MAYOR LUCILO ALKUINO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, ETC. ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Teodoro N. Pepito, et al. filed before the Court of First

Instance of Bukidnon on January 19, 1963 a petition for

quo warranto wherein they disputed the right of Lucilo

Alkuino, et al. to hold the positions of mayor, vice-mayor

and councilors, respectively, of the Municipality of Valencia,

Province of Bukidnon (Civil Case No. 239). Vicente

Cabiling, et al. also filed a similar petition of quo warranto

before the same court on January 13, 1963 questioning

the right of Eusebio Pabualan, et al. to hold the positions

of Mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality

of Dangcagan, Province of Bukidnon (Civil Case (No. 240).

And Benjamin Belisario likewise filed a quo warranto case before the same court on January 2, 1963 questioning the right of Marcelo Ramirez to hold the position

of secretary of the Municipality of Valencia, Province

of Bukidnon (Civil Case No. 243).

The respondents in the three cases above-mentioned

filed their respective answers in due time, and upon agreement of the parties, they were tried jointly. On June

7, 1963, the court a quo, after the reception of the evidence

renders decision upholding the right of petitioners therein to the positions of which they were allegedly deprived

by respondents awarding to them the salaries and emoluments pertinent thereto from the date of their removal

until their reinstatement, with costs against respondents.

On June 10, 1963, copies of the decision were served

both upon petitioners and respondents, thru their counsel.

On the same date, in the afternoon, petitioners filed an

urgent motion for execution setting the hearing thereof

on June 13, 1963. On June 11, 1963, respondents filed

their notice of appeal in the three cases, as well as their

corresponding cash bonds. Because of the appeal they

interposed respondents registered their opposition to the

motion for execution but, notwithstanding said opposition,

the court a quo granted the motion ordering forthwith

the immediate execution of the decision. In its order the

court a quo stated
the special reasons why in its opinion the issuance of the writ was
justified. And considering that the writ of execution was null and void
for the reason that it has been issued after the court had lest
jurisdiction over the case, respondents interposed the present petition
for certiorari.

This Court gave due course to the petition and issued

the preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.

It appears that the decision of the court a quo was rendered on June 7, 1963, copies of which were served upon

the parties on June 10, 1963. It also appears that on

the same date, in the afternoon, petitioners therein, now

respondents, filed an urgent motion for execution setting

the hearing thereof on June 13, 1963. And on June 11,

1963, respondents therein, now petitioners, filed their

notice of appeal in the three cases, together with the corresponding cash bonds. It is now contended that when

the court a quo granted the motion for execution in its

order of July 10, 1963, it no longer had jurisdiction over

the case for the reason that respondents therein, now

petitioners, had already filed their notice of appeal and

cash bonds long before, or on June 11, 1963. In other

words, the theory of respondents, now petitioners, is that

upon the filing of said notice of appeal and bonds, tho appeal is deemed perfected, and consequently, the court has

thereby lost its jurisdiction over the case except to issue

orders for the protection and preservation of the rights

of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated

by the appeal under Section 9, Rule 41, of the Rules of

Court.

There is no merit in this contention: Note that the

urgent motion for execution was filed on June 10, 1963,

when no notice of appeal has as yet been filed on the part

of the losing party. It was only on June 11, 1963. the

next day, when respondents therein, now petitioners,

filed their notice of appeal and cash appeal bonds. They

have even filed on the same date, June 11, 1963, a motion to

postpone the hearing of the motion for execution. From

these facts it is clear that the court a quo could still act

on the motion for execution filed on June 10, 1963 because

it was filed ahead of the notice of appeal and cash bonds

filed by petitioners herein. It cannot be successfully contended that the mere filing of the notice of appeal and

cash bonds has the effect of nullifying the motion for

execution filed one day ahead for that would sanction a

precedent wherein a party to a case, by the mere filing

of the notice of appeal and appeal bond, may deprive

the court of its authority to act upon a motion that has

already been placed within its jurisdiction. As this Court

has aptly said: “To hold that, in the present case, the

mere filing of the notice of appeal, and the filing or deposit

of cash bond with the clerk of court has automatically

deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction over this case,

would be to practically nullify the discretionary power

granted said court by section 2, Rule 39, to order, upon

good reasons, the execution of its judgment before the

expiration of the time to appeal; because in all cases

the judgment debtor may, on the very day the judgment

is rendered or notified to him, file notice of appeal and

deposit of P60.00 as cash bond with the clerk of court.”^[1]

Moreover, in case of cash bond, mere deposit of the

amount of P60.00 with the clerk of court is not sufficient.

Notice of such deposit upon the adverse party is still necessary, as well as its submission to the court for approval,

in order that the adverse party may object to the amount

of the bond and the court may decide whether to approve

the bond, or fix a different amount. ^[2] In other words,

mere filing of the cash bond is not sufficient. It is still

necessary that it be approved by the court. Therefore,

before this is done, the appeal cannot be deemed perfected

so as to deprive the court of its jurisdiction over the case.^[3]

Here, it does not appear that the appeal bonds had

already been approved by the court a quo
when it acted on the motion for execution. The approval of the
requisite appeal bonds by the Justice of the Peace of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, cannot be considered valid it appearing that the judge
presiding the court a quo was not absent

from his district when the alleged approval was stamped

by said justice of the peace.

As to whether there are good reasons justifying the

immediate execution of the decision of the court a quo,

suffice it to quote hereunder what said court says on the

matter:

“In the cases at bar, stronger and more compelling reasons exist

than in the Mabutas versus
Alzate case which involved only the position of a high school
principal, to warrant immediate execution of the judgment. This Court
is aware that since June, 1962 when the respondents were appointed to
their respective positions, a state of confusion ensued in the
municipalities concerned because two sets of municipal officials
claimed to be rightfully entitled to the office and pretended to
discharge its functions. In the municipality of Dangcagan two Chiefs of
Police appointed by the contending Municipal Mayors performed the
duties of the position, and criminal complaints had to be referred on
many occasions to the constabulary before they could be filed in court.
Varied official matters and transactions have been the object of
wrangling and dispute between the two sets of municipal officials in
the above-mentioned municipalities. The controversy in Dangcagan
reached a point wherein the Provincial Commander and the Provincial
Fiscal had to rush there to prevent bloodshed between the warring
factions on the occasion of the transfer of the seat of government from
the town proper of the barrio of Kitaotao last March, 1963. Complaints
from various residents of said municipalities about whom to deal with
in official matters have been brought to the attention of the Court.
Further continuation of the existing state of chaos obtaining in the
above-stated municipalities pending the final disposition of these
cases on appeal will aggravate the injury to the public service which
could not be allowed to pass with unconcern.”

Wherefore, petition is denied. The writ of injunction

issued by this Court is hereby dissolved. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal J.J., concur.

 

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^[1] PRISCO, et., al. vs. Castelo, et. al., 48 O.G. 2193, 2195.

^[2] PRISCO, et., al. vs. Castelo, et. al. supra.

^[3] Espartero, et., al. vs. Hon. Juan Ladaw, et., al. G.R. No. L-5181, February 24, 1953.