. All he could present is
a telegram of the Assistant Executive Secretary in response to a letter
of Kho’s daughter praying for reinvestigation. Said telegram reads as
follows:

“The President wishes me to administer receipt of
your telegram dated September 4 and inform you matter treated therein
will be given due consideration regards.

Sec. Bernal”

This telegram does not mean what Vicente Kho reads into it; namely,
that the President “gave his assent to the request for reconsideration”
or reinvestigation of the order. That telegram was dated September 5,
1962, and up to the hearing of this case in January of this year— even
to this date—no modification of the deportation order has been issued.

When this case was heard, attorney for petitioner stated that the
President had suspended the order of deportation. He was given a period
of time—which was twice extended —to produce such order of suspension.
Now, he finally admits his inability to do so. It seems that when he
made the statement he construed the telegram above-quoted as a promise
of Malacañan to reconsider, and had high hopes of securing such
suspension upon settlement of the tax liabilities of his client. His
hopes, however, have not materialized. Counsel should be reminded that
the defense of a client does not require or authorize the attorney to
state as a fact what he merely expects or hopes to accomplish. He is admonished to be more careful in the future.

As to the contention of Vicente Kho that he has filed with the Court
of Tax Appeals a petition- for revision of the tax assessment, for
non-payment of which he is being banished, it is enough to say that the
assessment was made in 1951 and the revision was asked much too late— only in 1962, i.e., after he had been found liable to deportation.

We have already held that when an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation
Board, the courts of first instance have no power to release such alien
on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it ((Bengzon vs. Ocampo, 84 Phil., 611; Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9700, February 28, 1962).

For the same reason, we must hold that respondent Kho, being held
for deportation upon orders of the President, may not be released on
bail.

The order granting bail must, consequently, be annulled with costs
against the said alien deportee, and the injunction heretofore issued
is made permanent. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

 

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^[1] Mr. Justice Barrera.